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ABSTRACT 
This project asks: whom do representatives seek to represent and how do they do 
it? Specifically, I seek to understand how marginalized state legislators define the 
concept of “constituency” and the implications for their legislative behavior. I argue that 
marginalization affects legislators through two avenues: socially through their identity, 
and institutionally through the proportion their identity group holds in the state 
legislature. I argue that when legislators are marginalized their awareness of identity and 
identity-based issue needs are prioritized and they will come to define group members as 
a salient identity constituency. Furthermore, they will seek to represent this salient 
identity constituency through legislative behavior because of a moral obligation to group 
members. Such a perception of constituency has implications for their hill and home style 
legislative behavior and affects their legislative preferences as well as their constituency 
activities at “home”. I argue that their conceptualization of home extends beyond 
traditional definitions that tend to be restricted to the geographical boundaries of the 
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district, to include women and minorities more broadly. I also show that representing 
both their district and a salient identity constituency results in additive pressures on their 
legislative activities. I examine the implications of the salient identity constituency theory 
through their legislative activities with constituents, their workload, and their committee 
memberships. Methodologically, I employ a multi-methods approach using three 
different data sources. The data come from face-to-face interviews with state legislators, 
an original survey of state legislators, and an aggregate data set of state legislators’ 
committee assignments from 14 states for three time points. 
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Chapter 1: Studying Identity-Based Representation in US State 
Legislatures 
A young bright-eyed first term legislator is ready to take on her work in the 
legislature. She’s an African American woman who fought a tough battle on the 
campaign trail but won by appealing to her genuine care for “community” and skills at 
coalition building. She arrives in the legislature on her first day, walks in to the chamber 
and quickly realizes she can easily count the few women and African Americans in the 
room; more so, all the women are white, and all the African Americans are men. No one 
else looks like her. In that moment she is reminded of how far we have come, that she, an 
African American woman, is now part of the decision making power in the same country 
that wouldn’t allow her parents to cast a ballot. In that moment she recognizes her 
responsibility to represent not only the district that elected her, but also the people she 
identifies with, the African American community broadly speaking. She also recognizes 
that given the few number of other women in the legislature, she must also be a voice for 
women in the state, she knows that there are certain issues men just don’t bring to the 
table. She is overwhelmed by the responsibility to represent several constituencies, but 
she is especially determined, being motivated by a sense of moral obligation to minorities 
and women who for too long have been inadequately represented in her state. The 
recognition that this responsibility rests with her and few others fuels her motivation and 
her drive to be an effective representative, not only for her district, but also for women 
and minorities everywhere. 
This is not an uncommon story for many of the recently elected representatives 
who are women and/or people of color. In a featured story for their “Divided America” 
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series, the Associated Press reported on the struggles for token legislators, who are the 
only or one of only a few legislators from their identity group. They told the story of 
Alfonso Lopez, Virginia’s only Latino state legislator, and noted his persistence in 
pushing for Latino friendly legislation. Repeatedly, his proposed measure would die in 
committee, but he persisted in pushing the same legislation. Lopez argued, “If we had a 
more diverse (legislature) and more Latinos in the House of Delegates…I don’t think it 
would be as difficult” (quoted in Lieb 2016). Similarly, Senator Margaret Rose Henry, 
who is the only black senator for Delaware, said “if there were more black elected 
officials, we would have a better chance to get something done” (quoted in Lieb 2016). 
Henry and Lopez’s statements highlight two lines of arguments about minority 
representation: that minorities will seek to push legislation on behalf of their identity 
group, and that being a token legislator, that is being the only legislator, or one of very 
few, of an identity group, increases their burden of doing so.       
In the 2010 Census, the non-Hispanic white population comprised 69.10% of the 
country’s 308 million inhabitants, yet, in 2015, nearly nine in every ten state legislators 
were white. Adding the consideration of gender in this calculation, with approximately 
51% of the population female, nearly seven in ten legislators are white men. Though we 
have seen an increase in the number of women and minorities as state elected officials, 
and especially minority women, the numbers are nowhere near proportional to the rest of 
the population (Center for American Women and Politics 2016; Hardy-Fanta et al. 2016). 
When presented with these data, two lines of questioning become apparent, first what is 
the impact of marginalization on legislators’ behavior, and secondly, how are our theories 
of legislative behavior impacted by the introduction of minority and women legislators? 
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The first question leads us to consider not only how race, ethnicity, and gender impact 
behavior, but also forces us to think about the context in which state legislators are 
operating. How does being so heavily out-numbered in a decision-making context impact 
behavior? What does it mean to be the only, or one of a few, state legislators of a certain 
identity? The second question forces us as academics to consider how many of our 
theories of legislative behavior have largely assessed the behavior of white men. 
Considering the behavior of marginalized legislators forces us to think outside the box of 
mainstream theories to examine legislative behavior. It pushes us to re-examine some of 
our fundamental assumptions about legislators and legislative behavior. The goal of this 
dissertation is to examine how marginalized legislators perceive of representation, and 
how they act upon it through their legislative behavior. I argue that being a marginalized 
legislator, through their identity and/or their group proportion in the legislature, affects a 
legislator’s policy priorities, their perceptions of constituency, and ultimately their 
legislative behavior in achieving representation.  
Table 1.1 State Legislators by Race, Ethnicity and Gender, 2015    
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent Total: 
white men 3,612 66.43%  white women 1,071 19.70% 86.13% 
black men 292 5.37%  black women 183 3.37% 8.74% 
Latino males 135 2.48%  Latinas 70 1.29% 3.77% 
Asian Am. men 32 0.59%  Asian Am. women 24 0.44% 1.03% 
Am. Indian men 3 0.60%  Am. Indian women 10 0.18% 0.78% 
Multirace men 5 0.90%  Multirace women 0 0.00% 0.90% 
Total: 76.37%  Total:    24.98%  
        
 4,079 1,358         5,437  
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Table 1.2 Population by Race, Ethnicity, 2010 
  Percent 
Whites 63.70% 
black or African American 12.60% 
Hispanic/Latino 16.30% 
Asian American 4.80% 
American Indian 0.90% 
Two or more races 2.90% 
 101.20%1 
   
Theories of legislator behavior argue that “to understand members’ behavior we 
must understand their ambition” (Herrick and Moore 1993, 765).  In other words, to 
understand legislators’ behavior is to understand their goals. Fenno (1978) provides a 
nuanced picture of congressional member goals that extends beyond Mayhew’s classic 
statement that the singular goal of legislators is re-election (Mayhew, 1974). Fenno’s 
work on members of Congress in their districts suggests that legislators have three goals: 
generate good policy, professional ambition, and prestige (Fenno, 1973;1977; 1978).  For 
Fenno (1973, 1978) and Mayhew (1974), legislative behavior was about re-election, and 
the representation of those individuals who were empowered to ensure their re-election 
(their district constituency). When Fenno and Mayhew wrote their landmark pieces, most 
of the legislatures in the United States were predominantly white and male. Their 
observations of legislative behavior were inherently portraying white male legislative 
behavior. As scholars of legislative behavior we must acknowledge the possibility that 
these assumptions are outdated as more and more legislators with diverse backgrounds 
are elected. Indeed, even Fenno himself, expanded some of his assumptions in Going 
Home: Black Representatives and Their Constituents (2003), as he recognized that 
African American members of Congress may seek to represent their group members in a 
                                                 
1 percentage points may not add up 100 because Latino/Hispanic was not considered a race in 2010 census, 
thus percentage points for whites is for "white alone" 
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“national constituency of African Americans” (Fenno 2003). I argue that legislators with 
diverse backgrounds, such as women and minorities, have additional goals in 
championing women and minority issues because as token representatives they feel 
obligated to do so.  
Contemporary research has found that minority women have been getting elected 
at higher rates than white women (C. E. Bejarano 2013; Scola 2014; Smooth 2010, 2014), 
but we know much less about these legislators once they are elected. In her comparison 
of election rates of white and non-white female state legislators, Scola proposes that there 
are geographical as well as institutional factors at play affecting minority women’s higher 
chances of winning state legislative office, though she admits the results are better at 
indicating reasons why white women do not get elected rather than why minority women 
do (Scola 2014, see also Bejarano 2013). Fraga et al. suggest while minority women may 
experience double marginalization, they may also have an advantage over white women 
through a concept they refer to as “strategic intersectionality” (Fraga et al. 2006, 2007). 
In their study of Latina state legislators, they find that minority women are able to use 
their multi-faceted identity to build coalitions and to generate a more fluid policy agenda. 
In other words, their multiple identities provided them with multiple options for 
legislative constituency building and policy responsiveness.  However, Marin Hellwege 
and Sierra (2016) urge caution in reading strategic intersectionality as an “advantage”, as 
it is only an advantage over white women and minority males, thus minority women are 
still electorally disadvantaged in comparison to white males (Marin Hellwege and Sierra 
2016). They further point out that the electoral advantage minority women may receive 
exists predominantly in the electoral context, and they indicate that Latina women may 
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still be disadvantaged vis-à-vis white males in the legislature (Marin Hellwege and Sierra 
2016). 
Descriptive representation, particularly through salient identity constituencies, 
may be an important intrinsic motivator for a marginalized legislator, whereas according 
to Fenno, representatives seek to generate good policy primarily for instrumental, self-
interested reasons (Broockman 2013, 2014; Mansbridge 1999, 2003). This puzzle should 
not be seen as an either-or situation, but rather the effect is an additive one. I argue that 
while all legislators have instrumental goals, minority and women legislators, particularly 
those who are especially marginalized in their legislatures, are likely to feel a sense of a 
moral obligation to represent their identity group’s interests. The assumption of a moral 
obligation is founded in three reasons. First, the sense of moral obligation is tied to a 
large literature showing that marginalized groups have a sense of group consciousness or 
belongingness with group members (Dawson 1994; Henderson-King and Stewart 1994; 
Masuoka 2006; Gabriel R Sanchez 2006). Secondly, as I will show I expect identity-
based representation to extend beyond the district, which means that those constituents 
cannot hold the legislator accountable through a vote, leading scholars to argue that the 
provision of representation to these groups is based in an intrinsic motivation 
(Broockman 2013; S. J. Carroll 2002a; Htun 2014; Mansbridge 2003). Finally, I use the 
term “moral obligation” because borrow the language from Mansbridge (2003), who 
detailed the theory on extra-district representation. The implication of generating good 
policy for both instrumental and intrinsic/altruistic motivations is that legislative behavior 
may change as the target, or scope of representation shifts. In other words, the type of 
policy that a legislator chooses to engage with may reflect different needs depending on 
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whether the representative is focusing on the personal pursuit of being re-elected (district 
targeted legislation), or on providing substantive representation for a descriptive 
constituency (driven by a salient identity) (Broockman 2013). I expect that these additive 
pressures result in legislative behavior that is different from that of white males; in other 
words, there is an additional responsibility related to representing a second constituency. 
Scholars have found that women tend to have a different leadership style than 
men. This literature has found that men and women tend to approach politics differently, 
and that women are more likely than men to self-describe themselves as hard working, 
better at achieving consensus as opposed to conflict, more likely to avoid the limelight in 
order to get the job done, likely to work more transparently, and to be more persuasive 
(Hardy-Fanta et al. 2016; Reingold 2000; C. S. Rosenthal 2001; Thomas 1994). Though 
the literature on women legislators, and popular media, often reference women’s 
differing leadership style, there is little quantitative evidence showing such a correlation 
exists(but see Hardy-Fanta et al. 2016; Kathlene 1994; Reingold 1996, 2000; Thomas 
1994). From qualitative empirical work, as well as journalistic interviews with female 
leaders, offering anecdotal evidence, there is reason to support these findings. The most 
relevant quantitative study of women’s leadership style is Sue Thomas’ How Women 
Legislate (1994) which presents evidence from a survey of state legislators that men and 
women differ in their attitudes about women in leadership positions. Thomas conducts 
interviews with women state representatives in six states (California, Georgia, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Washington). She asks about procedural 
change, and specifically asks women to predict what the legislative process would look 
like with more women. She states “women’s alternative conceptions of power translate 
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into concrete changes in the way they envision getting legislative business done” 
(Thomas 1994, 110). I suggest that women’s, as well as minorities’, legislative style 
comes as a response to attempting to represent multiple constituencies, both a district 
constituency and a salient identity constituency that extends beyond the district. 
Representing multiple constituencies with limited resources, suggests that women’s and 
minorities’ behavior should be significantly different than white men, particularly in 
terms of the issues they prioritize, the amount of work they do, and the amount of 
constituency service they do.  
The saying that women must work twice as hard for half the credit has become 
cliché, a catchphrase for the feminist movement based on the assertive quote by Ottawa’s 
first female mayor, Charlotte Whitton (Delacourt, 2011). While the phrase has been over-
used and tired, many women professionals still stand by the quote and indeed suggest that 
this holds true for women generally still in 2015. Although it is challenging to 
disentangle precisely why women “must work twice as hard”, there is evidence from both 
the face-to-face interviews and the survey data to suggest that this is the case. In an 
interview conducted in 2014 one minority female legislator remarked that: “I’m kind of a 
workaholic…I find myself that I love to work for our community. From the moment I 
wake up until the moment I sleep, I think about how to make our community better, not 
only on the state level, but even locally”. At the 2015 Legislative Summit during the 
Women’s Legislative Network 30 Year Anniversary Luncheon the (all-white female) 
panel was asked about mentorship and leadership as a woman in the legislature. One of 
the panelists, who holds the position of House Majority Leader, said that the road to 
leadership had been challenging, particularly because of the lack of mentorship. She 
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stated: “It has not been easy to get to the number two spot; especially as a woman, since 
[the legislature] is mostly run by men.” She then followed up with, “sometimes I feel I 
work three times as hard”. The Majority Leader made this statement unprovoked and 
without a leading or even related question, offering the statement as a spontaneous 
reflection on her experience in the legislature. As she made this remark, there was a clear 
murmur of agreement in the audience.  
When asked about constituency service beyond her district, a Haitian American 
representative said “word gets out…I have Haitian Americans from all around the state 
call my office because we have someone who strictly speaks creole. So I’ve had many 
people call my office. Sometimes that culture competence component is needed” 
(personal communication, August 20, 2014). The answer to why constituency service 
might be different from speaking on the floor or developing legislation became evident in 
my discussion with a minority female representative from the Midwest. I had asked her if 
she thought she might represent issues of minority communities better than other 
legislators; the conversation turned to a discussion regarding policy development and 
strategic legislative behavior. The legislator responded: 
Not necessarily…sometimes I find, whether it’s women’s issues 
or issues that are traditionally brought forward by people of 
color, I would rather have my [white] colleague run the racial 
profiling bill because then it’s not [me] who’s [the] only [one] to 
ever, always, bringing up that issue. Sometimes I think, people 
just shut their ears… 
Minority woman, August, 18, 2014 
This is a very important caveat to understanding differences in legislative 
behaviors, and also to understanding the need for different strategic behaviors, 
10 
 
particularly in different contexts. The legislator is arguing here that while she might be 
more prone to prioritize issues of race/ethnicity or gender, doing so too frequently might 
cause her to be further marginalized and ostracized by other legislators in her chamber.  
It is evident that while many strides have been made to lessen the political 
exclusion of minorities and women in legislative office, their continued marginalization 
poses several challenges in office. Katrina Shealy, the only woman in South Carolina’s 
Senate, said in an interview with the Free Times, it’s “hard to be a woman and be in 
political office” (quoted in Trainor 2016), and as Lieb (2016) notes “again and again, 
minority legislators in other states told the [Associated Press] that their priorities have 
been stymied partly due to a lack of others like them” (Lieb 2016). Being a minority or 
woman legislator in a context of social and institutional marginalization results in 
additional pressures, albeit intrinsic— from a sense of moral obligation, to represent a 
population that has been marginalized and under-represented. Thus, for a sub-set of 
legislators, this culminates in a view of constituency that is more expansive, and 
legislative behavior that is more extensive, than conventional wisdom has suggested.   
  Chapter Overview 
Chapter 2, “Marginalization and Implications for Legislative Behavior”, discusses 
the proposed theory of representation and legislative behavior for marginalized 
legislators. The theory argues that marginalization, through both social and institutional 
means, affects legislators’ preferences and priorities, their perceptions of constituency 
and ultimately their legislative behavior. Centuries-long marginalization along the lines 
of race, ethnicity and gender in the social context has impacted the preferences and 
behaviors of individuals who identity with these groups (Garcia 1986; Masuoka and Junn 
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2013). I expect that those legislators who are marginalized in the legislature, through a 
low group proportion, will be more acutely aware of their identity and thus be 
increasingly likely to prioritize the preferences of the identity group. I expect that 
legislators then come to perceive their identity group members as a salient identity 
constituency that is to be represented. I then argue that these preferences not only lead to 
substantive outcomes on the hill as legislators find opportunities to move forward 
legislation on behalf of the identity group, but also that legislators will expand their views 
of representation at “home” to represent their salient identity constituencies even when 
part of that constituency is beyond their district’s borders.  
Chapter 3, “A New View of “Home”: Perceiving of Identity Based 
Constituencies”, is the first chapter to test the implications of the salient identity 
constituency theory. It is an attempt to inform the causality of marginalized state 
legislators’ behavior. This chapter asks how do marginalized legislators perceive of their 
constituency and how do they build their constituency? This chapter empirically tests the 
concept of salient identity constituencies. This chapter relies on face-to-face interviews 
with state legislators conducted over two one-week periods of observation in 2014 and 
2015 at the Legislative Summits of the National Conference of State Legislatures. I find 
that marginalized legislators, especially those who are more heavily outnumbered in their 
legislature, perceive of identity-group members as a constituency, and that this 
constituency is not defined by geography. 
The first quantitative chapter is Chapter 4, “Going the Extra Mile: Surrogate 
Activities of State Legislators”, this chapter examines how state legislators engage in 
activities to represent their salient identity constituencies. This chapter tests if the 
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behaviors marginalized legislators engage in are consistent with their perception of a 
salient identity constituency. I consider how representing both an electoral district and a 
salient identity constituency might produce additive pressure and with it a heavier 
workload. I also ask if representing a constituency that is not defined by geography leads 
legislators to engage in representation outside the district, through what is known as 
surrogate representation. Chapter 4 uses survey data from an original survey conducted in 
2015 of legislators from 48 states.  I test several hypotheses based on the implications of 
the salient identity constituency theory: 
Hypothesis 4.1 Socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will meet with 
identity-based groups, both in general, and outside the district, more frequently 
than legislators who are not marginalized 
Hypothesis 4.2 Socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will meet with 
a larger number of types of groups, both in general, and outside the district, than 
legislators who are not marginalized 
Hypothesis 4.3 Socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will work more 
than legislators who are not marginalized.  
Hypothesis 4.4 Socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will provide 
constituency service on behalf of an extra-district constituency more frequently 
than legislators who are not marginalized. 
In Chapter 5, “Additive Pressures of Marginalization and the Effects on 
Committee Membership”, I focus on the impact of salient identity constituencies on hill 
style activities, that is, activities in the legislature. In particular I examine how 
marginalized legislators represent their identity-based constituencies’ preferences through 
their committee membership. This chapter seeks to answer the question of what types of 
committees that state legislators sit on. For this chapter I rely on comprehensive data of 
state legislators’ committee assignments for 13 different states for the years 1998, 2004, 
and 2010. I conduct quantitative analysis on the proportion of membership of one 
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committee type to all others for five different committee types. To do so I rely on a 
coding scheme of state legislative committees proposed by Sanchez and Marin Hellwege, 
2014. This chapter tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5.1: Marginalized legislators sit on a proportionally equal number of 
control and workhorse committees as non-marginalized legislators (white men and 
dominant group members)  
Hypothesis 5.2: Marginalized legislators are more likely to be members of 
caretaker committees than legislators who are not marginalized  
Hypothesis 5.3:  Marginalized legislators sit on a proportionally fewer number of 
private and public committees than non-marginalized legislators (white men and 
dominant group members)  
Chapter 6 will provide an overview of the findings of all chapters and discuss the 
contributions to the literature. Importantly, this chapter will also provide a discussion of 
future projections and implications for future research.  
  
14 
 
Chapter 2: Conceptualizing Constituency and its Effect on Legislative 
Behavior 
Representation is fundamental to the study of American politics as it informs our 
understanding of how well our democracy performs. In the U.S. electoral system, each 
member of the United States Congress represents a single geographically defined district 
(Fenno 1978). Though there is some degree of variation in U.S. state legislatures, by and 
large each state representative also represents a single geographically defined district 
(Smith 2003).2  The logic of the single-member representative system is such that each 
member of the legislature is tasked with representing the geographical district, or 
constituency. This system vastly improves the efficiency of democratic governance in 
comparison to the direct democracy first experimented within ancient Greece (Rehfeld 
2005). A representative form of democracy where elected officials represent some 
defined group provides a more efficient system of democratic governance. This is easy to 
see considering the complexity of our government and the size of our population; it 
would be near impossible for people to have the time and resources to vote on every 
issue. However, the electoral rules of how such representation is defined, by geography 
or through some other means, has important implications for how representation is 
provided and who is represented. A system of representation naturally begs several 
questions regarding who the representatives are, and who they ought to be, and also who 
they represent. 
                                                 
2 The variation in state legislatures affects the number of representatives who might share a geographically 
defined district, for example in New Hampshire, multiple representatives may represent the same district. 
However, in no case does a single representative represent more than one geographically defined district. 
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Given the multiple social cleavages in the United States, scholars have questioned 
the notion that representatives are, or should be, solely bound to act as delegates for their 
districts (Rehfeld 2005). A large body of literature has examined how U.S. legislative 
behavior is shaped by individual characteristics, such as race and ethnicity (Casellas 
2009, 2010; Fenno 2003; Haynie 2001; Minta 2011; Whitby 1997), gender (Cammisa and 
Reingold 2004; S. J. Carroll 2002b; Kanthak and Krause 2012; Osborn 2012; C. S. 
Rosenthal 2001, 2002; Swers 2002, 2005, 2013; Sue Thomas and Welch 1991), class, 
(Carnes 2012), and sexual orientation (Haider-Markel 2007a; Herrick 2009) to name a 
few. While many have argued that minority and female legislators in both Congress and 
state legislatures often act on behalf of members of their identity group, in what Pitkin 
(1967) refers to as substantive representation (Dovi 2002; Minta 2009, 2012a; Swers 
2002, 2005, 2013) few have systematically studied this behavior under the context of 
“constituency” (but see Carroll 2002; Fenno 2003; Htun 2014). Here I seek to gain a 
deeper understanding of the motivations for legislative behavior to establish a more 
systematic study of representation of what I will refer to as extra-district constituencies. I 
argue that minority legislators have an additional incentive, perhaps because of a feeling 
of a moral obligation, to represent members of their identity group, particularly if those 
groups have been socially marginalized as racial and ethnic minority groups and women 
have been in the United States. Therefore, the question I seek to answer is whether or not 
legislators perceive of “constituency” in ways other than the traditional geographically 
defined district. Do marginalized legislators perceive of “surrogate” constituencies that 
are not defined by geography, but rather by shared identity group membership? It is clear 
that representatives must pander to the needs of their electoral district constituency 
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because of electoral incentives. However, I argue, that under conditions of social and/or 
institutional marginalization, representatives will also perceive, and represent, identity 
constituencies. 
 A Theoretical model of Surrogate Representation and Legislative Behavior 
I propose a model of individual legislative behavior whereby surrogate legislative 
behavior is motivated by heightened identity saliency, which in turn is caused by 
marginalization through social status and/or, institutional weakness in terms of low group 
proportions. I contend legislators’ social identity, especially their minority status, and 
their institutional strength, defined as group proportion, help to shape individual 
legislative behavior. I assume legislators are rational actors. However, in contrast to 
many rational choice institutionalists, I propose that goals are also contingent upon 
context and may reflect group interests rather than simply narrow self-interest or 
instrumental goals of reelection. Legislators who operate in institutionally marginalized 
contexts are likely to feel an additional obligation to focus their representational efforts 
on their identity group, both inside and outside their districts. Importantly, this stems 
from legislators’ position of power; by virtue of their office, legislators are empowered to 
affect actual change. I argue that for marginalized legislators, who identity not only with 
their geographic constituency but also with a broader identity group, representational 
efforts will embrace serving both the district constituency’s goals, and the goals of their 
salient identity constituency.  
Figure 2.1 is a visual representation of the theoretical model. It depicts two 
separate avenues for marginalization: social position and institutional context. Social 
marginalization is caused by a minority social position, such as gender, race/ethnicity, or 
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both.3 The United States has a clear de facto social hierarchy allowing Caucasians 
(whites) and males a certain degree of privilege in society (Masuoka and Junn 2013). 
Consequently, individuals and groups can be marginalized along one or multiple lines of 
social stratification, known as intersectionality. As I explain in section 2.3, within the 
parameters of race/ethnicity and gender, white males can be considered the most 
privileged, while minority women, who are marginalized along both lines, are the most 
marginalized. In section 2.4, I explain that in addition to social position, the institutional 
position, or group proportion, can also lead to a sense of marginalization. Kanter (1977) 
showed that women, whose institutional position was very small in comparison to the 
proportion of men in the organization, exhibited different behaviors from women whose 
position was more balanced. I argue that for legislators, institutional position is an 
additional avenue to marginalization.  
Figure 2.1 shows marginalization, through both social and institutional means, 
can lead to both a raised identity salience (see section 2.5) and relatedly, an increased 
interest in identity policy preferences (see section 2.6). Under the condition of social 
marginalization, identity salience is raised through socialization in a system that 
politicizes race and gender (Garcia 1986, 2012; Mansbridge 1999; Masuoka and Junn 
2013). Relatedly, through institutional marginalization, identity salience is raised because 
of an awareness of the unbalanced proportions of groups within the institution (Kanter 
1977; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 1998b). This is akin to being a woman and walking in to 
a room full of men - while you might not have thought much about your identity as a 
                                                 
3 Marginalization can be caused by multiple lines of social position including not only gender and 
race/ethnicity, but also age, class, disability, immigration status, language, religion, region, and sexual 
preference, etc. Here I focus on what are arguably the two most salient identities- gender and race/ethnicity.  
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woman beforehand, your sense of gender identity is heightened in the context of being in 
a crowd that is dominated by men. Not only is the awareness of one’s own identity 
heightened, but also the marginalized position of the identity group and its members is 
heightened as well (McGuire and Padawer-Singer 1976; Sierra Leonard, Mehra, and 
Katerberg 2008). Similarly, when social and institutional marginalization exists, and 
when identity salience is high, there is an increased likelihood policy preferences and 
concerns related to identity will be prioritized. Again, consider being the only woman in a 
crowd of men; under these conditions one may prioritize women’s issues more than 
under conditions where there is a greater sense of gender parity. Gender and race/ethnic 
identity are likely to shape preferences, but prioritization of identity-based preferences is 
likely to be enhanced, when there is also institutional marginalization (Crowley 2004; 
Kanter 1977; McGuire and Padawer-Singer 1976; Sierra Leonard, Mehra, and Katerberg 
2008). Under unbalanced conditions, the burden is on the minority to raise issues the 
dominant group might not otherwise consider. For example, Mansbridge (1999) suggests 
an increase in minority representation can lead to more diversity in deliberations. I argue 
such a prioritization of minority issues may also be caused by a feeling of obligation by 
marginalized individuals to raise those issues because otherwise no one else can, or will. 
This leads to greater salience of minority related issues resulting in increased legislative 
emphasis on group issues both inside and outside the district.  While we can empirically 
assess social position and institutional position through (relatively) visual identifiers and 
counting of proportions, identity salience and preferences are individual and internal 
processes. In this dissertation I use social status, whether or not a legislator is a member 
of a traditional minority group (race, gender or their intersectionality), along with 
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institutional marginalization, defined as low group proportions in the legislature of the 
same minority group to examine if and when marginalized legislators differ from 
majority group members in their legislative behavior. 
The last section of the model describes the behavioral implications of having a 
raised identity salience and an increased interest in identity policy preferences. The 
behavioral implications are divided into two different sets of behavior- “hill” behavior 
and “home” behavior. Hill activities are individual activities that involve engagement 
with the collective legislature; they are in essence activities legislators engage in while at 
the capitol. Further, the goals and outcomes of these activities generally have an impact 
on the entire state. Hill activities include roll call voting, bill sponsorship, and committee 
membership (Fenno 1978; Smith 2003). Legislators’ “home style” refers to the behaviors 
and activities legislators engage in while in their  “home” district (Fenno 1978). These 
activities incorporate “constituency service”, including responding to citizen requests, 
attending rallies and events, and meeting with groups (Fenno 1978; Smith 2003).  
I argue that both hill and home behaviors are affected by a raised identity salience 
and an increased interest in identity policy preferences. Hill behavior will display an 
increased effort and prioritization of identity policies, in particular, on how committee 
memberships are affected. In terms of “home” style, I suggest the concept of constituency 
will be affected in such a way that legislators who are marginalized will seek to represent 
identity-based constituencies in addition to their “home” or district based constituency. In 
other words, marginalized legislators are likely to engage in representation and 
constituency services, of individuals who do not necessarily live in their district, in what 
is known as surrogate representation (S. J. Carroll 2002b; Mansbridge 2003). For 
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example, we might expect an African American legislator to write bills, such as one 
promoting affirmative action, which specifically target minority groups, or they might 
serve as a panelist for a NAACP meeting held anywhere in the state. 
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Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model of Surrogate Representation 
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 Marginalization through Social Position 
The United States has a history of marginalization of women and minorities 
through both institutional and social systems (Dawson 1994, 2001; Duerst-Lahti and 
Kelly 1995; Duerst-Lahti 2002; Githens and Prestage 1977). Cornell (1985) argues 
circumstance affects the salience and endurance of collective identities. Group members’ 
shared culture and shared interests will become more salient when they exist within the 
same institutional system or circumstances (Cornell 1996). The shared experience of 
political marginalization, such as political disenfranchisement, has been suggested as a 
strong motivator in constructing a sense of group belonging as part of an identity group 
(Garcia 1986, 2012). 
The political exclusion of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States is 
extensive.  Minority groups in the United States have been excluded from citizenship on 
the basis of race (African Americans and Native Americans) and ethnicity (Chinese and 
Japanese Americans), both de jure (until the 15th Amendment) and de facto (under Jim 
Crow laws) disenfranchisement, legal and social discrimination (slavery, in its worst 
form), and extensive inequality (including poverty, education, and health outcomes).  
There are several racial and ethnic groups in the United States, each of which have 
endured marginalization collectively in comparison to a privileged majority, but also 
specific discrimination targeted at its particular group and its members. The two largest 
racial/ethnic based identity groups in the United States today are African Americans, who 
comprise approximately 12% of the population (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011) and 
Latinos, who have succeeded African Americans as the largest minority group and now 
comprise approximately 16% of the population (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011). 
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African Americans are arguably the most cohesive identity group in the United States, 
and indeed this group has experienced the most direct and consistent discrimination on 
the basis of race. Many scholars attribute the strong cohesiveness of African Americans 
predominantly to a legacy of slavery; the legacy of slavery has also acted as a catalyst for 
continued unequal treatment and relatively poor sociopolitical outcomes, which may also 
help to increase black cohesiveness (Barker, Jones, and Tate 1999; Dawson 1994, 2001; 
Haynie 2001).   
Though other racial and ethnically based identity groups have not experienced the 
same high degree of cohesion as African Americans, scholars have shown that several 
groups, such as Latinos/Hispanics, Asian-Americans, Native-Americans, and Arab-
Americans do hold some sense of identity due to group membership (Barreto, Masuoka, 
and Sanchez 2008; Hertzberg 1971; Horse (Kiowa) 2005; Masuoka 2006; G. R. Sanchez 
and Masuoka 2010; G. R. Sanchez 2006). Similar to African Americans, members of 
these identity groups have also experienced political marginalization in direct response to 
their race/ethnicity (Masuoka and Junn 2013). Masuoka and Junn (2013) show how these 
groups have been marginalized through the use of legal actions, such as immigration laws 
to prevent the influx of Asian Americans and Latin Americans in particular. Native 
Americans (American Indians) have also been relegated to a marginalized position 
through the special relationships created between the United States and American Indian 
tribes whose members were not given full U.S. citizenship until 1924 (Hertzberg 1971). 
In several cases, particularly in the American South, members of minority groups were 
excluded from the political system through legal disenfranchisement until the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 and its extensions, particularly to language minorities, in 1975, 1982, 
24 
 
and 2006 (Barker, Jones, and Tate 1999; Garcia 1986, 2012; Haynie 2001; McCool, 
Olson, and Robinson 2002). Garcia (1986, 2012) argues that extensive legal and political 
exclusion, disenfranchisement in particular, has led to the saliency of identity group 
membership. Public opinion survey data provides further evidence for these theoretical 
assessments. Masuoka (2006) shows that for both Asian- Americans and Latinos, having 
experienced discrimination is a primary factor in holding a sense of pan-ethnic identity.   
In terms of gender, scholars have shown that children come to acquire an 
awareness of gender and sex role differences as early as age two (Weinraub et al. 1984). 
Indeed, “sex-role identity is thought to be one of the most powerful determinants of 
human behavior” (Simrell King 1995). Although studies have shown that women tend to 
hold lower levels of group consciousness than other groups, such as African Americans, 
studies show women persistently identify women as one of their primary group 
characteristics (Gurin and Townsend 1986; Gurin 1985; Henderson-King and Stewart 
1994; Miller et al. 1981). Women, as a group, have a long history of political 
marginalization, just as the racial and ethnic groups discussed in the previous paragraphs. 
Traditionally, a woman’s sphere was expected to remain around the family and the home 
(DuBois 1998). Women were disenfranchised from full political participation until the 
19th Amendment passed in 1920, but even beyond its passage women’s participation 
faltered behind men’s (DuBois 1998; Orum et al. 1974). By the 1960’s women were 
turning out to vote at the same rate as men and since the late 1960’s women have 
consistently turned out at higher rates than men, and the gap continues to widen (Center 
for American Women and Politics 2012). Even so, women’s underrepresentation in 
elected office persists. In the Unites States in 2016, women make up only 19.4% of the 
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U.S. Congress and 24.6% in state legislatures (with significant variation across states) 
(Center for American Women and Politics 2016). Fox and Lawless (2010) show a 
primary cause is linked to women’s ambition, as women are less likely to run for elected 
office (Fox and Lawless 2010). In terms of women’s policy representation, the United 
States falls behind in comparison to many other countries in providing equal rights to 
women, access to abortions, equal pay, protections from sexual and domestic violence, 
and family leave (Ravitz 2015). 
For minority women, the sense of salient identity becomes particularly heightened 
because of their dual marginalization in society. The intersectionality of identities, which 
ultimately culminates in a third distinct identity, is likely to lead to a heightened 
awareness of the needs of the salient constituencies as well as significant pressures to 
represent those constituencies. There is a growing literature on the empirical study of 
intersectionality and legislative institutions (C. Bejarano 2013; Hardy-Fanta et al. 2016; 
Marin Hellwege and Sierra 2016; Navarro, Hernandez, and Navarro, Leslie 2016; Scola 
2014; Uhlaner and Scola 2016). This literature, along with early more theoretical works, 
suggests caution in applying behavioral theories of white women to minority women 
because it may fail to consider their different experiences caused by their race or ethnicity 
(Crenshaw 1989, 1993; Hancock 2007; Hill Collins 1990). Crenshaw (1989) states, 
minority women are “situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently 
pursue conflicting political agendas.” Empirical evidence regarding intersectionality has 
shown that there are significant differences in regards to both gender and race/ethnicity 
(Garcia Bedolla, Tate, and Wong 2005; Garcia Bedolla 2007; Hancock 2007; Manuel 
2006; Orey et al. 2006; Sampaio 2014; Sierra 2010; Smooth 2011). Scholars have found 
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that because of their dual marginalization, minority women’s political voice has been 
depressed (Crenshaw 1989, 1993; Githens and Prestage 1977; Hardy-Fanta et al. 2016; 
Hawkesworth 2003; Manuel 2006; Marin Hellwege and Sierra 2016). Intersectionality 
implies that minority women legislators, identifying with two marginalized groups, 
should be expected to represent the political agendas of both their race/ethnicity as well 
as their gender. I expect minority women’s dual marginalization and intersectionality will 
lead to the perception of multiple salient identity constituencies along the lines of 
race/ethnicity and gender. This work will serve to extend our understanding of minority 
women legislators’ behavior, as well as improve our understanding of how the underlying 
foundation of marginalization can generalize to other groups’ behavior. 
 Marginalization through Institutional Position 
Marginalization can also be defined by a representative’s institutional position, 
which is when a representative’s identity group holds a small proportion of seats in the 
legislature. Kanter was among the first to argue that a group’s proportion in an 
organization impacts the behavior and effectiveness of members of that group, such as 
women. She identified certain members of the legislature as token based upon their low 
relative numbers.  For example, members who were less than 15% of the legislative 
population were defined as token and hence institutionally marginalized.  Marginalization 
makes tokens ineffective because they are undervalued by the dominant group (Kanter 
1977). When token groups increase in size they lose their marginalized status and become 
more effective players. Several studies use this framework in the legislative arena, 
particularly looking to the collective effectiveness of women legislators once a critical 
mass of women is reached, defined as holding at least 30% of seats (Beckwith and 
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Cowell-Meyers 2007; K. A. Bratton 2005; Childs and Krook 2008; Dahlerup 2006; 
Kanthak and Krause 2012; Numbers and Beyond: The Relevance of Critical Mass in 
Gender Research 2006; Tremblay 2006). When token groups reach 30% or more of the 
legislature, they are no longer defined as token, but are considered balanced players and 
can more effectively produce outcomes requiring collective action.  However, Kanthak 
and Krause (2012), as well as Crowley (2004), show tokens are able to be more effective 
than groups that are considered a minority (15-30%) or balanced group (30-60%) in 
proportion because they are more highly valued than members of larger (non-token) 
groups. They argue that “women face a dual dilemma as their ranks increase: men 
devalue them, which is to be expected, but so do women, which implies that minority and 
underrepresented groups that are increasing in size will see a concomitant decrease in 
actual influence in the legislature” (Kanthak and Krause 2012). Much of this work 
focuses on, and criticizes, the collective effectiveness of critical mass rather than the 
individual effectiveness, or perhaps effort, of tokens.  
 Salient Identity Constituencies & Identity-Based Policy 
Historically in the U.S., minorities and women have been severely 
underrepresented in the halls of legislators relative to their numbers in the population 
(Githens and Prestage 1977; Hardy-Fanta et al. 2016; Scola 2014; Sierra 2010; Smooth 
2010, 2014). As described in the previous section, the political exclusion and oppression 
of members of these groups in the United States has led to individuals considering these 
descriptive characteristics as the basis for part of their identity (Dawson 1994; 
Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967). The psychology of group interests, especially in a 
context of marginalization, is such that individual interests are intimately tied with group 
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interests (Dawson 1994; Haynie 2001; Whitby 1997). Due to the marginalization of 
identity groups, being a woman or a minority in the United States matters for political 
and social outcomes, resulting in a bond among group members (K. a. Bratton and 
Haynie 1999; Dawson 1994; Gurin 1985; Haynie 2001; Mansbridge 1999, 2003; Whitby 
1997). Elected officials who belong to these groups are likely to share the same feelings 
of belonging and identity, as well as share group interests as any other member of the 
group (Haynie 2001; Whitby 1997). As Whitby (1997) and Haynie (2001) argue it 
follows logically that group members who reach the status of lawmaker should hold the 
same interests and seek to pursue those interests.  
Because of the degree of institutional marginalization, we should also reasonably 
expect group members, who have reached such a high level of inclusion into the political 
system as lawmakers, have not only an interest, but also a moral obligation to represent 
identity group members (Htun 2014; Mansbridge 2003). I further argue that the identity 
bond among these groups leads legislators to perceive of their respective identity group 
as a constituency to be represented, regardless of whether or not the identity-based 
constituents reside in their district. I test this implication in Chapter 3.  
Identity-based representation is the foundation for understanding the motivation 
for and purpose of surrogate representation and related legislative behavior. Identity-
based representation is often referred to as descriptive representation, which is the extent 
to which the representative resembles the constituency in terms of their experiences or 
personal characteristics, thus suggesting an intimate link between representative and the 
represented (Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Swain 1995). Pitkin (1967) refers to this 
form of representation as standing for a group of constituents. Mansbridge (1999) further 
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suggests that when the identity bond between descriptive representative and their 
constituency is defined by a marginalized group, the bond of representation is stronger. 
(Mansbridge, 1999). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect minority and women legislators 
as group members share these interests, and will thereby seek to act as representatives for 
their salient identity constituencies. An increase in the number of descriptive 
representatives  also signals to group members and to society at large that group members 
have the ability to rule, and an increase in presence may increase group members’ 
feelings of efficacy, while low descriptive representation may lead to feelings of 
alienation (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Pantoja, and Segura 2003; Hansen 1997; 
Mansbridge 1999), further igniting the moral obligation to represent salient identity 
constituencies. Not only does descriptive representation have an impact on the group 
members, but also, given the tenets of democracy as a system of inclusion, increased 
descriptive representation lends legitimacy to the institution of representation, especially 
in a context of past discrimination (Mansbridge 1999; Tolleson-Rinehart 1994). This is 
related to the sense of moral obligation, as the logical converse is that when descriptive 
representation is low the institution appears illegitimate, fueling marginalized 
representatives’ sense of moral obligation to provide representation for salient identity 
constituencies. Representatives from disadvantaged groups are suggested to have a moral 
responsibility to respond to the functions of descriptive representation, such as signaling 
an ability to rule, increased legitimacy, and increased efficacy for group members, 
through their presence and their legislative behavior (Mansbridge 1999, 2003). 
Members of marginalized groups, such as racial or ethnic minorities and women, 
tend to hold shared preferences resulting from a shared set of experiences (Dawson 1994; 
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Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014; Fenno 2003; Garcia 2012; Githens and 
Prestage 1977; Haynie 2001; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Whitby 1997), and when identity 
salience is heightened, those preferences are prioritized (Gonzalez Juenke and Preuhs 
2014; Gurin 1985; Haynie 2001, 2002; R. R. Preuhs and Gonzalez Juenke 2011; Whitby 
1997). This study will examine the role of women and minorities in a framework of 
mainstream legislative scholarship, not only in the role of descriptive representatives, but 
also in the more nuanced role of surrogate representative. My theory of surrogate 
representation, described in more detail later in this chapter, highlights how both social 
and institutional marginalization may lead to an even greater level of identity salience 
and prioritization of identity policies that lead to different legislative behaviors compared 
to representatives who hold a more dominant position either in society or institutionally. 
In particular, I show that using the surrogate representation framework creates an 
opportunity to think outside of the box, beyond a district-based definition of constituency, 
to consider the more fluid concept of salient identity constituencies. Gender, race, and 
ethnicity can be considered salient identities, not only because some groups hold a 
minority position, but also because their minority position has been politicized and has 
resulted in distinct policy preferences and priorities. Representatives who belong to these 
groups are then expected to be particularly likely to champion the policy agendas of their 
salient identity groups ((K. a. Bratton and Haynie 1999; K. A. Bratton 2005; Brown 
2014; Reingold and Swers 2011; Saint-Germain 1989; Takash 1993; Sue Thomas and 
Welch 1991; Werner 1968). 
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 Surrogate Representation in Hill and Home Style Activities 
Legislators engage in a number of activities in an effort to represent their 
constituencies. Their activities, broadly speaking, can be divided into two different types 
of activities: “hill” and “home” activities. Hill activities encompass legislators’ “policy 
responsiveness”, whereas their home style involves “service responsiveness” (Norris 
1997). Most hill style activities are low cost/ high reward activities. Compared to 
constituency service, these activities, such as committee deliberations, voting on bills, 
and sponsoring bills primarily require presence and moderate participation In return these 
activities offer high reward because they are highly visible to both voters and donors. In 
the words of Mayhew (1974), legislators are able to use these activities for the purposes 
of credit claiming.  Home style, however, offers the opposite calculation. These activities, 
which mostly consist of what is called “constituency service” are high cost-low reward 
(Norris 1997). Constituency service involves responding to very specific requests from 
constituents, such as finding out why a constituent is not receiving his/her social security, 
or helping someone through the legal process of immigration. Other home style activities 
include the numerous meetings and “appearances” legislators make with local groups. 
Legislators spend much of their time being present for meetings, rallies, plenaries, 
workshops, conferences, and the like (Norris 1997; see Chapter 4 for current survey 
results). Constituency service activities are very high cost, as they often involve the 
presence or activity of the legislator rather than staff, and they often require a lot of 
research or preparation for the activity. In return there is little reward for constituency 
service; a legislator cannot build a foundation of support on constituency service, though 
some claim it can have a positive impact at the margins (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 
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1984). Home activities affect the recipients of the service, whereas hill style activities 
have a broader impact on the whole district or even the whole state.  
The question of representation, and by extension, legislative behavior begs the 
question of who is represented? The constituency is the group of individuals whom a 
representative seeks to represent. Though this term is often used synonymously with 
“district”, using the two interchangeably assumes the district is the only constituency that 
representatives seek to represent. Fenno (1978, 2003) claims constituency can be seen as 
concentric circles where the largest conceptualization of constituency is the district, or 
“geographical constituency” (Fenno 1978; Smith 2003). In his view “the district [is] the 
entity to which, from which, and within which the member travels” (Fenno 1978, 1). This 
constituency is a “legally bounded space” defining a particular territory, with an “internal 
makeup” of individuals of different demographics and political views. Within a district 
there exist several sub-constituencies, mostly defined by the degree of support of the 
representative in reaching his or her goals. There is a “reelection constituency” of 
primarily partisan supporters who make up the base of the representative’s re-election 
efforts. Within the reelection constituency there is a “primary constituency”. The primary 
constituency consists of mostly partisan supporters who serve as the most organized and 
active supporters, as Fenno describes "the test for inclusion and exclusion goes beyond a 
vote, to the intensity and the durability of one’s support” (Fenno 1978, 19). The smallest 
constituency is the “personal constituency”. This is the constituency of the 
representative’s closest circle of friends and family; they are not only his strongest 
supporters, but also those “to whom he has entrusted his political career” (Fenno 1978, 
24). Though Fenno recognizes that legislators collectively have a broader impact on the 
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country at large in the case of Congress (hill style), his perception of the home 
constituency extends only to the geographical territory of the district.  
Weissberg (1978) coins the term dyadic representation to signal a representational 
relationship between a single representative and his or her (district) constituency, such as 
Fenno (1978) describes. Weissberg (1978) proposes that “recent American research on 
legislative responsiveness has usually viewed representation in an electoral context” 
(Weissberg 1978, 536). Similar to Fenno’s observation of hill style, Weissberg concludes 
that legislators may provide collective representation. This scope of representation 
involves the provision of representation by one or more representatives for districts that 
are not their own. Weissberg concludes that citizens are more strongly represented than 
previously believed because even though citizens may not be receiving dyadic 
representation when their chosen candidate lost the election, they are still receiving 
representation through collective representation (Weissberg 1978). Weissberg further 
concludes that “collective representation also appears to solve the troublesome theoretical 
problem of how minorities are to be represented in a system of single-member districts 
with first-past-the-post elections” (Weissberg 1978, 547). In this short mention, 
Weissberg simultaneously argues that minorities are more likely to represent minority 
constituents, and this representation is likely to occur in a surrogate manner, a theory that 
I will test in this study.  
In the dyadic scope, which is what Fenno refers to as the “home,” a single 
legislator represents a geographically defined constituency, which is the electoral district. 
In the surrogate home style, a single legislator represents individuals who may exist 
within several electoral districts, instead the perception of the representational 
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relationship from the perspective of the legislator is the salient identity constituency 
membership. Figure 2.2 is a visual conceptualization of the dyadic and surrogate scopes 
of representation, or views of “home”, where the box represents district boundaries and 
SIC represents those belonging to a salient identity constituency. Note that in the dyadic 
home style a legislator represents constituencies within a district boundary, whereas in 
the surrogate home style the legislator represents a particular set of individuals belonging 
to the salient identity constituency but who may reside in various districts. Importantly, I 
expect marginalized legislators to exhibit both forms of representation. 
Figure 2.2 Scope of Representation 
 
Other scholars have suggested additional constituencies may exist beyond the 
district, in particular for state legislators, however disagreement exists as to the reasons 
for considering an extra-district constituency, and who belongs to the extra-district 
constituency (S. J. Carroll 2002b; Fenno 2003; Gollob 2007; Htun 2014; Mansbridge 
2003; Smith 2003). This parallel concept of extra-district representation is closely related 
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to the Burkean concept of “virtual representation” (Burke 1774), Weissberg’s (1978) 
“collective representation” and Mansbridge’s “surrogate representation” (Mansbridge 
2003) all of which suggest some legislators may take on representation of a constituency 
that is not confined to the territory of the district. I use the framework of “surrogate 
representation” as it is the most developed in terms of its theoretical causation and 
implications.  
Some scholars suggest extra-district constituencies are geographically defined, 
however larger than the district (Gollob 2008; Smith 2003 but see Carroll 2002 and 
Fenno 2003). Smith (2003) envisions the virtual constituency for state legislators as a set 
of further concentric circles that are broader than the district, with the largest being the 
whole state but echoing Fenno’s visualization. Smith (2003) argues state legislators may 
engage in virtual representation because of progressive ambition as higher office entails 
larger geographic districts. Jewell (1983) hypothesizes virtual representation is common 
among state legislators because of their relatively small districts that often overlap other 
jurisdictions and districts such as cities or school boards (Jewell 1983). Importantly 
Jewell (1983), Smith (2003), and Gollob (2008) all argue that the virtual constituency 
serves a benefit to the individual legislator, complementary to Fenno’s (1978) perception 
of legislator goals. 
Theories of legislator behavior argue that “to understand members’ behavior we 
must understand their ambition” (Herrick and Moore 1993, 765).  In other words, to 
understand legislators’ behavior is to understand their goals. Fenno (1978) provides a 
nuanced picture of congressional member goals that extends beyond Mayhew’s classic 
statement that the singular goal of legislators is re-election (Mayhew, 1974). Fenno’s 
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work on members of Congress in their districts reveals that legislators have three goals: 
generate good policy, professional ambition, and prestige (Fenno, 1973;1977; 1978). I 
argue that marginalized legislators have a fourth goal in seeking to represent their salient 
identity constituency in an effort to create political inclusion for these groups. Though 
many scholars of legislative behavior founded in Mayhew (1974) and Fenno’s (1973) 
work often operationalize representation as a means to reach their goals, I argue that 
representation is an end of itself. Marginalized legislators’ ambition is strongly tied to 
their efforts of political inclusion for the group. Marginalized legislators have an 
imperative to enforce social justice on behalf of the salient identity constituency, or as 
Mansbridge call it, a moral obligation to represent the identity group. The concept of 
moral obligation signals the prioritization and urgency marginalized legislators have for 
representing their salient identity constituency, even if electoral rewards are small or non-
existent. Broockman (2013) calls the same concept an “intrinsic motivation” to deliver on 
those interests (Broockman 2013; Mansbridge 2003). In addition, a surrogate 
constituency is not necessarily defined by a territory, other than that it is an extra-district 
constituency. Mansbridge argues that in surrogate representation there is “no power 
relationship between surrogate constituent and representative” such as that between 
donors and recipients, rendering self-serving explanations unable to explain this why 
legislators would engage in extra-district representation. Mansbridge (2003) proposes that 
the electoral connection is not necessary for representation to exist because, “surrogate 
representatives feel responsible to their surrogate constituencies” and that the “sense of 
surrogate responsibility becomes stronger when the surrogate representative shares 
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experiences with constituents in a way that a majority of the legislature does not” 
(Mansbridge 2003, 523. Original emphasis).  
2.6.1 Prioritizing Policy Preferences on the Hill 
The evaluation of legislators’ hill activities involves examining their policy 
congruence in comparison to policy preferences of different constituencies (Harden 2013, 
2014). Examining hill style behaviors in the context of surrogate representation is 
arguably very similar to the concept of substantive representation. As discussed above, 
the difference is in the motivation for representation. The theory arguing the link between 
descriptive and substantive representation does not tell us why minority legislators 
represent minority constituents; it could be because of a shared interest and thus it is a 
reflection of the individual’s preferences, or it could be, as is the case for surrogate 
representation, that the legislator specifically seeks to represent the group’s interests. 
Further, relationship between these forms of representation does not tell us about the 
scope of representation; legislators may reflect the interests of the salient identity 
constituency because s/he represents a majority-minority district, or the representative 
may seek to represent minority interests broadly speaking, beyond the district, as 
surrogate representation suggests. This study both theoretically, and empirically, 
examines these differences; however, admittedly the outcomes of policy based, hill style 
representation are quite similar to descriptive representation.  In section 2.6, I show that 
members of salient identities, such as women and racial/ethnic minorities, tend to have 
sets of shared policy preferences. Representatives with salient identities likely enhance 
the diversity of deliberation that should lead to an increase in substantive representation 
for those identity groups (Haynie 2001; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Whitby 1997). In 
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other words, we should expect that women and minority legislators should hold the same 
identity-based policy preferences that other group members do. Further, the theory 
suggests that legislators will use their position as law-makers to prioritize those policy 
preferences in the legislative process. Indeed, studies have continuously suggested that 
representatives who hold those same salient identities have an impact on substantive 
policy outcomes (Minta 2009, 2011, 2012a; R. R. Preuhs 2005; Swers 2002, 2005, 2013).  
Studies have also consistently shown that women and minorities often bring in new 
topics for legislative deliberation (Mendelberg, Karpowitz, and Goedert 2014b; Michele 
Swers 2002; Piscopo 2011; M. S. Rocca and Sanchez 2008; Swers 2005).   
The literature on female legislators suggests that female legislators are likely to 
engage in activities that promote so-called “women’s issues” and that they are likely to 
introduce previously “uncrystallized”, or new, issues (S. Carroll 2003; Reingold and 
Swers 2011; Reingold 1992; Saint-Germain 1989; Swers 2002, 2005, 2013; Sue Thomas 
and Welch 1991), and when these activities are on behalf of women broadly speaking 
they should be termed as surrogate representation (S. J. Carroll 2002b; Htun 2014; 
Mansbridge 2003). In terms of self- ascribed policy priorities, women representatives are 
more likely than men to prioritize policies dealing with children, the family and welfare 
(Sue Thomas and Welch 1991). Their prioritization of these issues is also evident through 
their legislative activities. Women are more likely to be members of committees that 
focus on health, education, social, and human service issues (S. J. Carroll 2002b; Dodson 
1998; Werner 1968).   
The literature on race and ethnicity similarly suggests that minority legislators are 
likely to hold a coherent set of policy preferences that are distinct from whites (Minta 
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2009, 2011, 2012a; R. R. Preuhs 2005; Swain 1995; Tate 2003; Whitby 1997). For 
example, African Americans legislators are more likely than white legislators to be 
members of health and social services committees (Bratton & Haynie 1999; Sanchez & 
Marin Hellwege 2014).  Studies of bill sponsorship have shown that black legislators are 
more likely than their white counterparts to promote legislation that is congruent with the 
black community’s policy goals even after controlling for party (Canon 1999; Grose 
2005; Haynie 2001; Tate 2003). Studies on Latino legislators show that Latinos also have 
different policy preferences than non-Latinos, however, this finding has consistently been 
weaker than for African Americans (Bratton 2006; Sanchez & Marin Hellwege, 2014). 
Recent work on minority women’s legislative behavior finds that minority women 
tend to behave in ways predicted by theories of both female and minority legislative 
behavior. Carroll (2002) argues that female African American members of Congress 
advocate for women’s issues while simultaneously incorporating policy priorities of 
interest to the black community. Takash (1993) makes a similar argument in her study of 
Latina politicians in the California state legislature. In looking to policy provisions by 
descriptive representatives, Orey, et al. (2006) find that African American women state 
legislators are more likely to introduce more progressive bills.  
2.6.2 Scope of Constituency- Conceiving of Home 
Empirical studies of surrogate representation of identity-based groups have thus 
far been limited to within-group studies of women (S. J. Carroll 2002b); African 
Americans (Broockman 2013; Fenno 2003), and minority women - specifically 
Afrodescendant women in Latin America (Htun 2014). While not all specifically 
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reference surrogate representation, each considers how legislators seek to represent 
constituents that are not geographically defined.  
Carroll (2002) is the first empirical test specifically assessing Mansbridge’s 
(2003) theoretical conceptualization of surrogate representation. The qualitative study 
involves two rounds of interviews with around 40 female members of Congress in 1997-
1998. Carroll (2002) argues, women’s underrepresentation in Congress, which at the time 
was less than 14% of seats, causes women in Congress to have a sense of “surrogate 
responsibility”. Carroll specifically asked the Congresswomen if “in addition to 
representing their districts, they felt a further responsibility to represent women” (Carroll 
2002, 53). Unlike other scholars examining links between descriptive and substantive 
representation, Carroll makes an important contribution in that she differentiates between 
dyadic and surrogate representation. She also points out that while some Congresswomen 
came to Congress without an intention to focus on women or women-centered issues, 
their institutional marginalization caused them to shift their focus (S. J. Carroll 2002b). 
She concludes her results noting that Congresswomen do see their district as a top-
priority, but that despite differences in their districts, most of them do act, and perceive of 
themselves, as surrogate representatives (S. J. Carroll 2002b).   
Carroll (2002) approaches her study with the specific intent of first re-
conceptualizing how we discuss descriptive representation and then examining the extent 
to which women engage in surrogate representation. Fenno (2003), however, approaches 
his study as an extension to his (1978) study on constituency and Members of Congress’ 
home style. In his classic book Home Style: House Members in their Districts (1978), 
Fenno argues that members of Congress perceive of several different constituencies but 
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argues that these are bound to the geographical boundaries of the district. In Going 
Home: Black Representatives and Their Constituents (2003), he acknowledges that 
“African American members…perceive a fourth constituency to which they respond, one 
beyond the district—a national constituency of black citizens who live beyond the 
borders of any one member’s district, but with whom all black members share a set of 
race-related concerns (Fenno 2003, 7).  Fenno’s qualitative, “soak-and-poke”, inquiry of 
four black members of Congress, partially culminates in the suggestion that these 
minority representatives  have the additional goal of furthering minority interests, an 
interest that separate them from their white counterparts (Fenno 2003).  
Htun (2014) is the only study examining the role of surrogate representation 
outside the United States, and specifically focuses on minority women (Carroll 2002, 
does include a section on minority women but her analysis is not specifically focused 
here). She presents evidence that surrogate representation exists across several Latin 
American countries, and across several different institutional contexts as, 
“Afrodescendant women…have advocated the interests of (both) women and of 
Afrodescendants” and that this representation extends beyond each legislators’ individual 
district to represent their identity constituency broadly (Htun 2014, 132). Htun points out 
how Afrodescendant female legislators’ proportional under-representation in legislative 
institutions, in a context of social marginalization, has led them to, “perceive a mandate 
to speak out and introduce policy initiatives on behalf of Afrodescendant and women’s 
rights” (Htun 2014, 133. Emphasis added). Htun’s result of a perceived mandate echoes 
Mansbridge’s suggestion of the moral obligation, which serves as a causal mechanism for 
marginalized legislators’ decision to engage in surrogate representation.  
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Broockman (2013) furthers the notion of moral obligation to the surrogate 
constituency by testing differences in extrinsic (personal gain) and intrinsic 
(altruistic/moral) incentives for representation (Broockman 2013; Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996). Broockman (2013) tests the hypothesis that representatives who share an identity 
should be more likely to represent constituents who share this identity even if they do not 
reside in the district (surrogate representation). Using a field experiment sending email 
requests using an alias “which strongly signals being black” (Broockman 2013, 525), and 
varying the fictional constituents’ location within district, and out-of-district, he finds that 
as a whole, legislators are less likely to respond to out of district requests, but black 
legislators are more likely to respond than nonblack legislators regardless of the 
constituent’s location. As Broockman explains, there is a potential cost-benefit analysis 
to be had for representatives in considering representation of surrogates, as there is no 
electoral gain from providing services to citizens who do not live within the district 
(Broockman 2013). 
This study seeks to expand on these studies of surrogate representation in several 
important ways. First, each of these studies are within-group studies examining if a 
certain group engages in behaviors consistent with surrogate representation. This 
dissertation instead compares multiple groups to explore if a) all groups engage in such 
behavior and b) if any one group does so more than others. Secondly, each of the studies 
explores Mansbridge’s theory regarding social marginalization, which is that members of 
groups marginalized in society should be more likely to engage in surrogate behavior. In 
turn, the studies have explored surrogate behavior for women, minorities, and minority 
women with an assumption that these groups are numerically marginalized in the 
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institution as well. This study explicitly examines both social marginalization and 
institutional marginalization to test whether these underlying assumptions about social 
position hold when varying the context of institutional position. In order to examine 
social marginalization within varying contexts, I test my theory in state legislatures, 
which is an additional expansion on the literature, as three of the four previous studies 
test their implications in national legislatures. The sub-national level allows for greater 
diversity in institutional contexts that a single institution study cannot provide. There is 
great methodological diversity in the surrogate representation literature offering results 
and insights based on theory (Mansbridge 2003), qualitative interviews (S. J. Carroll 
2002b; Fenno 2003), case studies (Htun 2014), and quantitative field experiment 
(Broockman 2013). However, each employs a single-method study to test their 
theoretical implications. This study recognizes the gaps in the existing literature and the 
value in the methodological richness offered by using a multi-methods approach to 
triangulate on multiple implications and assumptions that existing theory offers. Finally, 
by using Fenno’s (1978) framework of hill and home style approaches to representation, I 
am able to explore and test both sets of implications of engaging with the constituency at 
“home” and the policy preferences prioritized on the “hill”. 
 Theoretical Implications 
The implication of the theory of surrogate representation is that marginalized 
representatives should recognize salient identity constituencies, both within and outside 
their districts, and engage in activities on their behalf, in other words treat them as 
constituents. I examine the implication that marginalized legislators perceive of salient 
identity constituencies in Chapter 3. The salient identity constituency theory also suggests 
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that legislators who seek to represent both their district constituency as well as one or 
more salient identity constituencies outside their district will have additive pressures to 
respond to all constituencies resulting in a higher workload. Therefore, I examine, in 
Chapter 4, workload differences between marginalized and dominant legislative 
members.  In terms of home style activities, the theory implies that marginalized 
representatives should be more likely to meet with their salient identity constituency 
groups, even if these meetings (including events and rallies) take place outside the district 
because salient identity constituencies are not necessarily bound to the district and may 
include a surrogate constituency. I test several hypotheses related to these implications  in 
Chapter 4. Finally, the theory implies that socially and/or institutionally marginalized 
legislators, including minorities, women, and especially minority women, are especially 
likely to prioritize identity politics and sit on committees that reflect those interests.  I 
examine committee membership in Chapter 5. 
Theoretically, most state legislators are likely to engage in some degree of 
surrogate representation. Through their various legislative activities, legislators regularly 
represent individuals even if they do not live in the district. Often this happens 
collectively in the form of a public good, where everyone benefits or suffers from the 
passage and implementation of legislation. State legislators engage in surrogate 
representation for several reasons, in some instance a surrogate constituent sought out 
this representative for reasons of shared partisanship, policy interests, or occupation 
(Mansbridge 2003). Jewell argues that state legislative districts in particular are so small 
that there is often overlap with other legal jurisdictions that leads to significant 
cooperation among state legislators and may ultimately lead to helping surrogate 
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constituents (Jewell 1983)). Some scholars argue that legislators regularly engage in 
extra-district representation because it can fulfill electoral goals, in particular they 
suggest that political ambition for higher office is more likely to lead a legislator to 
perceive an extra-district constituency (Gollob 2007; Smith 2003). All of these may be 
reasons for individual approaches to political representation, but another reason may also 
be a shared salient identity.  
Within-group studies have allowed for a richness in data, but have failed to 
explore the foundations of surrogate representation. I seek to use a more expansive theory 
to examine both the foundations of salient identity constituencies and the implications for 
legislative behavior. First, I argue that legislators perceive of group members as salient 
identity constituencies because of marginalization. I expect marginalization to occur in 
multiple layers through social marginalization (identity) and through institutional 
marginalization, which I define as low group proportion in the legislature (Kanter 1977; 
Kanthak and Krause 2012).  I examine implications for legislative behavior through both 
policy efforts (hill style) and constituency service (home style) activities. I examine how 
policy priorities are aligned with group members’ preferences, and also how legislators 
engage with the identity constituency through constituency service when the salient 
identity constituency may extend beyond the electoral district. I focus my discussion of 
identity on gender (women) and race/ethnicity (minorities), because of the saliency of 
these identities in the US context (Hutchings and Valentino 2004); however arguably 
other salient identities are likely to establish similar relationships between representatives 
and a surrogate constituency, such as class (Carnes 2012) or sexual orientation (Haider-
Markel 2007b; Herrick 2009). 
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The coming chapters test each of these implications starting with testing the 
underlying foundation of how marginalization leads to the recognition of salient identity 
constituencies. Chapter 3 will address how social and institutional marginalization leads 
legislators to recognize salient identity constituencies. It utilizes face-to-face interviews 
and participant-observation forms of qualitative methods to examine the underlying 
motivations behind this behavior. Chapter 4 will address several different legislative 
activities to show differences in hill, district-home, and surrogate activities. Finally, 
Chapter 5 will address committee activities, as one measure of hill style activities, to 
examine how legislators represent salient identity constituency group preferences.  
 Research Methodology  
To test the implications of my theory I use three different types of data, both 
qualitative and quantitative in nature. The first methodological approach uses qualitative 
data, including observations and face-to-face (FTF) interviews with state legislators. 
These data were obtained during two rounds of week-long data collection during the 
2014 and 2015 National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL) Legislative Summits. 
During these two weeks of field work, I conducted formal interviews with 14 legislators, 
including seven minority women, five white women, a minority male and a white male. I 
also had dozens of informal conversations, and attended several panels, workshops, 
round-tables and conference meetings, including all meetings scheduled for the Women’s 
Legislative Network for both years (See schedules in Appendix A). These data provide 
rich descriptions of personal accounts of representational motivations and behaviors. 
These data were most important for the purposes of theory-building. Collecting the data 
was predominantly an exercise in listening to the data, allowing each respondent’s 
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personal account to inform an understanding of representation used to generate testable 
hypotheses. These data were imperative to understanding how both context and 
motivation affect legislative behavior. I explain more details of the data collection and 
theory-building process in Chapter 3. 
The second set of data used in my research design comes from an original survey 
of state legislators from 48 states conducted in 2015. The survey data include self-
reported legislative behavior, including data on workload, constituent meetings, and 
constituency service. This new survey was necessary to tackle some of the questions 
regarding behaviors in the district in comparison to behaviors outside the district. The 
survey also asks about motivations for behavior in relation to a non-district based 
constituency. To the author’s knowledge, no other survey of state legislators is able to 
distinguish representation of an extra-district constituency. This data set is supplemented 
by comprehensive data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 
which include descriptive data on every state legislator in 2015. The supplemental data 
allow for analysis of both social and institutional marginalization using race, ethnicity, 
gender, and group proportion in the legislature.  
The final data set is an original dataset of 4,263 unique state representatives from 
13 states for three time points (1998, 2004, 2010). The data include measures of 
legislators’ committee memberships, race, ethnicity, gender, group proportion, years in 
the legislature, political party and leadership positions. These data are exceptional in their 
comprehensive measure of committee membership, allowing for a comparison of over 
400 committees across states and time, and also provide an opportunity for a comparison 
between proportion of one type of committee to all others. While several studies of 
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committee membership are limited either by examining single group behavior (Barrett 
1995; Orey, Overby, and Larimer 2007), a single state analysis (Broockman and Butler 
2015; Hedlund 1989), or only a small selection of committees (Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 
2011), these data allow for an analysis that can address each of these limitations.  
The introduction of institutional marginalization is more than a theoretical one, 
one of the features of these datasets is that they include a variable for group proportion. 
Unlike other works on surrogate representation which focus on social marginalization 
(Broockman 2013; S. Carroll 2003; Fenno 1978; Htun 2004), I am able to explicitly test 
social and institutional marginalization, separately, but parallel, to one another in the 
analysis. I am particularly interested in the behavior of highly marginalized populations, 
and pay particular attention to the behavior of minority women and tokens in comparison 
to white men and dominant group members. However, these rich data allow me to 
compare behaviors across all four identity groups (minority women and men, and white 
women and men) and group proportion categories (tokens, minority, balanced, and 
dominant group). These data allow me to look beyond the behavior of one group to 
actually examine the behavior of one group in comparison to another. This comparison is 
crucial as it informs us about whether one groups’ behavior is different or unusual from 
our conventional expectations. For example, the finding that marginalized legislators are 
highly likely to sit on social welfare committees is predominantly interesting because 
white men and dominant group members are less likely to exhibit the same behavior.  
 Benefits of Triangulation with Multiple Methodologies  
A multi-methods approach is particularly appropriate for this dissertation as it 
attempts to answer questions of both motivation and correlation. Using multiple 
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approaches of data collection and analysis allows for a more holistic understanding of the 
implications and the nature of the theory. A multi-methods design is preferred for the 
study of complex concepts, such as representation, to allow various methods to 
complement each other in more thoroughly testing it (Jick 1979).  Jick (1979) states that 
there is “desirability of mixing methods given the strengths and weaknesses found in 
single method designs.” (Jick 1979, 602). A complex, or holistic, multi-methods design 
serves several purposes, such as, ensuring findings are based on the phenomena and not 
the methods, answering different types of questions or implications of a theory, for 
combining fieldwork with survey methods, and for different processes in the research 
design (theory building vs. theory testing (Cambell and Fiske 1959, Jick 1979, Seawright 
2016).  
My research design for the dissertation uses three different methods (interviews, 
survey, and aggregate data). The data sets each have their benefits and limitations. The 
primary advantage of the face to face interviews is the ability to engage directly with the 
data to, literally, have a conversation with the data provider to dig deeper to understand a 
weaker or especially interesting response. The interviews were especially important to 
answer questions of motivation; why do legislators behave a certain way? Using a semi-
structured set of interview questions allowed the respondent to answer the question more 
freely, in ways that the researcher might not have anticipated. This is important both for 
theory building and survey production. In terms of theory building, not being limited by 
previous findings in the literature, but rather asking state legislators themselves how they 
perceive of representation was crucial for developing several features of the salient 
identity constituency theory. In addition, the responses that I was provided during the 
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first interview session (which occurred before the survey instrument was completed), 
were instrumental in constructing both questions and selected responses for the survey. 
Whereas the survey data may be somewhat limited by its predetermined set of questions 
and responses, this methodology has other benefits such as answering questions of (self-
reported) behavior and providing power to make correlations and broader generalizations. 
The survey methodology was useful in theory testing, especially as the measures were 
developed in tandem with the development of the theory, allowing for more precise 
measures of outlined concepts. Finally, the aggregate data provide the best opportunity 
for correlation and broader generalization as a study of the population of state legislators 
within the given parameters. This allows for a very strong analysis of committee 
memberships, but suffers somewhat from lacking a broader richness in understanding 
legislative behavior more broadly. The advantages and limits of each method 
complement one another to generate a more holistic research design and study. Using this 
design, I am able to test several different implications of the salient identity constituency 
theory in ways a single method design would not allow.  
Chapter 3: A New View of “Home”: Perceiving Identity Based 
Constituencies 
The theory of surrogate representation argues that marginalized legislators are 
more likely to have raised identity salience and interest in identity-based issues. The 
theory argues further that this should lead to particular legislative behaviors furthering the 
agenda of an identity-based constituency (See Chapter 2 for more detail). The model 
assumes legislators’ raised identity salience will lead to a view of identity group members 
as a constituency. It is expected that these legislators will seek to represent the salient 
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identity constituency through policy efforts (hill style behaviors) and constituency 
services (home style behaviors) regardless of their geographical location. This chapter 
tackles questions about the assumption that legislators who belong to marginalized 
groups have raised identity salience and thereby a view of identity group members as a 
constituency to be represented.  
Following the theoretical work of Mansbridge (2003), which theorizes surrogate 
representation—representation without an electoral connection, I seek to understand why 
legislators may act as surrogates, and how they perceive of the concept of “constituency”. 
Mansbridge’s (2003) theoretical argument, and empirical works examining surrogate 
representation, argue that minorities and women are more likely to provide representation 
beyond the district, because they are likely to provide it for members of their identity 
group who may not otherwise have a descriptive representative in their district 
(Broockman 2013; S. J. Carroll 2002a; Htun 2014; Mansbridge 2003). The key question 
for this chapter is whom do legislators represent? As I show in Chapter 2, social and 
institutional marginalization have important implications for group members’ sense of a 
shared identity. I use face-to-face semi-structured interviews to explore whether 
marginalized legislators will use their lawmaking power to further the agendas of their 
group members because of a shared identity. (Haynie 2001; Whitby 1997). I extend this 
argument to suggest that marginalized legislators view group members as a constituency 
to be represented through both policy efforts and constituency service (Fenno, 2003 
makes the case for African American legislators).   
Legislative theory predicts that  legislators are primarily interested in representing 
the constituency that elected them— their district constituency (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 
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1974). Fenno (1978) makes the case that the district constituency is the largest 
constituency legislators perceive of, but that representatives also perceive of smaller 
constituencies within the electoral district. He argues that there are smaller contingencies 
within the district such as the party, campaign supporters, friends, and family, are all 
constituencies within the district constituency. He illustrates these multiple constituencies 
as concentric circles where the district is the largest circle. Importantly, these 
constituencies are defined by a relationship to the legislator, but confined within the 
territory of the district. I argue that marginalized representatives perceive of 
constituencies based on a relationship to the legislator—identity, but that the constituency 
perception extends beyond the district. Instead of the district-bound, or dyadic, view of 
constituency held by Fenno (1978), I follow Mansbridge’s (2003) conceptualization of 
“surrogate representation”. The argument for surrogate representation is that under some 
conditions, representatives may have incentives to represent constituencies which are not 
geographically defined, but defined by some group membership. This view is also similar 
to Weissberg (1978), who perceived of “collective representation”, which he thought was 
particularly useful to examine the representational relationship between minority 
members of Congress and minority constituents. Fenno (2003) acknowledges that 
African American members of Congress may have a “fourth” constituency which 
encompasses all African Americans; he argues that this perception comes from a sense of 
shared experiences and expectations of shared outcomes (Fenno 2003). Carroll (2002) 
makes a similar argument about women, as does Htun (2014) about Afrodescendant 
women in Latin America. Each of the studies on surrogate (or collective) representation 
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only examine one group: women (Carroll 2002), African Americans (Fenno 2003; 
Broockman 2013), and Afrodescendant women (Htun 2014). 
There are four goals of this chapter related to the overarching question of 
motivations for representation. Primarily, I seek to show that women and minority 
legislators see their group members as salient identity constituencies because of their 
historical and current social marginalization (S. J. Carroll 2002a; Fenno 2003; Htun 2014; 
Mansbridge 2003). Second, I argue since these constituencies are not defined by 
geography, the goals of representation for these constituencies comes from a sense of 
obligation to represent these groups, owing to a sense of group consciousness tied to a 
historical political exclusion (Broockman 2013; Dawson 1994; Mansbridge 2003; G. R. 
Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Tate 2001). Third, I argue legislators perception of social 
groups as constituencies is heightened when the identity group is marginalized within the 
institution because such contexts heightens the awareness of the groups’ social 
marginalization and need for representation (Kanter 1977; Mansbridge 2003; McGuire 
and Padawer-Singer 1976; Sierra Leonard, Mehra, and Katerberg 2008). Finally, I show 
that networks, caucuses, or other organizational mechanisms are important to further the 
agenda of marginalized groups particularly as an identity group grows, in order create a 
structure to focus issues (Kanthak and Krause 2012). To examine these questions, and 
test my arguments, I focus on minority women and legislators whose identity group 
(gender and/or race/ethnic group) holds a small proportion in the legislature, as I expect 
these legislators will be the most likely to perceive salient identity constituencies. 
Perceiving of group members as a constituency has several important implications 
for legislators’ behavior. Legislators who are marginalized will seek to further the policy 
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interests of minority group members through bill sponsorship, and committee 
memberships (hill style) as well as meet with identity group constituents (home style) on 
a large scale (surrogate representation).  
 Building Salient Identity Constituencies 
The saliency of race, ethnicity, and gender as identities based on political 
exclusion and as motivators for behavior is well-documented (Dawson 1994; Dovi 2002; 
Mansbridge 1999). There are large bodies of literature describing and analyzing identity 
groups’ distinct policy preferences (Caiazza 2004; Dovi 2002; Michele Swers 2001, 
2002; G. R. Sanchez 2006; Swain 1995; Swers 2005, 2013), political ideology (Dawson 
2001; DeSipio 1996) attitudes (Branton, Cassese, and Jones 2012; Branton 2007; Gay 
2002; Norrander and Manzano 2010), and political behavior (Barreto 2007; Bobo and 
Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). There are also large bodies of 
literature discussing the relationship between representatives’ descriptive features and 
their policy preferences and priorities; commonly discussed as the relationship between 
descriptive and substantive representation, and it has been well hashed out in terms of 
gender (Burrell 1998; S. J. Carroll, Dodson, and Mandel 1991; S. J. Carroll 2002a; 
Dodson 1998; Saint-Germain 1989; S. Thomas and Welch 1991), race (Haynie 2001; 
Hero and Tolbert 2004; Minta 2012b; Robert R Preuhs 2006a; Tate 2001, 2003), 
ethnicity (Gonzalez Juenke and Preuhs 2014; Kerr and Miller 1997; Lopez and Pantoja 
2004; Takash 1993), and other descriptive features such as sexual orientation (Herrick 
2009), occupation (Squire 2007), or even parenthood (Bryant and Marin Hellwege 2016).  
Most of the above mentioned studies do not differentiate between the motivation 
for the representation of these groups. The expectations of descriptive representation 
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mostly suggest that legislators embody the same preferences as their group members and 
as a result represent group members. However, while this argument is strong in 
explaining preferences, it is not as strong in explaining behavior, such as meeting with 
groups or engaging in constituency service, which are high cost low reward activities 
(Norris 1997). This study is different as it seeks to examine the underlying motivations 
for representing group interests and explicitly differentiates between representing group 
members only in the district and group members broadly speaking (but see Grose 2005). 
Therefore, I show that legislators view group members as distinct constituents who are 
owed representation.  
Continued political exclusion and oppression leads to a sense of community and 
group consciousness, this is evident in studies of African Americans, and to a lesser 
extent, Latinos and women (S. J. Carroll 2002b; Dawson 1994; G. R. Sanchez and 
Masuoka 2010). I expect a sense of group consciousness, or at least awareness, to be 
heightened among elites because of their relatively visible status as descriptive 
representatives.  
Whitby (1997) and Haynie (1999) argue that group consciousness, and awareness 
of the identity groups’ social position follows individuals as they transition to become 
elites in the political system as political leaders and lawmakers, and as such we should 
expect minority legislators to further the agendas of the minority groups once in office 
(Haynie 2001, 2002; Minta 2012a; Whitby 1997). There is a significant literature that has 
focused on showing that legislators pursue agendas which reflect the group preferences 
(Minta 2012b; Swain 1995; Tate 2003; Thomas and Welch 1991). This literature 
somewhat fails in showing the motivation behind supporting such legislation. I argue that 
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not only do elites hold policy preferences and attitudes similar to their identity groups, 
they also see identity group members as constituencies to represent. Elites who belong to 
these groups are likely to have a sense of obligation to give back to their communities 
because they are now in a position of inclusion in the political arena (Broockman 2013; 
Haynie 2001; Whitby 1997). As political leaders of marginalized groups they see 
themselves as charged with the task of furthering the groups’ agenda for political 
inclusion (Htun 2014). I expect that some of the motivations for legislative behavior are 
to include the marginalized groups into the political arena and to represent the identity 
group membership. 
I expect marginalization causes identity group members to have a raised saliency, 
and consequently, I expect that legislators who are marginalized along the lines of 
multiple intersecting identities should be especially likely to perceive of identity based 
constituencies. Minority women hold two separate and salient identities through their 
gender and their race/ethnicity, ultimately culminating in a third and distinct identity as 
minority women. The experience of identifying with multiple identities is known as 
“intersectionality,” and has several important implications for behavior —most 
importantly for this chapter is that minority women should perceive of several salient 
identity constituencies more than minority men and more than white women?  Is that 
ture?  I think you need to make these qualification and relative statements somewhere. 
(Crenshaw 1989; Gay and Tate 1998; Smooth 2011). Minority women are marginalized 
in society through the current and historical political exclusion of minority and women’s 
interests. As Githens and Prestage (1977) argue, “politics has long been ‘man’s 
business’…[and] politics has also been ‘white folks’ business’, as a consequence, black 
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women have been doubly excluded from the political arena” (Githens and Prestage 
1977).  
Early literature on intersectionality tended to focus on the challenges for minority 
women through dual marginalization or “double disadvantage” (Crenshaw 1989). 
However, Brown (2014) points out “it is important to note that intersectional identities 
create both oppression and opportunity; they reflect the social stratification that points to 
the operation of power relations among groups within a given identity category” (Brown 
2014). Brown’s insistance that intersectionality can create opportunity is echoed in 
Bejarano (2013) and Scola (2014) works, both of which show minority women state 
legislators win office at higher rates than white women. Fraga et al (2006,2007) argue 
that minority women may hold a “strategic intersectionality”  because minority women’s 
dual identities descriptively maximize appeals to both male members of the identity 
group and to women regardless of identity group (Fraga et al. 2006, 2007). They argue 
that minority women state legislators may be better able to build coalitions across identity 
groups because they embody multiple salient identities as “minorities” and as “women 
(Fraga et al. 2006, 2007). Consequently, Fraga et al (2006, 2007) also suggest that 
minority women are able to generate a more fluid policy agenda that appeals to a broader 
audience because of their experience in responding to additive pressures (Fraga et al. 
2006, 2007). Their findings of strategic intersectionality imply that minority women are 
likely to perceive of, and respond to, salient identity constituencies that include both 
women and minorities. 
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 Data and Methods 
To understand the motivation behind representation and the perception of salient 
identity constituencies I conducted face-to-face (FTF) interviews with state legislators 
and engaged in participant-observation during two national meetings for state legislators, 
staff, and lobbyists. Face-to-face interviews and participant observation are especially 
effective tools for understanding legislators’ motivations because they allow the 
respondent to define their conceptions without any pre-constructed definitions provided 
by the researcher. These types of fieldwork methods allow the researcher to “soak and 
poke”, giving the researcher access to “insider” information (Fenno 1978; Leech 2002). 
The semi-structured nature of the interview process is also optimal for understanding 
questions of causation and motivation because it allows for an interaction between 
interviewer and the subject that is not present in most other methodologies. This format 
ensures the subject understands the question being asked and also allows for the 
possibility for follow-up questions. A common critique of the interview method is its lack 
of generalizability; to which I respond in two ways. First, the interviews are not intended 
to establish correlation; instead qualitative methods are often used for interpretive and 
inductive purposes, such as theory building (Mayan 2009). As Mayan explains, “by 
studying naturally occurring phenomena, qualitative researchers attempt to interpret or 
make sense of the meaning people attach to their experiences or underlying a particular 
phenomenon” (Mayan 2009). Using face-to-face interviews has pushed this research in 
developing an understanding for legislators’ personal motivation which could not have 
been hypothesized by the researcher without the respondents’ insights. Again, the face-
to-face interviews serve a purpose in building a theory of salient identity constituencies, 
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and the conditions under which such perceptions are more likely, the implications of 
which may be tested using other methods. Thus, while generalizability may not be 
established through the interviews, it will be established by the dissertation as a whole 
through various quantitative methods. 
Studies of state legislator behavior using interviews or other qualitative methods 
often suffer from a lack of state variation by limiting the study to one or a few states 
(Reingold 2000; Tolleson-Rinehart 1994). To combat the geographic limitations (a 
challenge which persists due to researchers’ limited resources), I instead chose to 
interview state legislators during conferences for the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (The NCSL Legislative Summits of 2014 and 2015). Traveling to one 
common meeting location allowed me to observe and meet with state legislators from 
around the country. The Legislative Summit brings thousands of state legislators to a 
single location providing a natural and easy point of access for interviews and participant. 
The NCSL Summit serves as an excellent venue for face-to-face interviews because I was 
able to interact with the state legislators in a professional but more social and relaxed 
setting.  Additionally, the goals of the Legislative Summit include professional 
networking, discussing strategies for policy goals, and socially engaging with other 
legislators- all of which are related to the objectives of this study. 
Interviews and observations were conducted at the 2014 National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL) Legislative Summit in Minneapolis, MN and the 2015 
Legislative Summit in Seattle, WA.  All lower house state representatives (and Nebraska 
senators) were recruited for the study one month prior to the beginning of the meetings 
via e-mail, regardless of intention to attend the Summit (as such information was not 
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provided by the NCSL). Though all state legislators were invited, I received nearly no 
contact via e-mail, but instead found the best way to recruit participants was through 
more organic means, networking during the meeting (Email invitation in Appendix B). I 
conducted 14 semi-structured interviews, engaged in countless shorter and/or non-
purposive conversations, and acted as either participant or observer (or both) in 10 full 
days of panels, workshops, committee meetings, luncheons, and other events as part of 
the Legislative Summit (See schedule in Appendix A, and semi-structured interview 
instrument in Appendix C). The interviewees included seven minority women, five white 
women, a white man and a minority man, providing data from each of the four groups, 
although admittedly overwhelmingly from minority women. The respondents represented 
eight different states, including states in the Northeast, South, Midwest, Southwest, and 
Pacific Northwest regions. The respondents represented states with various degrees of 
institutional marginalization as well. There were six tokens, four minority group 
members, three balanced group members, and one dominant group member.  
I used a prepared set of open interview questions allowing for a focused 
conversation, but one where the researcher cannot predict the answers (Mayan 2009; 
Richards and Morse 2007). I asked state legislators about whom they seek to represent 
and how they represent these constituencies through their legislative activities. The semi-
structured interviews lasted about 30 minutes, though the range was between 10 minutes 
and 1.5 hours. Interview questions fell under 6 categories: goals and priorities; district 
composition; representation; legislative activities; collegiality in the legislature and 
women and minorities in legislative politics. The semi-structured interview questions 
were based on the implications of the theory and many questions were built on the 
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previous literature that included interviews of state legislators and other elected officials 
(S. J. Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Reingold 2000; Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Sue Thomas 
1991a)4. The interview data were analyzed for patterns of motivations using inductive 
and abductive reasoning, these processes involved treating the theory as malleable and 
adjusted with each interview. I analyzed the qualitative data through memoing and 
theorizing (Mayan 2009). Memoing, which involves making connections and questioning 
the data, is a helpful tool during semi-structured interviews as this concurrent analysis 
allows the researcher to push the theory and “entertain theoretical notions about the 
phenomenon” (Mayan 2009). Essentially, what this means in practical terms is engaging 
in conversation by listening to the respondent, and using the responses to follow up and 
push the respondent on further questions or allow for further elaborations on responses to 
expand the researchers pre-conceived ideas. Memoing is a very useful tool in the theory-
building process. Theorizing the data allows the researcher to hone in on key statements 
to summarize the abstract meaning of the data, particularly through building the theory, 
this is related to memoing, but rather than expanding and elaborating, it pushes the 
researcher to narrow down to key points (Mayan 2009). Each of these qualitative forms 
of analyses were used throughout the study and post-data collection to build the theory of 
salient identity constituencies and their role in surrogate representation.  
                                                 
4 The interview instrument is attached as Appendix B. 
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 Findings 
The findings of this qualitative study suggest marginalized representatives define 
constituency differently from white men and that their motivations to run for office come 
from a sense of group needs more than electoral self-interest. In addition, motivations 
vary by the proportion of the group membership in the legislature. The first, and perhaps 
most important question in understanding how minority women perceive of constituency 
and representation was about the motivations for representation; what was the catalyst for 
choosing to become a representative? What is the role of minorities & women in state 
legislatures? Do minority women representatives see themselves as representatives for an 
identity group? If so, how does that affect their role as state representatives, and their 
decision to run in the first place? 
3.3.1 Representing the district…and then some 
 Studies of legislative ambition have shown that women are less likely to run than 
men, and that women may need to be recruited to run for public office (Lawless and Fox 
2005; however, see Scola 2014 and Bejarano 2013 who suggest lack of political ambition 
is predominantly a problem among white women). The key to understanding the 
ambition-gap is understanding the different motivations for the reasons why men and 
women do decide to run for office. When Debbie Walsh, director of the Center for 
American Women in Politics, who moderated the NCSL Women’s Legislative Network’s 
30th Anniversary Luncheon in the summer of 2015, stated “women run to do something 
and men run to be somebody” she received an applause and a standing ovation from the 
room of about 100 women state legislators and staff in agreement. The notion that 
women representatives are more likely to choose to engage in legislative work because of 
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a desire to accomplish substantive outcomes on behalf of others, rather than because of a 
self-interest in establishing a political career, was not only immensely popular in the 
room, but also the description of male ambition appeared to be something female 
legislators lamented about their male colleagues. In each one of my interviews I started 
the conversation with a question about the reasons the legislator chose to run for office. 
Many of the responses, without any prompt, involved a discussion of community, 
identity, and a desire for political inclusion. One Midwestern minority woman articulated 
this sense well in her analogy of “adding a voice to a chorus”: 
When I made the decision to run…it was to add my voice to the chorus, 
and not merely a chorus that is older white males, farmers, ranchers, 
or attorneys, but a chorus that I didn’t always think included the 
perspective of...quite frankly a black person who did not grow up in 
poverty. So often we engage and relate to people of color from a 
position of ‘aww you poor thing, I’m up here, you’re down there’- 
that’s just another version of racism as far as I’m concerned.   
Minority woman, August 19, 2014 
The Midwestern legislator’s response clearly shows the desire for political 
inclusion and her attention to the need for diversity to create political inclusion. Her focus 
on identity and racism suggest that her motivation for representation comes from a sense 
of group belonging. Her response also indicates an important note on diversity within 
racial and ethnic groups, and how members of minority groups are perceived. This 
legislator points out that political exclusion is related to stereotypes, and even racism, 
because there are assumptions made (in this case about class) about members of minority 
groups. Through our conversation this legislator illustrated a need for more descriptive 
representation of historically underrepresented groups. She suggested that because of the 
diversity within these identity groups it is impossible for one, or a few, legislators to 
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sufficiently represent the group. In other words, while she recognized the need for 
descriptive representation to further the agenda of marginalized groups, she bemoaned 
the essentialism and stereotypes attached to them. 
I found the Midwestern minority woman’s response, and the notion of running for 
office for the sake of representation, a very important piece to understanding 
representation itself. Many of my conversations led me to see that for minorities and 
women, ambition for political office is intimately linked with whom the legislator is 
seeking to represent, and that their ambition is often linked to identity and political 
exclusion. I spoke with a Latino (male) representative who shared his perspective on 
whom he represents, whom he perceives to be part of his “constituency”.  
I represent working people and there are aspects of our working class 
that have to also be paid special attention; and (social) treatment, 
whether they be people of color, communities of color, and other 
protected classes, but my district, which is, you know, about 85% white, 
the largest minority is probably Asians, certainly is Asians. We don’t 
know the full count on Latinos, but I know that it’s larger than those 
who might be registered to vote.    
Latino, August 22, 2014 
Intriguingly, this representative acknowledged that he represents several 
constituencies, and he also offered that some of these constituencies were not 
geographically defined, nor confined to the district. Instead, his response included a 
discussion of constituencies defined by social status (workers), identity, and geography. 
His response points to the acknowledgement that legislation affects groups across the 
state and not just within a certain district, and that his goals of representation are to 
further the agendas of working people. In his response to why he is politically engaged, 
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this legislator spoke for a long while about the political exclusion of certain groups and 
how that affected his desire to run for office. He continued:  
So, I guess I’m supposed to answer why I’m involved? That’s why, I 
want to help our community make a difference, wherever we are; 
whether we’re in the Eastern part of the state…we need to represent 
one way or the other. That means stepping up and running for all the 
various offices that are out there, committees and commissions to 
higher elected office.  
Latino male, August 22, 2014 
It is worth noting that throughout our conversation this legislator used 
“community” and “Latinos” or “people of color" interchangeably, suggesting that for 
him, constituency must not necessarily be geographically defined, but rather defined by a 
shared identity and group membership.  He also indicated the need for more minority 
representation, similarly to the Midwestern minority woman’s earlier response. Again, 
indicating that there is an expectation that these representatives will work on behalf of the 
identity group, and that more representatives of the same background would result in a 
smaller individual share of representing the salient identity constituency. This 
representative also very clearly illustrated the notion of surrogate representation, that the 
representation of the identity group is not geographically defined, but that it can 
transcend the district lines. His words, “wherever we are”, suggests that the electoral 
connection is inconsequential to the moral obligation and personal desire to represent 
members of the identity group. 
In all of my conversations with state legislators, whether male or female, and 
whether white or a racial/ethnic minority, they indicated an expectation that there were 
differences in perspective, style, and/or policy priorities along the lines of gender and/or 
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race/ethnicity. They also suggested that issues defined along the lines of identity would 
be best represented, or more likely to be brought to the attention of the chamber, by a 
member of the same identity group. Speaking to her gender, one minority female 
representative stated: 
 Women bring a different perspective into government. Women 
understand the intimate needs of families, they understand you 
know…not saying that men don’t understand it, but you know women 
live that every day, making sure that our families are okay. So we bring 
that unique perspective, I would say that intimacy into government. 
Women, we care more, we feel more emotionally attached, so you 
know, we want to bring people to government  
Minority Woman, August 21, 2014 
Interestingly, a white male representative echoed that there may be a need for 
more women in government, but found it important to give a caveat in his saying that: 
“I’m all for more women- unless it’s my seat” (Personal Communication, August 6, 
2015). None of the women or minority representatives I spoke with included the same 
sense of self-interest in discussing the role of gender and race/ethnicity in the legislature. 
As I have argued, one of the predominant implications of marginalization among 
legislators is that they will perceive of their group members as salient identity 
constituencies. I spoke with an Asian American state legislator from the Northwest who 
distinguished her multiple constituencies very clearly and deliberately.  
I have a dual constituency, and really I have three constituencies- One, 
my district, they are the ones who elected me and I represent them very 
well. Two, immigrants, there are few immigrants in the legislature (an 
Indian, a Latino, a European…). Three, Koreans, I speak Korean, and 
I ‘m the only one who represents this community  
Minority woman, August 4, 2015 
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Importantly, this response was to the question “Who do you represent?” 
indicating that this is her natural perception of her constituencies and who she represents. 
Further, the theory suggests that one of the implications of raised identity salience and 
increased interest in identity policy preferences is for marginalized legislators to have a 
different “home” style behavior that includes representing identity based constituents 
regardless of residency in the electoral district. The state legislator’s response very 
clearly separates her district constituencies from her two identity-based constituencies. 
Importantly, she does not say “immigrants in my district” or “Koreans in my district”.  
Fenno (1978) argued that legislators have several constituencies within the district 
(the broadest constituency). He expected that legislators may have strong supporters from 
a “primary” constituency, which might have included such identity based groups in the 
electoral district. Instead, and this was further clarified in our conversation, these 
constituencies are groups of individuals who do not necessarily reside in the district. In 
addition, the constituencies she described were clearly defined by a shared identity. 
Fenno (2003), who finds similar behavior and perception among African American 
members of Congress, calls a national constituency of African Americans a “fourth” 
constituency for these members. Carroll (2002) finds the same among women members 
of Congress, as does Htun (2014) among Afrodescendant legislators in Latin America. 
The perception of a surrogate constituency, a constituency which is not defined by 
geography and includes constituents who may not live in the district is what I argue is the 
result of a raised identity salience due to marginalization. That marginalization is the 
foundation for conceiving of salient identity constituencies is made clear in the 
legislator’s statement as she points out that she’s “the only one” representing those 
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communities. In so doing, she is dually signaling that the groups are under-represented, 
and that the groups are in need of representation, and, in other words have been 
historically overlooked. 
Similarly, but in an admittedly more leading question about extra-district 
representation, I asked: “do you represent anyone who is not in your district?” One black 
woman legislator from the Midwest said: 
I would absolutely consider the black church a constituency…when it’s 
time to run, or to give me support, the African American churches, 
which might not be in the boundaries of my district [support me].  
Minority woman, August 19, 2014 
While, again the question was specifically asking about representation beyond the 
district, it is noteworthy that she responded with an identity group. In addition, such a 
specific perception of the constituency also shows that she is not speaking about a broad 
notion of representation, a hill style, where granted all citizens in the district admittedly 
are affected by her presence in the legislature. Instead, she is pinpointing a very specific 
constituency, beyond the district, which is tied to her identity.  
 For many minority legislators the distinction between identity-based 
representation and representation of the district specifically can be difficult to make as 
many minority representatives are elected from districts that are at least somewhat 
diverse, if not majority-minority. Thus it is important to distinguish between 
constituencies and activities that are in- versus outside- the district when examining these 
differences. One minority legislator spoke specifically about the difference between his 
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district constituency, which is mostly white, and his identity based constituency 
(Latinos):   
We have a whole different opportunity now for Latinos in the 
legislature with the largest delegation we’ve ever had in the history of 
the state. All of us unfortunately, well, I shouldn’t say unfortunately, 
but it should be noted that we come from the western part of the state, 
mostly white suburbs, although the minority vote was irrelevant to our 
election, but all of us are very involved with minority issues.  
Minority male, August 22, 2014 
His statement shows clear evidence for surrogate representation. He defines a 
constituency based on identity and then specifically states that there is no electoral 
connection to this constituency. He also implicates that other minority legislators are 
engaging in the same surrogate behavior by stating that they are all involved in issues that 
affect this minority constituency despite the fact that there is no electoral connection 
between the representation and the ability of voters to hold the representatives 
accountable. Instead, it is clear that the motivation for representation is tied to a personal 
obligation rather than instrumental goals.  
To understand how he prioritizes issues, or handles any tension or conflicts 
caused by his divided attention, I pushed further on the notion of the surrogate 
constituency; he responded:  
My district has been very understanding, it’s never an issue for me to 
work on these other things. Which is funny because I know a lot of my 
Democratic leadership was afraid that I was going too far out and that 
I was going to make myself problematic in my district…but in the two 
elections since I was elected, the 2010 and again now, these are non-
issues.  
Minority male, August 22, 2014 
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Although he acknowledged that his attention is indeed divided between his 
district constituency and his surrogate constituency, he said that any tension created by 
his out-of-district attention is now a non-issue, and that clearly he was still sufficiently 
working on behalf of his district since he was re-elected twice. He also touches on 
another very important circumstance, the perception of the Democratic leadership. He 
notes that the Democratic leadership expressed concern about his surrogate behavior and 
how it might impact his relationship with, and his electability in, his district. This shows 
the contrast between their priorities in that the Democratic leadership clearly expects 
legislators to be primarily concerned with the district, whereas the marginalized legislator 
displayed a moral obligation to represent the salient identity constituency.  
3.3.2 Extra Layers of Marginalization and Surrogate Representation 
The bond of surrogate representation is the strongest, and the most likely, when it 
comes from the basis of identity, and particularly a salient identity such as race, ethnicity, 
and/or gender (Mansbridge 1999, 2003). Scholars have argued that the strong bond is 
created through a shared experience of historical marginalization for members of the 
group; in its strongest forms this shared experience can form a sense of group 
consciousness or linked fate among members (Dawson 1994; Mansbridge 1999). When 
conducting interviews with the various state representatives, I noticed a degree of 
variation in their likelihood to discuss either salient identity constituencies, or surrogate 
representation. The first distinction was, as expected, between individuals who identified 
as minorities or as women or both, in comparison to white men. These individuals, as 
discussed in the previous section, tended to discuss a moral obligation to represent their 
identity group. The discussion of salient identity constituencies, and an identity-
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community as constituency was particularly common among minority women, which was 
the expectation based on the literature. According to the theory of strategic 
intersectionality, minority women should be the most likely to perceive of salient identity 
constituencies as they would be likely to seek to represent their district, women, and 
members of their minority group. However, I found a second distinction after noticing 
that there was a higher degree of variation than I expected among the minority women 
interviewees.  
After engaging in multiple conversations about representation and attending 
several workshops and panels addressing the issue, it became clear to me that there was a 
lot of variation in terms of whether legislators naturally perceived of multiple 
constituencies, but also I saw a difference in the perception of whether there was a 
perceived need for representation of other groups. I considered, in particular, two 
interviewees in 2014, and some confirming conversations in 2015, whose responses were 
initially surprising given the literature I had reviewed on minority and women’s 
representation. In 2014, I spoke at length with a minority woman legislator from the 
South. I asked her about why she ran for office, who she represents, and her perception of 
gender and race/ethnicity in the legislature. I found in her answers that she was 
particularly concerned with “community.” I pushed her on this definition to understand 
how she perceived of community, and found it was geographically determined. In 
response to my question “Whom do you represent”, she responded:  
I’m representing the voices of the district I was elected from, and each 
and every bill, they become a law over this whole state…so I look at it 
from, how will this touch my community that I’m representing? and 
how will it touch the rest of the community when there are bills with 
state-wide implications?   Minority woman, August 21, 2014 
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Clearly, this minority woman representative took a much more traditional 
approach, as we would expect following Fenno’s (1978) definition of constituency and 
home-style behaviors. She’s representing her district though she does also recognize that 
her legislative activities, such as bill-writing, for the most part, affects the whole state, 
but she does define a salient identity constituency. She went on to state that her key goal 
is to represent the communities closest to her, so I followed up asking about these 
communities which she considered are the “closest”, again keeping in mind the 
ambiguity in the words “community” (which can be geographically defined or not) and 
“closest” (which can refer to either proximity or feeling), and she responded: 
The (communities closest to me), that would be my district 
communities. I have Hispanics, Asians, Africans, the Black 
community…everything that we do will touch each community either 
positively or negatively, and I try to make sure that nothing that I do 
will touch any of those communities negatively as much as possible.  
Minority woman, August 21, 2014 
This is an important departure from the earlier discussions of surrogate 
representation, as this minority woman is focusing her scope of representation on a 
dyadic, within-district, relationship; a geographically defined constituency. That said, she 
is specifically defining communities within her district by race and ethnicity. The finding 
was counter to my initial expectations; I expected a minority woman to perceive of 
multiple constituencies including both minorities and women, and that those would not 
be geographically defined.  
To make matters more confounding, I later spoke with a minority male 
representative from the Northwest, whom I introduced in the previous section. His 
responses indicated he clearly perceived of salient identity constituencies that were not 
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geographically defined, and acknowledged his engagement in surrogate representation. 
These early interactions caused me to further examine how context affected these 
legislators. I sought out to understand why a minority woman, with dual marginalization, 
would be less perceptive of multiple constituencies and why a minority man would be 
more perceptive of multiple constituencies. Some key pieces in the conversation with the 
minority male legislator pushed my theory about how legislative context affects behavior. 
In particular, the legislator discussed how the institutional marginalization of his identity 
group impacted his behavior: “I know that the lack of Latino leadership at the legislative 
level requires me to also be aware of those issues [in other parts of the state] too” 
(08/22/2014). His argument suggested that as a Latino he would always acknowledge 
Latino interests, that is act as a descriptive representative; however, what really pushed 
him to not just support but champion these issues, and to be aware of issues tied to 
Latinos outside of his district is the fact that there are very few Latinos in his legislature. 
In other words, he felt not only socially marginalized as a member of a minority identity 
group, but also, given how few members of his identity group are legislative leaders, it 
means he felt a stronger responsibility to represent this constituency. I reflected on the 
responses from the minority woman from the South and considered her context and 
realized that in her state minority women hold a relatively larger proportion of seats. In 
other words, there are either sufficient descriptive representatives causing less of a need 
for legislators to act as surrogates, or there is sufficient representation of groups’ interests 
to not warrant a need for surrogate representation.  
The theoretical addition of institutional marginalization was supported when in 
2015, I spoke with a minority woman legislator from a state with over 30% women. As 
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introduced above, while she acknowledged several constituencies, her district, 
immigrants, and Koreans; she did not mention women, instead her non-district, identity 
based constituencies were all based on an institutional marginalization. Her responses, 
“there are few immigrants in the legislature”, “I’m the only one representing this 
[Korean] community” specifically address how group proportions affect her perceptions. 
She may not have perceived of the same moral obligation because comparatively her 
legislature boasts a large number of women. 
3.3.3 Divided We Lose: group size & cleavages 
The qualitative evidence in this chapter supports the expectation that individuals 
who belong to a socially marginalized group are likely to perceive of salient identity 
constituencies: if those individuals are also marginalized in their organization (such as 
legislators), they are more likely to engage with those salient identity constituencies 
through surrogate representation. Just as curious is the behavior of individual group 
members of non-token groups; as the group’s proportion grows why do individuals 
become less motivated to work for surrogate constituencies? The answer is, in part, that 
as group proportion grows (but is less than dominant), individuals become more likely to 
free-ride, they perceive that their group will still receive substantive benefits without 
his/her own participation in ensuring those benefits (Olson, 1967). Further, as Kanthak & 
Krause (2012) show, as the group grows, internal cleavages become more apparent and 
group members are less likely to value each other highly (Kanthak and Krause 2012). 
Much of the literature on women’s participation in particular, and minority representation 
broadly speaking, suggests that once the group reaches a so-called critical mass that 
opportunities for effective substantive representation will be more likely (Dahlerup 
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2006). The concept of the critical mass, and group proportion’s conditional effects, harks 
back to Kanter (1977) who shows that an individual’s effectiveness is tied to the group’s 
proportion in the legislature (Kanter 1977; Saint-Germain 1989). Given the variation in 
success of legislatures with critical mass to produce effective substantive representation, 
more recent literature has attempted to evaluate what causes this variation (Celis et al. 
2008; Childs and Krook 2008). Many of these explanations have related to women’s 
positions in the legislature and recognized that they are more likely to hold rank-and-file 
positions than legislative leadership positions (Childs and Krook 2008). Kanthak and 
Krause (2012), however; argue that once group proportions reach closer to what could be 
considered a critical mass (about 30%), then the group is much less likely to be cohesive 
and act as a group. When the group is marginalized, it is more likely to act cohesively as 
a group, and they coin this phenomenon the “Diversity Paradox” (2012). Kanthak and 
Krause (2012) argue that a growing group can be more effective if there are 
organizational tools, such as caucuses, to create cohesion (Kanthak and Krause 2012). 
Both the literature and the present findings support the expectation that having a 
strong legislative caucus can be important in ensuring the legislative effectiveness of 
substantive representation of a group (Kanthak and Krause 2012). This is important as it 
speaks to the relationship between individual behavior and legislative effectiveness. 
Importantly, legislative effectiveness is different from individual behaviors in engaging 
with or supporting identity constituencies. There is an important distinction here to be 
made between the organized group behavior and the behavior and attitudes of individuals 
who belong to an identity group. One of the challenges for legislators, particularly 
marginalized legislators, is how to best be effective in achieving legislative outcomes 
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(e.g. passing bills). Though most of this study examines legislator’s motivations and 
prioritizations in behavior, a question of effectiveness arises, particularly as marginalized 
legislators by definition are under-represented in the legislature. Most legislators choose 
to join several caucuses in order to overcome some of the collective action problems 
associated with governance (Hammond 2001). Kanthak and Krause (2012) argue that 
establishing organization is imperative to further the interests of marginalized groups, 
particularly as the group grows, because the Diversity Paradox predicts that individual 
efforts are less likely under non-token conditions (Kanthak and Krause 2012). In other 
words, if marginalization is likely to lead to an increase in identity-based efforts, 
conversely, less marginalization leads to a lower individual effort. Kanthak and Krause 
(2012) argue that organization is a useful tool in combating this decreased effort. I argue 
that marginalized legislators are likely to perceive of a need for organization to further 
identity-based interests and that organizations, such as caucuses, are tools marginalized 
legislators may use to gain attention and support for their efforts. That said, given the 
parameters of this study in examining individual legislative behavior and motivation, I 
make no expectations regarding the effectiveness of caucuses for policy development. As 
of 2016 eleven states did not have some mechanism for organization among women 
(NCSL 2016); however, the organizational strength and membership (partisan vs. non-
partisan) varies much across the groups (Kanthak and Krause 2012). 
The Women’s Legislative Network (WLN), a sub-organization of the National 
Conference of State Legislatures;  is a bi-partisan organization with automatic 
membership of all women state legislators in the United States (including territories). 
According to the Network’s first president who spoke at the 30th Anniversary, the 
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Network was established in 1985 in response to a statement made by then- President of 
the NCSL (a white man). In a discussion of having a female president he remarked, “over 
my dead body”. In reflecting on the occasion she said, “that was totally 
unacceptable…we had to get organized” (08/05/15). She further discussed the creation of 
the Network, and she illustrated how women at the time were in a position where they 
were marginalized in many legislatures but there was a sufficient number of women 
overall to warrant a need for an organization, which could further women’s interests 
broadly speaking, and in a bi-partisan way. Creating an organized network does not only 
create coordination among members, it also signals the importance of the groups’ issues 
to the rest of the legislative membership and to the citizenry. One Latino legislator 
discussed how creating a Latino caucus could help further the Latino agenda, the 
challenges associated with doing so, and the importance of having strong support for the 
success of the caucus: 
We’re starting a Latino Legislative Caucus, they [the Democratic 
leadership] haven’t yet said anything about it, they haven’t told me I 
can’t yet though. We are still somewhat ad-hoc to the House 
Democratic Caucus, we don’t get the same kind of support, staff 
support that the other committees might get, and I think that the party 
really wants to show that they are in all the way to help us. They should 
be doing that, because the more we can elevate the issues that are 
important to our communities, the more the communities will start to 
recognize they don’t have to be robbed to make that work.  
Minority man, August 22, 2014 
Another reason for decreased motivation to represent salient identity constituents 
in a non-token context, is that as a group grows, differences among the group become 
more apparent and will make cleavages more likely (Olson 1965). Formal coordination 
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helps insure that the focus is on the broader goals of the whole membership; however, 
this focus can be tested even from within the membership.  
The impression of within-group differences and cleavages was felt strongly by the 
leadership of the Women’s Legislative Network during a business meeting in 2015 and 
also during the 30th Anniversary Luncheon later in the week. The 2015 business meeting, 
which included the Network leadership (of about 20 women), opened discussion 
surrounding the Network’s strategic plan for the future. The main goal was to establish 
goals, a mission statement, and plans for a time capsule for the Network. Some of the 
women board members felt that the goals of the Network should be about “encouraging 
women to run, all women, of all parties” (08/02/2015). According to the veteran 
legislators, this has been a general part of the mission previously; however, it had not 
been previously codified. This statement created a murmured response from some 
legislators in the room. The president-elect, a white woman from one of the Plains states, 
stated that, “we need to move away from talking about ‘all women’” (08/02/2015). She 
argued that a more partisan approach was necessary, and that there was “no longer” a 
need to pay special attention to women’s issues and women’s representation broadly 
speaking. In her tirade she went on to question the very existence of the network itself. 
She brought up a previous meeting of the top Network leadership where some of these 
discussions had also taken place and reflected on her statement, then saying “I don’t even 
know why we were there” (08/02/2015). This statement created a lot of tension, and 
visibly angered some of the others, particularly the minority women in the room, who felt 
that women legislators have yet to achieve parity in either numbers or power and that 
they still need to work together “across the aisles (of partisanship)” (08/02/2015). This 
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statement by the President-elect came at the business meeting on the first day of the 
Summit and framed the rest of the week as many conversations among legislators took 
place about this statement. Most of these conversations were in opposition to the 
President-elect’s statements, and most were among women of color. This observation 
highlights the need for accounting for additional cleavages, especially race and ethnicity. 
The exchange also offers an example of the concept of institutional marginalization and 
the diversity paradox. As the theory suggests, white women, who are dominant within the 
Women’s Legislative Network (i.e. among women legislators), were less motivated to 
create a mission focused on all women, seeking instead to focus on non-identity based 
issues. Conversely, the marginalized group (i.e. minority women), supported a continued 
effort and stated mission focusing on the needs of women.   
The cleavage between white women and women of color became especially 
apparent during the Anniversary Luncheon when the panel of women who had held 
legislative leadership positions (all white women) was opened up to the audience for 
questions. One black woman state legislator asked the panel, and the room, “What do we 
do to push women of color because it’s even more difficult as a woman of color- we 
don’t take time to learn each other’s culture” (08/06/2015). The first two panelists 
ignored the specific question of race, but rather focused on the broader notion of women. 
One of them highlighted the institutional marginalization of women broadly and the 
importance on the broader identity of women without the race/ethnicity cleavage and said 
“when I first started there were very few women, really trying to take time to meet with 
each other; we do still have something in common- it takes working together” 
(08/06/2015). The third panelist responded to the question with “color-blindness, we’re 
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all the same” (08/06/2015). This statement created enormous tension in the room. One 
group of women of color, who were all seated at one table in the back, were not only 
visibly but audibly agitated at the notion, many of them rolling their eyes in contempt. 
One black woman legislator sitting next to me leaned over to say “this is what white 
privilege looks like!” (08/06/2015) a white woman legislator at the same table offered: 
“this is a reflection of her generation” (08/06/2015). The experienced moderator quickly 
gave some remarks about the diversity of women in state legislatures and closed the 
panel. However, the table discussions, and soon hallway discussions rose with tensions 
mostly along racial lines. This event clearly indicated that an intersectional cleavage 
along the line of race, exists within this group of women. The need, and truly the plea, for 
women of color was founded in the recognition that while women as a whole are 
reaching beyond a minority position in state legislative politics, broadly speaking, 
minority women are still in many ways marginalized. The failure of the white woman 
panelist to recognize this was also tied to her perception of the marginalization of women 
broadly speaking and a need to find common ground for all women because of her 
perhaps dated perception. Understanding these types of cleavages are important to the 
theory of salient identity constituencies, because it signals that having minorities and 
women in legislatures is insufficient, and that there is a need for minority women. 
Relatedly, such cleavages signal a need to study identity-based representation through the 
lens of race/ethnicity and gender. This exchange highlights how minority women 
perceive of issues related to women and minorities writ large, but also minority women 
specifically, in other words highlighting the dual marginalization of women. 
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 Implications 
The findings in this chapter mostly serve as a theory-building exercise in 
understanding how marginalization in two contexts affects the perception of salient 
identity constituencies, which can then further lead to a surrogate view of home style 
behavior. The findings show that there is support for the notion that state legislators who 
belong to marginalized groups can perceive of, and represent, salient identity 
constituencies in addition to their district constituency, at least along the lines of 
race/ethnicity and gender. Further, the qualitative methods allowed for a deeper 
understanding of marginalization in multiple contexts, which otherwise might not have 
been explored. The findings show that social marginalization and institutional 
marginalization have an effect on perceptions of constituency. I showed that these effects 
can be seen as layers of identity that shape behavior, where social marginalization may be 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for surrogate representation. The interviews 
conducted clearly delineated this duality, or layers, of marginalization: 
So I’ve always been aware of the plight of minorities and what my 
father and his grandmother, my great grandmother, have done to make 
me, obviously, be self-aware of these things … the number of 
legislators of color is not proportionate to the demographics in the 
state…and it’s particularly true for Latinos  
Minority man, August 22,2014 
 There are several implications of perceiving of salient identity 
constituencies for surrogate activities and home style behavior. The finding that 
legislators are motivated to represent on behalf of multiple constituencies (both a district 
and a salient identity constituency), and constituencies that are not necessarily electorally 
bound suggests that there is reason to believe that legislators may engage in surrogate 
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activities that expand our notion of “home” style. This is an important step in the broader 
study of representation because it suggests an important normative point about our 
democracy. If representatives are actively seeking to represent citizens to which there is 
no link of accountability, it indicates a previously overlooked strength of our democratic 
system. It also raises questions about whether marginalized legislators, broadly speaking, 
are experiencing tensions between their identity group, their district, and/or their party, 
and also whether their multiple constituencies are resulting in a larger proportion of work 
to respond to those constituencies. In terms of surrogate representation, recognizing 
salient identity constituencies is but one step in examining this concept. The qualitative 
data serves an important role in understanding motivations and unrestricted attitudes 
about the concept of representation and constituency, but this chapter does not show the 
implications for legislative behavior. Questions remain regarding activities on behalf of 
surrogate constituencies; how many engage in surrogate behaviors? Does marginalization 
predict surrogate behavior? And is the theory built here  part of a larger pattern of 
representation among legislators? I test these implications in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Going the Extra Mile: Surrogate Activities of State 
Legislators 
In this chapter, I examine the implications of the salient identity constituency 
theory on state legislators’ hill (policy development) and, particularly, home 
(constituency service) style behaviors presented in Chapter 2. The theory suggests that 
legislators who are socially or institutionally marginalized will have a raised identity 
salience and an increased interest in identity-based policy preferences, which results in 
perceiving of group members, regardless of their geographical residency, as a salient 
identity constituency (See Chapter 3). Having such a perception of a non-geographically 
defined constituency generates several testable implications. First, it implies that 
marginalized legislators should seek to represent their salient identity constituency in 
addition to their electoral district, resulting in a higher demand on their time. In other 
words, that they will work more. In addition, marginalized legislators will seek to 
represent their salient identity constituency through both policy development efforts (hill 
style) and constituency service (home style). I rely on the “Representation in U.S. State 
Legislatures” survey which I conducted in 2015, along with some qualitative data from 
the 2014 and 2015 NCSL Legislative Summit to test these claims.  
 Motivations for Legislative Behavior 
Mayhew’s (1974) theory of legislative behavior, on which most contemporary 
studies of legislative behavior relies, suggests that legislators are rational and unitary 
actors who are singularly interested in re-election. He argues that the activities of 
legislators can ultimately be categorized into advertising, credit claiming, and position-
taking; but that each of these behaviors are intimately tied with the desire to be re-elected 
(Mayhew 1974). The primary concern of a legislator in Mayhew’s theory is the electoral 
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connection between the legislator and the voters in the district, as the key to re-election is 
sufficient voter support. Fenno (1978) agrees with Mayhew that re-election is, at least, a 
primary goal for legislators. He argues that to achieve the goal of re-election, legislators 
must necessarily develop the electoral connection by engaging with their constituents at 
“home” (Fenno 1978). In understanding the “home style” of legislators, Fenno suggests 
that legislators have multiple and nested constituencies, the broadest of which is the 
district. This argument is based in a rationalist theory of behavior which recognizes that 
not all residents of the districts are members of the same party as their legislator, and 
thereby are less motivated and less likely to contribute to the legislator’s goal of re-
election. Thus, efforts should be focused on the smaller, but district based, constituencies, 
narrowing a legislator’s focus. If, as Mayhew (1974) and Fenno (1978) argue, the 
constituency is bound to the district and legislative representation is motivated solely by 
electoral gains, then logic would follow that legislators’ efforts should be focused on 
engaging in activities that benefit the district, a highly instrumental view of 
representation. However, the salient identity constituency view of representation suggests 
that because of social and institutional marginalization, legislators are motivated by a 
moral obligation to represent an identity-based constituency. 
There is a growing literature examining the behavior of minority and women 
elected officials (Broockman 2013, 2014; Butler and Broockman 2011; Grose, Mangum, 
and Martin 2007; Hardy-Fanta et al. 2016; Mendez and Grose 2014; Navarro, Hernandez, 
and Navarro, Leslie 2016). Much of this literature has examined the extent to which 
minority and women representatives echo the preferences of their identity groups, in what 
is known as the link between descriptive (standing for) and substantive (acting for) 
85 
 
representation (Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Dovi 2002; Michele Swers 2002; 
Minta 2009, 2012b; Pitkin 1967; Robert R Preuhs 2006b; Reingold and Haynie 2014; 
Reingold and Swers 2011; Swers 2005). The literature has shown that in most cases 
legislators echo the preferences of their identity group, and are more or less successful in 
their outcomes (Childs and Krook 2008; Kanthak and Krause 2012; Minta 2009; Osborn 
and Mendez 2010; Osborn 2012; Reingold and Swers 2011). These studies have shown 
that women are more likely to support issues related to women such as children and 
families, healthcare, violence against women, and education (S. J. Carroll 2002b; S. 
Carroll 2003; Osborn 2012; Swers 2002, 2013, 2016), and that minority legislators 
similarly engage in issues related to minorities’ and women’s marginalized position in 
society, such as healthcare, unemployment, education, race relations, and public safety 
(Barrett 1995; Brown 2010; Minta 2009, 2011; Orey, Overby, and Larimer 2007; Whitby 
1997).  
The literature on policy preferences and legislative behavior has provided much 
evidence that minority and women legislators do provide substantive representation on 
the basis of their descriptive features. However, by looking primarily at the alignment of 
policy preferences, the literature has been less adept at considering the target of 
substantive representation. In other words, this scholarship looks at one half of legislative 
behavior- the “hill style”, the behavior that legislators engage in at the legislature such as 
roll call voting, bill sponsorship, and committee assignments. However, legislators also 
engage in a tremendous amount of constituency service; meeting with constituents and 
helping them solve problems they are faced with (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1979, 
1984; Norris 1997). Considering the evidence that minority and women legislators 
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provide substantive representation through their position as descriptive representatives, a 
question has been posed of whether so-called descriptive representatives represent 
minorities and women who live both within and outside the district boundaries as 
identity-based constituencies (S. J. Carroll 1989; Fenno 2003; Htun 2014).  
Mansbridge (2003) provides a framework for distinguishing between 
representation in and outside of the district, which she calls “surrogate representation”. 
Mansbridge (2003) argues that surrogate representation should be more likely when the 
legislator belongs to an historically excluded group including women and racial/ethnic 
minorities. She asserts that  the “sense of surrogate responsibility becomes stronger when 
the surrogate representative shares experiences with constituents in a way that a majority 
of the legislature does not” (Mansbridge 2003, 523. Original emphasis). She continues to 
say that legislators who have a shared experience with an identity group “feel not only a 
particular sensitivity to issues relating to these experiences, but also a particular 
responsibility for representing the interests and perspectives of these groups, even when 
members of these groups do not constitute a large fraction of their [district] constituents” 
(Mansbridge 2003, 523). She argues that having a marginalized position leads to a moral 
obligation to represent group members.  
There is a smaller, but growing literature, which has examined minority and 
women’s representation in these terms, suggesting that marginalized legislators have 
intrinsic motivation to represent group members broadly speaking (Broockman 2013; S. 
J. Carroll 2002a; Fenno 2003; Htun 2014). Carroll (2002), Fenno (2003), and Htun 
(2014), each show that marginalized legislators perceive of identity group members as 
constituents broadly speaking, and will seek to represent identity-based constituents in 
87 
 
what Fenno (2003) calls a “fourth, national constituency” (Fenno 2003). These studies 
collectively explain the social foundations for a moral obligation to represent group 
members, including African Americans (Fenno 2003), women (S. J. Carroll 2002a), and 
Afrodescendant women in Latin America (Htun 2014) by using in depth interviews and 
case studies. However, these studies fall a bit short in exploring the implications on 
particular legislative behaviors, and distinguishing between within, and outside, district 
activities. Broockman (2013) fills this gap, somewhat, by showing that African American 
state legislators respond to constituency service requests from African American 
constituents regardless of district residency.  
Mansbridge’s (2003) theory of surrogate representation has been predominantly 
linked to identity-based representation as described above. However, her statement that 
the “sense of surrogate responsibility becomes stronger when the surrogate representative 
shares experiences with surrogate constituents in a way that a majority of the legislature 
does not” (Mansbridge 2003,523) signals a need to consider the proportion of seats held 
by the legislator’s identity group. Though the institutional context has been implicitly 
examined as many women and minority legislators, and particularly minority women 
legislators, tend to hold a small proportion of seats in legislatures, the impact of what I 
refer to as institutional marginalization, or group proportion, on individual behavior has 
been understudied.  
A parallel literature of the effect of group proportion has existed since about the 
late 1970’s, and has focused predominantly on the behavior of women. In particular, the 
question of the need for a, so-called, critical mass came into foray in the late 1970’s 
following Kanter’s (1977) discussion of group proportions within organizations and the 
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notion of tokenism (see also Dahlerup 1988, 2006; Saint-Germain 1989). The term 
critical mass, which is borrowed from physics, refers to an “irreversible turning point”, or 
a starting point for change; and is expected to rest around 30% of group proportion 
(Dahlerup 2006). In other words, the theory suggested that women and minority 
legislators have not been able to exert change because they still hold a minority position 
in a majority rule institution.  
The study of institutional marginalization and critical mass has focused on the 
collective ability of a sub-set of legislators to pass legislation. The critical mass theory 
has received criticism over the years, in particular, in the face of evidence showing that 
the presence of high percentages (30%) of women in state legislatures and national 
legislatures across the globe has failed to bring the expected substantive changes (Celis et 
al. 2008; Childs and Krook 2008). Some scholars have argued that the critical mass 
argument fails to acknowledge the hierarchical structure and importance of gate keepers 
in the legislature and that women are less likely to hold such gate-keeping or leadership 
roles rendering them largely ineffective (Childs and Krook 2008). Others have argued 
that the soft or informal politics which happens behind the scenes, in “cigar filled 
backrooms” do not include women (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Others still have 
argued that as women become a larger minority group, there is less incentive to be 
constrained to the “essential” preferences of the marginalized group and the minority 
group becomes more likely to behave more mainstream, that is more like the majority 
(Kanthak and Krause 2012).  
Most of the criticisms of critical mass, and thereby the influence of group 
proportion, consider the collective ability or inability of the group to exert change. 
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However, some argue, as I will, that group proportion does not only affect the collective 
ability of the group to exert change, but also affects individual behavior as well. In “The 
Diversity Paradox”, Kanthak and Krause (2012) hold that institutional marginalization 
matters to the behavior of women (minority) legislators. They argue that barring 
institutional mechanisms incentivizing collective coordination among the minority group, 
that individually, these group members are likely to reduce their substantive 
representation of their social group as they increase in size (Kanthak and Krause 2012). 
They argue that as the group grows in size institutionally, so too does the incentive to 
“free-ride” on essential goals of the group. Institutional marginalization then creates a 
moral obligation for legislators to engage in representation of their group members in a 
way they might not if they were not marginalized. In other words, the recognition of 
being a token representative for that group creates an intrinsic incentive to represent that 
group (Gurin and Townsend 1986; McGuire and Padawer-Singer 1976; Sierra Leonard, 
Mehra, and Katerberg 2008). Since the group is defined along the lines of identity (race, 
ethnicity, and gender) and not geographical boundaries, the representation, both in terms 
of the constituency (who is represented) and the legislative behavior can be expected to 
transcend traditionally defined district constituencies (how they are represented). In this 
chapter, I extend Kanthak and Krause’s (2012) argument and test if marginalization 
affects individual legislative behavior, but particularly if social and institutional 
marginalization affects legislators’ individual behavior through their home-style. 
 Theory 
My expectation is that marginalization impacts legislators’ perception of 
constituency, that is, that they will perceive of an identity-based constituency, and 
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thereby have substantial effects on their legislative behavior. I make an assumption based 
on the literature, that marginalized legislators have a moral obligation to represent a 
salient identity constituency due to an empathetic understanding or “consciousness” of 
marginalized or under-represented constituencies’ experiences because of their own dual 
marginalization (Crenshaw 1989; Githens and Prestage 1977; Gurin and Townsend 1986; 
Gurin 1985). I expect that those legislators who are the most marginalized— minority 
women for social marginalization, and tokens for institutional marginalization— will be 
the most likely to represent salient identity constituents. Minority women are dually 
marginalized by both their gender and race/ethnicity and so are likely to represent two 
salient identity constituencies in addition to their district (S. J. Carroll 2002a; Crenshaw 
1993; Fraga et al. 2006, 2007; Githens and Prestage 1977; Htun 2014; Marin Hellwege 
and Sierra 2016). Tokens’ salient identity is stronger than non-tokens because their small 
group proportion leads to an awareness of their marginalized identity and thereby the 
marginalization of the identity group (Gurin 1985; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 1998b). I 
expect marginalized legislators to behave differently from non-marginalized legislators 
because their goals as legislators are not only tied to self-interest, but also to an interest to 
further the agenda of the group, and most importantly lend a voice to a group which has 
been historically excluded (Haynie 2001; Mansbridge 1999, 2003; Whitby 1997).  
Mansbridge (1999) suggests that diversifying a legislative body to allow for a 
discussion of previously uncrystallized interests is one of the main goals of descriptive 
representation, and as seen in the discussion of the literature, minorities and women do 
bring in a different set of interests. However, as noted, legislators are expected to have 
instrumental goals of re-election, and I maintain that for marginalized legislators, 
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traditional assumptions of legislative behavior, such as re-election, still hold true. 
However, I argue that marginalized legislators have additional pressures, albeit internal 
pressures, to represent a salient identity constituency. Because marginalized legislators 
have additional goals to represent salient identity constituencies, and additional 
motivations based in a moral obligation, we should expect that those additional pressures 
will also affect their legislative behavior, such as their view of constituency, the amount 
of work they engage in, and their propensity to provide services to constituents who do 
not live in the district. Since minority and women legislators want to represent other 
women and minorities to lend these groups a voice, and since these constituencies are 
defined by identity rather than geography, we should expect marginalized legislators will 
not be restricted by geographical boundaries in their representation. 
As discussed in the review of the literature, social marginalization (identity) alone 
is insufficient to explain variation in behaviors among women and minorities because it 
fails to take institutional context into account. We might reasonably expect that when an 
identity group has a non-token position in the legislature, individual members will feel 
less of a moral obligation to represent the identity group because of an expectation that 
there is sufficient representation available collectively (Kanthak and Krause 2012).  
Institutional marginalization, as I have defined it here, can be seen as a second 
layer of marginalization; while it is defined by identity, it emphasizes the proportion a 
legislator’s group holds in the legislature. The qualitative data from the 2014 and 2015 
NCSL Legislative Summit lent support to my argument that marginalized legislators 
perceive of salient identity constituencies as presented in Chapter 3. In comparing the 
qualitative data between an African American woman representative from a state with a 
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large African American population, a sizable (non-token) minority of African American 
women legislators, and a legacy of African American female leadership, to a Latino 
representative from a mostly white state with a recent, but growing, largely immigrant, 
Latino community and a small number of Latino legislators, the institutional context in 
terms of group proportions became evident. The African American woman indicated that 
most if not all of her legislative activities were motivated by her desire to represent her 
geographical district, where as the Latino (man) discussed how his identity-based 
constituency was a strong motivator for representation rather than his electoral 
constituency. Seemingly the degree of marginalization in the legislature explained 
variation among socially marginalized (minority) legislators.  
In a broad sense, I expect that both hill and home style behaviors will be affected 
by the perception of a salient identity constituency. I expect that marginalized legislators 
are more likely than non-marginalized legislators to meet with constituency groups that 
are defined by race/ethnicity and gender because they are more likely to perceive of 
identity-based groups as constituents. I also expect that the additive pressures 
marginalized legislators experience in representing both their district as well as at least 
one salient identity constituency, will result in marginalized legislators meeting with a 
larger number of groups. In other words, I expect that marginalized legislators do not 
shift their focus, but rather add to it. Relatedly, I expect that the workload should be 
greater for marginalized members as they seek to represent not only their electoral 
district, but also the salient identity constituency. As a consequence, they should spend 
significantly more time than white men on all of their legislative activities. I expect they 
will spend more time studying and developing legislation to meet the needs of their 
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several constituencies. I also expect that they will spend more time campaigning and 
fundraising as they are likely to do so both through traditional campaign avenues, 
highlighting interests of the district, but also particular rallies highlighting the symbolic 
values of minority and women representatives (such as rallies with NALEO, NOW, or 
the NAACP).5 Again, I expect all legislators do work long hours, and to fundraise (both 
in and outside the district), but I expect that marginalized legislators do so more. 
Similarly, I expect that marginalized legislators will write more legislation to respond to 
the added pressures, ultimately resulting in a higher number of bills, again an indication 
of an increased workload.  
I expect that marginalized legislators’ perception of salient identity constituencies 
expands the perception of home outside the district boundaries, that is, a surrogate 
perception of representation because salient identity constituencies are defined by identity 
rather than geography. I expect that marginalized legislators will seek to provide 
constituency service to their salient identity constituency regardless of geographic 
residency. Having a salient identity constituency further implies that marginalized 
legislators will meet with identity-based groups both within and outside district 
boundaries, and that they will provide constituency service on behalf of individuals who 
do not reside in the district. Legislators attend meetings and rallies with constituents 
frequently because it helps build the electoral connection, building rapport with the 
community (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1979, 1984; Fenno 1978; Norris 1997). I argue 
that marginalized legislators must respond to traditional district demands while also 
providing constituency service to the salient identity constituency, because they have a 
                                                 
5 National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, National Organization of Women, 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
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moral obligation to do so. Meeting the same pressures as other legislators and having 
additional constituency groups to respond to should ultimately result in a higher 
frequency of meetings with groups both in and outside of the district, a higher likelihood 
to meet with identity-based groups, and a higher likelihood to provide surrogate 
constituency service. 
4.2.1 Hypotheses 
To summarize my expectations presented in the previous section, I present the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4.1 Socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will meet with 
identity-based groups, both in general, and outside the district, more frequently 
than legislators who are not marginalized 
Hypothesis 4.2 Socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will meet with 
a larger number of types of groups, both in general, and outside the district, than 
legislators who are not marginalized 
Hypothesis 4.3 Socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will work more 
than legislators who are not marginalized.  
Hypothesis 4.4 Socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will provide 
constituency service on behalf of an extra-district constituency more frequently 
than legislators who are not marginalized. 
 Data and Methods 
To test the implications of the surrogate representation theory on legislators’ 
behavior, this study utilizes a survey of state legislators. The state level allows for 
sufficient variation for both social and institutional variation that a Congressional study 
would not be able to offer. There are no publically available datasets that specifically ask 
legislators to distinguish between activities within district and outside district, and about 
the motivations for legislative behavior. Thus, the data on legislative behaviors come 
from an original survey; the “Representation in U.S. State Legislatures” survey was 
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conducted in 2015. The text of the survey is available in Appendix D. All 5,437 lower 
state house representatives and assembly members in all U.S. states, and all senators from 
the unicameral Nebraska legislature were invited to participate.6 The survey was 
distributed in mixed modes, starting with an email invitation with an embedded link to an 
online Opinio© survey, a subsample of legislators was then sent paper surveys.7The sub-
sample was selected based on their identity with the goal of over-sampling women and 
minorities.8 The sub-sample included all 1,358 women and all minority (466, male) state 
representatives and assembly members in the U.S., as well as a random sample of 23 
white men per state for a total of 2,974 state representatives.9 Legislators were contacted 
a total of four times via email invitation. The online survey was first distributed to all 
representatives on February 18th, 2015, with a follow-up reminder on February 27th, 
2015. Starting on March 12th the invitation was sent to all representatives on a schedule 
based on the closing date of their legislative session10. The paper survey was mailed to 
the subsample on March 26, 2015.  
The total contact rate for e-mail invitations was high, 96.3% based upon an 
automated reply that I received from most state legislators (using AAPOR’s Contact Rate 
1),11 as can be expected with state legislators whose contact information is kept updated 
                                                 
6 See Appendix E for a copy of the e-mail invitation 
7 A list of email and physical addresses was provided to me by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures 
8 Data on the gender and race/ethnicity of participants was provided to me by the National Conference of 
State Legislatures 
9 The number of white men was determined by a budget restriction. 
10Full schedule of dates: All: 02/18/15, 02/27/15; AR, KY, NM, SD, UT, VA, WV, WY: 03/12/2015, 
03/17/2015; AK, AZ, GA, ID, IN, MD, MS, MT, ND, TN, WA: 05/18/15, 05/25/2015; CO, FL, HI, IA, IL, 
KS, MN, MO, OK, VT: 06/02/15, 06/05/2015; AL, CT, DE, LA, ME, NC, NE, NH, NV, OR, RI, SC, TX: 
07/20/2015, 07/24/2015; CA, MA, MI, NJ, NY, OH, PA, WI: 03/12/2015, 04/15/2015, 05/15/2015. 
11 AAPOR’s Contact Rate 1 is calculated as: (I+P) +R+O / (I+P) +R+O+NC+ (UH + UO). Where I= 
Complete Interviews, P=Partial Interview, R=Refusals and Breakoffs, O=Other, NC=Non-Contact, 
UH=Unknown Household Occupied, and UO=Unknown, Other (AAPOR 2016). 
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regularly (AAPOR 2016). There were a total of 342 completed surveys, yielding a 6.3% 
response rate using AAPOR’s Response Rate 2 calculation, which includes both 
complete and partial responses (AAPOR 2016).12 Of these surveys, 215 were completed 
online (AAPOR RR2: 3.9%) and 127 were completed on paper (AAPOR RR2: 4.3%). 
The response rate for the Representation in U.S. State Legislature’s 2015 survey was 
significantly lower than earlier surveys of the same population (Maestas, Neeley, and 
Richardson 2003). I expect that part of the explanation for the low response rate, and the 
large gap between the contact rate and the response rate is that state legislators are highly 
likely to use automated replies for e-mail contact, as such the e-mail contact rate may be 
inflated. In addition, it was suggested to me by some legislators that they receive 
thousands of emails each week, and with the small staff they are provided they are not 
effectively able to filter through emails (personal communication 07/30/2015). One 
legislator in particular said that often times state legislators are not able to distinguish 
between legitimate research and spam, and err on the side of non-response (personal 
communication 08/05/2015). I expect a similar issue of filtering between legitimate 
research and what amount to political “spam” occurs for mail surveys. The final survey 
sample includes respondents from 48 of the 50 states.13 There are 36.4% women and 
63.6% males of which there were 27% white women, 9.4% minority women, 44.5% 
white men and 19.1% minority men. The sample is somewhat skewed towards minorities 
and women in comparison to the population of state representatives which include 19.7% 
                                                 
12 AAPOR’s Response Rate 2 is calculated as; (I+P)/(I+P) + (R+NC+O) + (UH+UO). Where I= Complete 
Interviews, P=Partial Interview, R=Refusals and Breakoffs, NC=Non-Contact, O=Other, UH=Unknown 
Household Occupied, and UO=Unknown, Other (AAPOR 2016).  
13 There were no respondents from Illinois or West Virginia 
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white women, 5.2% minority women, 66.5% white men and 8.6% minority men.14 
4.3.1 Measuring Marginalization 
I conduct two separate and parallel analyses to examine marginalization from two 
angles: marginalization in society (identity) and marginalization in the legislature (group 
proportion). I use four different categories of social identity based on race/ethnicity and 
gender: white men, minority men, white women, and minority women. This data was 
provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures. I focus the social 
marginalization analysis on minority women because these legislators are expected to be 
dually marginalized, and have multiple salient identity constituencies (women and 
minorities). I thus see them as a most likely case for engaging in surrogate representation 
in comparison to white women, minority men, and white men. I define institutional 
marginalization as the proportion of seats a legislator’s identity group holds in the 
chamber.  For example, in the North Carolina lower chamber there are eight African 
American women out of the total 120 seats, thus each African American female 
representative has a 5.8% group proportion. I code whether a legislator was institutionally 
marginalized or not using Kanter’s categories of group proportions in organizations: 
token group members with 15% or fewer legislators of the same race/ethnicity and gender 
in the legislature, minority group members with 15-30% of the legislature, balanced 
group members with 30-60% and dominant group members who hold at least 60% of the 
legislative seats.15  
I expect the results to be similar when comparing social and institutional 
                                                 
14 Because of the concern for skewed results the analyses were also run using probability weights; however, 
no significant differences were found. 
15 For example, if minority women in State “A” hold 5% of seats each minority woman in that state is 
coded as belonging to a “token” group. 
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marginalization given that in most cases minority women are token (correlation between 
the two measures is .80). However, there is a degree of variation between these variables; 
importantly, there are several cases where white women and minority men are tokens. In 
Oklahoma, for example, white women made up only 11.8% in 2015, and minority men 
only 3.8%. In some cases, such as Oklahoma, there are several token groups and one 
overwhelming dominant group. On the flip side, in New Mexico, which has no dominant 
group, both minority men and minority women enjoy a “minority” group position, 
whereas white women are tokens and white men hold a balanced group position. 
Importantly for comparison in the analysis is that to date, only white men have held a 
dominant position, and never a token position; thus I suggest that these analyses should 
be repeated if such circumstances occur. The comparisons do tell us an important story 
about how marginalization, and the burden it places on legislators to represent a salient 
identity constituency, impacts their legislative behavior. That said, it is important to note 
that these are separate analyses, while there is a degree of institutional variation, to a 
large degree (again, a correlation of 0.80), there is still significant overlap of categories. 
In most cases minority women are token and white men are dominant, and the majority of 
shifts exist among white women and minority men.  
4.3.2 Measuring Legislative Activity 
This study uses several different dependent variables to examine the implications 
of perceiving salient identity constituencies and to test the resulting hypotheses. All of the 
activities are based on self-reported answers to questions from the 2015 State Legislator 
survey. As an overview, I focus on four sets of analysis, meetings with race/ethnic 
minority groups and women’s groups, the number of groups met with, the amount of 
work and surrogate constituency service. In terms of meetings with groups, I also 
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distinguish between behaviors in general and those that are specifically outside of the 
district.  
For Hypothesis 4.1, I seek to test whether marginalized legislators meet with 
groups defined by identity, both in general and specifically outside the district. I use two 
matrix style questions to examine legislators’ engagement with groups. The first question 
asked “How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, conferences, 
etc.) sponsored by the following groups?” Respondents were asked to respond if they met 
with certain groups: “never” (1), “rarely” (2), “sometimes” (3), “frequently” (4), or “very 
frequently” (5). Because the frequencies in both extreme categories, “never” and “very 
frequently” were very small, I recoded these to be combined with “rarely” and 
“frequently” for a total of three response categories— “rarely”, “sometimes”, and 
“frequently”. I asked respondents about their activities with nine different group types: 
business associations, community associations, educational groups, environmental 
groups, professional associations, racial/ethnic minority groups, religious groups, student 
or youth groups, and women’s groups.  
My measures for the identity based groups are “women’s groups” and 
“racial/ethnic” minority groups. I use a follow-up question, which was identical except 
for the qualification of meeting with these groups outside of the district. This distinction 
is important because it implies that a legislator is engaging with a surrogate constituency. 
I test Hypothesis 4.1 using bi-variate t-tests comparing most marginalized to least 
marginalized legislators. Table 4.1 offers some descriptive statistics on the frequency 
with which legislators report meeting with different types of groups. The type of group 
most frequently met with was “community” groups; 68.4% of respondents reported 
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meeting with such groups. The least frequently met with group type was race/ethnic 
minority based groups with only 20.3% of respondents reporting meeting with this group 
“frequently”. A majority of legislators (51%) reported meeting with race/ethnic minority 
groups “rarely”. About a quarter (26.4%) of legislators reported meeting with the second 
identity-based group type, women’s groups; one third (33.1%) said they meet with these 
groups “rarely”. The plurality of respondents said they meet with women’s groups 
“sometimes”. The identity based group types are highlighted in the table. 
Table 4.1 Frequency of Group Meetings 
How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, 
conferences, etc.) sponsored by the following groups? (Index of: Business associations, 
Community associations, Educational groups, Environmental groups, Professional 
associations, Racial/Ethnic minority groups, Religious groups, Student or Youth groups, 
Women’s groups) 
 
Group "never"/"rarely" "sometimes" "frequently" 
     
Business 11.3% 41.3% 47.3% 
Community 4.0% 27.6% 68.4% 
Education 10.1% 41.6% 48.3% 
Environment 34.8% 41.5% 23.8% 
Professional 15.1% 46.5% 38.5% 
Race 51.0% 28.7% 20.3% 
Religion 47.2% 31.1% 21.7% 
Students 23.1% 43.8% 33.1% 
Women 33.1% 40.5% 26.4% 
 
Hypothesis 4.1 also posits that marginalized legislators should be more likely to 
meet with identity-based groups outside the district. As such, I follow-up the previous 
question on “participating in activities” with a nearly identical question asking about the 
same group meetings outside the district, the descriptive statistics for this question are 
presented in Table 4.2. For these surrogate meetings, outside the district, the most 
frequently met with type of group was education groups, with 31.1% of respondents. The 
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lowest frequency group type was religious groups, with only 10.8% respondents 
indicating they meet with this group type “frequently”. In terms of the two identity-based 
groups, a majority of legislators report that they meet with race/ethnic minority groups 
and women’s groups “rarely”, with 62.9% and 50.0% of respondents respectively. Only 
13.7% of legislators say they meet with race/ethnic minority groups outside the district 
“frequently” and 23.4% say they do so “sometimes”. In comparison, 19.7% of legislators 
say they meet with women’s groups “frequently” and 30.3% report they meet with such 
groups “sometimes”.   
Table 4.2 Frequency of Group Meetings Outside the District 
How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, 
conferences, etc.) OUTSIDE the district, sponsored by the following groups? (Index of: 
Business associations, Community associations, Educational groups, Environmental 
groups, Professional associations, Racial/Ethnic minority groups, Religious groups, 
Student or Youth groups, Women’s groups) 
 
Group "never"/"rarely" "sometimes" "frequently" 
     
Business 27.9% 46.6% 25.5% 
Community41.6% 36.6% 21.8% 
Education 29.4% 39.5% 31.1% 
Environment49.2% 32.4% 18.4% 
Professional32.3% 43.0% 24.7% 
Race 62.9% 23.4% 13.7% 
Religion 66.0% 23.2% 10.8% 
Students 42.5% 38.8% 18.7% 
Women 50.0% 30.3% 19.7% 
 
To test the second hypothesis, I rely on the same questions, and 3-category, 
recoded, responses, as above regarding meetings with groups. However, I limit the 
analysis to legislators who responded that they meet with the groups “frequently”, and 
then create a count of the number of groups (out of 9) that legislators meet with 
“frequently”. As presented in Table 4.3, on average, legislators meet with 2.9 groups in 
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general, and 1.4 groups outside their district. The modal number of groups, both overall 
and outside the district, is zero, which includes respondents who said they meet with all 
groups either “never”, “rarely”, or “sometimes”. I analyze the data using t-test to compare 
the number of groups that the least and most marginalized legislators meet with. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Count of Groups Met with "Frequently" 
 Count Percent for all Groups Percent outside District  
 0 25.2% 53.2%  
 1 11.1% 10.5% 
 2 9.9% 10.8% 
 3 14.6% 8.2% 
 4 14.3% 7.3%  
 5 9.9% 4.4%  
 6 6.4% 3.2% 
 7 3.8% 1.8%  
 8 2.1% 0.6%  
 9 2.6% 0.0%  
 Average 2.9 1.4 groups 
   
 
As another way to look at both frequency and count, I created an index of all 
groups by adding the responses for all group meetings (with the raw 5 categories) and 
dividing by the nine total groups. This variable should be interpreted on the scale of 0-5, 
where 0 is “never” and 5 is “frequently”. For this variable high scores indicate meeting 
with many groups frequently, and lower scores measure few meetings with few groups. 
The average score for overall group activities is 2.9, and 2.7 for outside the district, as 
presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Frequency of Indexed Groups 
 Mean Min Max 
    
 Overall 2.9 0 5 
 Outside District 2.7 0 5 
 
I test Hypothesis 4.3, which posits that marginalized legislators have a higher 
workload, using a set of several different dependent variables. This set includes variables 
measuring what proportion the legislator’s work is to a full-time job, the number of hours 
spent on various activities (both on the hill and at home), and the number of bills the 
legislator writes in an average session. This set of variables provides a good test of the 
implications related to having multiple constituencies (the district and at least one salient 
identity constituency), as more constituencies should result in a higher workload. The 
first variable used is the proportion of full-time work; the survey asked: “averaged over 
an entire year and taking into account session time, interim work, constituent service, and 
campaigning, what proportion of a full-time job is your legislative work?” The responses 
are on a scale from 0-4 where 0="less than 30%", 1="30-50%" 2="50-70%", 3="70-
90%", 4="90% or more". Given Hypothesis 4.1, I expect legislators who are more 
marginalized will perceive of their position as closer to a full-time position and less 
marginalized legislators will see their position as less than a full-time position as this is 
closer to the expectation for legislators according to the part-time nature of most state 
legislatures. I conduct a difference of means test between the most and the least socially 
and institutionally marginalized legislators to test Hypothesis 4.3. Consistent with the 
institutional design of part-time legislatures, most state legislators report that they 
perceive of their job as less than a full-time position. As seen in Table 4.5, 65% of 
members say it’s less than or equivalent to 70% of a full-time position, and only 18.9% 
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report their position to be 90% or more of a full-time position. The average state 
legislator registers at 2.1 on the scale, marking closest to the category of legislative work 
equating to “51-70%” of a full time job. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Proportion of Full-time position 
“Averaged over an entire year and taking into account session time, interim work, 
constituent service, and campaigning, what proportion of a full-time job is your 
legislative work?” 
 Percent Cumulative Percent 
Less than 30% 9.8% 9.8% 
31-50% 27.3% 37.1% 
51-70% 27.6% 64.7% 
71-90% 16.4% 81.1% 
91% or more 18.9% 100.0% 
 
I also examined the amount of hours worked across four different activities to test 
Hypothesis 4.3. The question read “how many hours do you spend per week (consider the 
average week) on the following activities: legislative business (overall), meeting with 
constituents/ studying proposed legislation/ developing new legislation/ campaigning and 
fundraising”. The respondent was given the opportunity to provide an open-ended 
response (in the form of an integer) for this question. The question was developed to 
examine several aspects of work to gauge the amount of work legislators put in to each 
activity. This question offers a survey of what the types of activities all legislators are 
expected to engage in. Though I expect marginalized legislators to spend more time on 
each activity, breaking down into specific activities will allow for a more complete 
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comparison. The average legislator spent about 40 hours overall on legislative activities. 
This is interesting in comparison to the previous question in which most legislators 
reported spending less than a full-time position. This may indicate that at least some 
legislators perceive of a full-time position as more than 40 hours. In terms of individual 
activities, legislators report spending about 7 hours on constituency service, 12 hours on 
studying proposed legislation, nearly 6 hours on developing legislation and 2 hours 
campaigning and fundraising during the session. These descriptive statistics are provided 
in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Number of Hours Spent 
How many hours do you spend per week (consider the average week) on 
the following activities? 
 Hours 
Overall 39.2 
Constituency Service 7.0 
Studying Proposed Legislation 11.9 
Developing Legislation 5.7 
Campaigning & Fundraising 1.9 
 
I measure amount of work in a third way through bill sponsorship. I expect that if 
legislators perceive of additive pressures there should be a need for additional legislation 
to be written. For this question the survey asked “how many bills do you write in the 
average session?”, and respondents were offered seven categories with ranges of numbers 
of bills. “Respondents were given the options of “0 or never written a bill”, “1- 5”, “6-
10”, “11-20”, “21-25”, “26-30”, and “31+”. However, because the frequencies were very 
small in the extreme categories I recoded the raw data to a four-category ordinal variable 
where 0= “0-5”, 1= “6-10”, 2=”11-20”, 3=”20+”. This question allows for a more precise 
measure of bill sponsorship than the previous question which asked about the numbers of 
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hours spent developing legislation. The average number of bills falls slightly below the 
“6-10” category at 0.9, though the modal category was “0-5 bills” (44%), as seen in Table 
4.7. 
Table 4.7 Number of Bills Written 
How many bills do you write in the average session? 
Number of Bills Frequency Cumulative 
0 to 5 44.0% 44.0% 
6 to 10 30.3% 74.3% 
11 to 20 16.0% 90.3% 
21+ 9.7% 100.0% 
 
Finally, I test Hypothesis 4.4 which asks about legislators’ propensity to engage in 
surrogate constituency service. This question seeks to answer if marginalized legislators 
perceive of a broader definition of “home” and perceive of surrogate constituents. I asked 
legislators if they engage in constituency service “on behalf of citizens who do not live in 
[the] district”. The questions offered a five-point scale, where only extreme points were 
provided the qualitative designations “never” and “often”.  As seen in Table 4.8, more 
than 95% of legislators engage in surrogate constituency service, with most reporting one 
scale step over “never” (coded here as “2”). 
Table 4.8 Surrogate Constituency Service 
Do you provide constituency service on behalf of 
citizens who do NOT live in your district? 
 Percent Cumulative 
Never 4.7% 4.7% 
2 38.2% 42.9% 
3 22.3% 65.2% 
4 21.3% 86.5% 
Often 13.5% 100.0% 
 
 Results 
One of the goals of this chapter is to introduce institutional marginalization as an 
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important variable in understanding legislative behavior. I argue that using identity, or 
social marginalization, is insufficient to understanding institutional behavior, and that 
including institutional marginalization will improve models of such behavior. Because of 
the large number of dependent variables, as well as the focus on comparing the two 
different marginalization measures, I present the results as part of three sets, and within 
each set I present the social marginalization variable first, followed by the institutional 
marginalization variable. Overall, the results suggest that minority women’s legislative 
behavior is impacted by the additive burden of representing salient identity constituencies 
in addition to the district. However, the results also indicate that the institutional 
marginalization variable performs just as well, if not better than the social 
marginalization variable, thus showing that the key to understanding salient identity 
constituencies and surrogate behavior lies in the condition of marginalization. 
4.4.1 Meeting with Race/Ethnic Minority Groups and Women’s Groups 
Table 4.9 shows the results for frequency of meeting with race/ethnic minority 
groups and women groups by social marginalization. I present the results for the most 
and least socially marginalized groups, minority women and white men. The Chi2 
analysis shows that minority women behave significantly different from white men, in 
that they meet with both more race/ethnic minority groups and women’s groups. In terms 
of meeting with race/ethnic minority groups, the frequencies are nearly reverse; whereas 
66.7% of minority women meet with such groups frequently, 63% of white men report 
they do so rarely. In comparison only 19.1% of minority women meet with race/ethnic 
minority groups rarely. Only 11.1% of white men report meeting with race/ethnic 
minority groups. For the middle category “sometimes”, 14.3% of minority women fell 
into this category in comparison to 25.9% of men. These results support Hypothesis 4.1. 
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The data for women’s groups is also consistent with Hypothesis 4.1, which posits that 
minority women should be more likely to meet with women’s groups than white men are. 
Continuing in Table 4.9, the results show that white men are about equally likely to 
respond that they meet with these groups either “rarely” (45.5%) or “sometimes” 
(42.5%). Only 11.9% of white men say they meet with women’s groups “frequently”. In 
comparison a majority of minority women (57.1%) say they meet with women’s groups 
“frequently”. 28.6% of minority women say they meet with such groups “sometimes”, 
and 14.3% report doing so “rarely”.  
The results hold for meeting race/ethnic minority groups and women’s groups 
outside of the district, that is as a surrogate constituency. Table 4.9 also shows these 
results. 57.1%, the majority, of minority women report that they meet with race/ethnic 
minority groups, outside the district, “frequently”. There is strong support for Hypothesis 
4.1 and the notion that minority women meet with a race/ethnic salient identity 
constituency. 19.1% say they meet with race/ethnic groups outside the district 
“sometimes” and 23.8% do so “rarely”. In comparison white men rarely meet with 
race/ethnic minority groups outside the district. Nearly three-quarters, 72.6%, of white 
men report meeting with these groups “rarely”. Only 8.2% report doing so “frequently” 
and 19.3% fall into the “sometimes” category. Hypothesis 4.1 is also supported by the 
data on meetings with women’s groups outside the district. Nine in ten minority women 
meet with women’s groups either “sometimes” (45%) or “frequently” (45%). Only 10% 
of minority women report meeting with such groups outside the district only “rarely”. In 
comparison 63.2% of white men report meeting with women’s groups outside the district 
“rarely”, 12.8% report they do so “frequently”, and 24.1% are in the “sometimes” 
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category. Taken together, the data on race/ethnic minority groups and women’s groups by 
social marginalization lends support for Hypothesis 4.1 showing that minority women 
meet with groups more frequently than white men do, both in general but also outside the 
district.  
Table 4.9 Meetings with Identity Groups by Social Marginalization 
How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, 
conferences, etc.) sponsored by the following groups? 
 Race/Ethnic Minority Groups Women' Groups 
 Min. women White men  Min. women White 
men 
Rarely 19.1% 63.0%  14.3% 45.5% 
Sometimes 14.3% 25.9%  28.6% 42.5% 
Frequently 66.7% 11.1%  57.1% 11.9% 
 n= 21 135  21 134 
 chi2: p=0.000  chi2: p=0.000 
 
How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, conferences, etc.), 
OUTSIDE the district, sponsored by the following groups? 
 Race/Ethnic Minority Groups Women' Groups 
 Min. women White men Min. women White 
men 
Rarely 23.8% 72.6%  10.0% 63.2% 
Sometimes 19.1% 19.3%  45.0% 24.1% 
Frequently 57.1% 8.2%  45.0% 12.8% 
 n= 21 135  20 133 
 chi2: p=0.000  chi2: p=0.000 
 
The data also showed that tokens meet with women and race/ethnic groups more 
frequently than dominant group members, also supporting Hypothesis 4.1. Just as with 
the social marginalization analysis, the gap was larger for race/ethnic minority groups; 
59.5% of tokens said they meet with these groups “frequently”, whereas only 12.5% of 
dominant group members meet these groups “frequently”. Only 27.0% of tokens 
compared to 64.8% of dominant group members report meeting with race/ethnic minority 
groups “rarely”. 13.5% of tokens and 22.7% of dominant group members responded with 
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“sometimes” meeting with race/ethnic minority groups. In terms of the women’s groups 
the results for institutional marginalization were similar to the results for social 
marginalization. In Table 4.10, the results show that a majority of tokens (54.1%) report 
meeting with women’s groups “frequently”. Among tokens, 27.0% said they do so 
“sometimes” and 18.9% they “rarely” meet with women’s groups. 45.7% of dominant 
group members, said they “rarely” meet with women’s groups, 41.7% report they do so 
“sometimes”, and only 12.6% say they meet with women’s groups “frequently”. These 
results all lend support for Hypothesis 4.1, showing that tokens meet race/ethnic minority 
groups and women’s groups more frequently than dominant group members.  
Hypothesis 4.1 is also supported by results analyzing meetings with race/ethnic 
minority groups and women’s groups outside of the district. Nearly half of tokens, 
47.2%, report meeting with race/ethnic minority groups outside of the district, in 
comparison only 8.6% of dominant group members report the same. Conversely, 74.2% 
of dominant group members report they meet with these groups “rarely”, about one third 
(33.3%) of tokens report the same. 19.4 of tokens, and 17.2% of dominant group 
members say they meet with these groups “sometimes”. As for women’s groups the 
numbers are somewhat less skewed for tokens, 38.2% report they meet with these groups 
“frequently”, 35.3% say “sometimes” and 26.5% say “rarely”. In comparison, two-thirds, 
or 66.9%, of dominant group members say they meet with women’s groups “rarely”. 
Only 12.6% of dominant group members report meeting with these groups “frequently” 
and the remaining 20.5% report they do so “sometimes”. 
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Table 4.10 Meetings with Identity Groups by Institutional Marginalization 
How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, conferences, etc.) 
sponsored by the following groups? 
 Race/Ethnic Minority Groups Women' Groups 
 Tokens Dominant  Tokens Dominant 
Rarely 27.0% 64.8%  18.9% 45.7% 
Sometimes 13.5% 22.7%  27.0% 41.7% 
Frequently 59.5% 12.5%  54.1% 12.6% 
 n= 37 128  37 127 
 chi2: p=0.000  chi2: p=0.000 
 
How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, conferences, etc.), 
OUTSIDE the district, sponsored by the following groups? 
 Race/Ethnic Minority Groups Women' Groups 
 Tokens Dominant Tokens Dominant 
Rarely 33.3% 74.2%  26.5% 66.9% 
Sometimes 19.4% 17.2%  35.3% 20.5% 
Frequently 47.2% 8.6%  38.2% 12.6% 
 n= 36 128  34 127 
 chi2: p=0.000  chi2: p=0.000 
 
4.4.2 Meeting with Groups 
In terms of the index group variable, the results, presented in Table 4.11, show 
that minority women meet with groups more frequently overall than white men do. The 
average score for minority women was 3.5 on the 5-point frequency scale, or between the 
“sometimes” and “frequently” category, whereas white men only reach 2.7, between 
“rarely” and “sometimes”. A t-test revealed that the -0.8 difference was statistically 
significant (p <0.001). In terms of the surrogate meetings, or meetings outside of the 
district, minority women engage in these activities at a score of 3.3 again between 
“sometimes” and “frequently”, and white men only at 2.6 (between “rarely” and 
“sometimes”, again this, -0.7 difference is statistically significant (p<0.01). The data lend 
support to the theoretical arguments that minority women act as surrogate representatives, 
not only do they perceive of constituencies that are not defined by the district (as shown 
in the previous chapter), but they are also actively going “the extra mile” to meet with 
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constituent groups even when this requires a broader definition of home style activities. 
In addition, there is also no significant difference between minority women’s overall 
activities and their activities outside of the district (p>0.70) meaning that their 
participation outside of the district is indistinguishable from their behavior inside the 
district. In comparison, white men engaged with groups significantly less outside of their 
district than they do inside the district (p <0.01 and p<0.02 respectively). That said, an 
important point to be made is that all legislators do meet with groups outside of the 
district at least on a rare occasion. These data support Hypothesis 4.2, and show that 
social marginalization does affect legislative behavior in terms of meeting with groups in 
and outside of the district. 
 To further examine Hypothesis 4.2, which posits that marginalized legislators 
meet with a larger number of groups frequently than legislators who are not marginalized, 
I present data from the count variable of number of groups in Table 4.11. This variable 
allows for a test of additive pressures in a way that tests for Hypothesis 4.1 cannot. Tests 
for Hypothesis 4.1 only show that minority women meet with race/ethnic minority groups 
and women’s groups, it could be the case that this is due to a shift in focus, rather than an 
added focus. The next analysis allows for a test of the number of groups legislators meet 
with; again, I expect that minority women are more likely to meet with more groups on a 
frequent basis than white men. I found that on average minority women meet with 3.9 
groups of the nine groups asked about in the survey, compared to 2.7 groups, on average, 
for white men, a significant difference of -1.2 groups (p<0.05). Minority women also 
meet with more groups outside of the district; 2.7 groups compared to 1.5 groups for 
white men, also a significant difference of -1.2 groups (p<0.01), again lending support to 
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Hypothesis 4.2 which suggests that minority women engage with more groups than white 
men.  
Table 4.11 Meeting with Groups by Social Marginalization 
  Minority women White men Difference 
 (n=16-20) (n=126-133) 
How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, conferences, etc.) 
sponsored by the following groups? (Index of: Business associations, Community 
associations, Educational groups, Environmental groups, Professional associations, 
Racial/Ethnic minority groups, Religious groups, Student or Youth groups, Women’s 
groups) [1=never 2=rarely 3=sometimes 4=frequently 5=very frequently] 
  3.5 2.7 -0.8*** 
How frequently do you participate in activities sponsored by the following groups 
OUTSIDE your district? 
  3.3 2.6 -0.7*** 
Count of number of groups met with "frequently" 
  3.9 2.7 -1.2* 
Count of number of groups met with outside the district "frequently" 
  2.7 1.5 -1.2*** 
 
† p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
 
The results for the relationship between group proportion and meeting with 
groups, presented in Table 4.12 echoes the results for identity. Tokens, as minority 
women, meet with groups more frequently, both in and outside the district, as presented 
by the index variable. The survey results suggest that tokens meet with groups more 
frequently overall. In terms of overall group meetings tokens score 3.3 on the five-point 
frequency scale, whereas members of the dominant group only reach 2.7, a statistically 
significant difference of -0.7 (p<0.001). Tokens also frequently meet with groups outside 
of the district, with a score of 3.1 on the five-point scale, whereas dominant group 
members place at 2.6, again this -0.5 difference is statistically significant (p<0.01). For 
tokens there was no difference in the frequency of meeting groups in general in 
comparison to meeting them outside the district (p>0.40), suggesting that there are no 
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differences in these behaviors. These data support Hypothesis 4.2 and also show that 
institutional marginalization is at least as good of an explanatory variable as social 
marginalization, and that being a token in a legislature does affect legislative behavior in 
terms of meeting with groups in and outside of the district. 
According to Hypothesis 4.2, I expect that tokens should be more likely than 
dominant group members to meet with more groups. The results for this analysis are also 
presented in Table 4.12. As for the number of groups that legislators indicated they meet 
with “frequently”, the results show that tokens meet, on average, with 4.5 groups out of 
the presented nine groups (community, education, business, professional, students, 
women, environment, religion, and race).  The results show that tokens frequently meet 
with a significantly higher average number of groups (4.5) than dominant group members 
do, who only meet with 2.4 groups on average, the -2.1 difference in the number of 
groups is statistically significant (p<0.001). Looking back to the identity variable I 
showed that minority women, while frequently meeting with more groups than other 
identity groups, only meet with 3.9 groups, compared to 4.5 for tokens. This is strong 
support for the notion that institutional marginalization performs at least as well, if not 
better than the social marginalization variable. Tokens also frequently meet with more 
groups outside of the district than dominant group members do, Tokens meet with 2.5 
groups outside the district compared to 1.2 for legislators who hold a dominant position 
in the legislature, the 1.3 difference in the number of groups is statistically significant 
(p<0.001).  
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Table 4.12  Meeting with Groups by Institutional Marginalization 
  Tokens Dominant Difference 
 (n=32-40) (n=126-148)  
How frequently do you participate in activities (rallies, celebrations, 
conferences, etc.) sponsored by the following groups? (Index of: Business associations, 
Community associations, Educational groups, Environmental groups, Professional 
associations, Racial/Ethnic minority groups, Religious groups, Student or Youth groups, 
Women’s groups) [1=never 2=rarely 3=sometimes 4=frequently 5=very frequently] 
  3.3 2.7 -0.6*** 
How frequently do you participate in activities sponsored by the following 
groups OUTSIDE your district? 
  3.1 2.6 -0.5*** 
Count of number of groups met with "frequently" 
  4.5 2.4 -2.1*** 
Count of number of groups met with outside the district "frequently" 
  2.5 1.2 -1.3*** 
  
† p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
 
4.4.3 Amount of Work 
I use three separate measures for amount of work legislators engage in, proportion 
of a full-time position, hours per week, and number of bills written. These results are 
shown in Table 4.13. In terms of proportion of full-time position, white men, on average, 
score just below the “51-70%” category at 1.9. Minority women on the other hand 
registered a 3.0, fully in the next category, “71-90%”. In comparison to white men, the 
results show that indeed minority women at least perceive that they work more than white 
men report to perceive (p<0.01). The t-test showed that there was a significant difference 
between these two identity groups (p< 0.01).  
The results reveal that minority women work more hours than white men, and 
work more in each specific category than white men, as presented in Table 4.13. On 
average, legislators report spending about 26 hours on the activities I specifically asked 
about. The total average number of hours minority women reported spending on these 
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particular activities overall is nearly 36 hours. They report spending about nine hours on 
service, 14 hours studying legislation, nine hours developing legislation, and four hours 
campaigning in a typical week while the legislature is in session. Comparably, white men 
report spending seven hours on service, 12 hours studying legislation, five hours 
developing legislation, and 1.5 hours campaigning while in session. The total number of 
hours for white men was about 25. These results show that minority women report 
spending 11 hours more per week on these activities than the average white male, a 
difference of 44%, a significant difference (p<0.01).  T-tests conducted on each activity 
examining the differences in means between minority women and white men reveal that 
any differences in terms of constituency service and studying legislation are insignificant. 
However, both developing legislation and campaigning were significantly different 
(p<0.01; p<0.05). In terms of the sheer amount of hours worked across all activities, the 
hypothesis is supported, though with varying results depending on the specific activity. 
There is mixed results for Hypothesis 4.3 in terms of this measure; in terms of the overall 
workload, developing new legislation and campaigning & fundraising, Hypothesis 4.3 is 
supported, though this is not the case for “meeting with constituents” and “studying 
proposed legislation”.  
Continuing in Table 4.13, I present results for the number of bills written by 
legislators as another measure of the amount of work legislators do. When disaggregating 
the means based on identity, no clear pattern emerges; and indeed the t-test shows no 
significant differences in the means between white men and minority women. There was 
a difference in the modal category which was “0-5 bills” for white men (43.9%) and “6-
10 bills” for minority women (47.6%). These results might suggest that this is a relatively 
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difficult test, and that there is a need for disaggregating the scale into actual bills written 
since a majority of legislators fell into just one category, in the future a similar survey 
question might consider either smaller categories or an open ended response. At this 
point, there is no support for Hypothesis 4.3 in terms of number of bills written. 
Table 4.13 Amount Worked by Social Marginalization 
  Minority Women White men Difference 
 (n=16-20) (n=126-133) 
Averaged over an entire year and taking into account session time, interim work, 
constituent service, and campaigning, what proportion of a full-time job is your 
legislative work?  [0="less than 30%" 1="31-50%" 2="51-70%" 3="71-90%" 
4="91% or more"]      
 3.0 1.9 -1.1** 
 
How many hours do you spend per week (consider the average week) on the following: 
[open ended] 
 
Total 35.7 24.7 -11.0** 
Meeting with Constituents 9.0 7.2 -1.8   
Studying Proposed Legislation  13.9 11.8 -2.1
   
Developing New Legislation  8.9 5.3 -3.6*** 
Campaigning and Fundraising  3.9 1.5 -2.4* 
 
How many bills do you write in the average session? [0= “0-5”, 1= “6-10”, 2=”11-
20”, 3=”20+”]  
 1.0 0.9 -0.1 
    
† p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
 
 The analyses for workload by institutional marginalization are presented in Table 
4.14. According to Hypothesis 4.3, I expect token members, who are the most 
marginalized and the most likely to feel additional pressures from the desire to represent 
multiple constituencies, to report working more than members of the dominant group 
who are the least marginalized in the legislature. A t-test showed that in terms of the 
proportion of a fulltime job being a legislator takes up, the differences in the means 
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between the various groups are much smaller than they were for the identity groups. 
Dominant group members score just at 2 on the scale from 0-4, which is the marking 
point for the “51-70%” category, while the overall average rests slightly above (2.1). 
Token group members score slightly higher at 2.6, just past the halfway point between 
the “51-70%” category and the “71-90%” category. The hypothesis is supported by the 
data and shows that tokens perceive of their position as a greater proportion of a full-time 
position than members of the dominant group.  
The results reveal that tokens work substantially more hours than members of the 
dominant group, and in each specific category in comparison to those in the dominant 
group. On average, tokens report spending about ten hours on service, 15 hours on 
studying legislation, nine hours on developing legislation, and seven hours on 
campaigning in a typical week while the legislature is in session. Notably, these numbers 
are greater than the numbers for minority women, except in the case of developing 
legislation where the numbers are equal. The total number of hours tokens reported 
spending on these particular activities is over 40 hours, a full three hours more than 
minority women reported. Comparably, dominant group members report spending about 
seven hours on service, 12 hours studying legislation, five hours developing legislation, 
and one-hour campaigning while in session. The total number of hours for members of 
the dominant group was only 23.5 hours, nearly half of the number of hours reported by 
members of the token group.  
To examine the differences in means of each activity between tokens and 
dominant members, I conducted a series of t-tests which revealed the differences in the 
hours spent on constituency service and studying legislation were significant (p<0.01; 
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p<0.05), unlike the relationships between minority women and white men for the same 
activities. Hours spent campaigning was also significantly different for tokens and 
dominant members. However, there was no statistical difference between tokens and 
dominant group members for developing legislation. Hypothesis 4.3, positing that tokens 
spend more hours working, was largely supported, and was more consistently supported 
in examining group proportion in comparison to identity. In addition, the differences, 
particularly for number of hours worked, presented more stark differences between 
groups. 
 In terms of the number of bills written, also presented in Table 4.14, the average 
score for token members was 1.3 which reaches beyond the “6-10 bills” per session 
category. In comparison the average member was just below this category (at 0.9), and 
minority women were solidly in this category (at 1.0), the average for dominant members 
was 0.8. The t-test to compare tokens and dominant members was significant (p<0.02) 
indicating that tokens write significantly more bills than dominant group members. In 
comparison to the identity variable, the group proportion variable performed much better 
and was able to lend support to Hypothesis 4.3. This suggests that the number of bills 
written may be more of a function of marginalization than a gendered or racialized style 
as may be the case with perception of amount of work.  
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Table 4.14 Amount Worked by Institutional Marginalization 
  Tokens Dominant Difference 
 (n=32-37) (n=117-126) 
Averaged over an entire year and taking into account session time, interim work, 
constituent service, and campaigning, what proportion of a full-time job is your 
legislative work?  [1="less than 30%" 2="30-50%" 3="50-70%" 4="70-90%" 5="90% 
or more"] 
  2.6 2.0 -0.6* 
How many hours do you spend per week (consider the average week) on the following: 
[open- ended] 
Overall  40.3 23.6 -16.7** 
Meeting with Constituents  9.6 6.7 -2.9* 
Studying Proposed Legislation  15.4 11.6 -3.8
   
Developing New Legislation  8.6 5.0 -3.6** 
Campaigning and Fundraising  6.9 1.3 -5.6* 
How many bills do you write in the average session?  
  1.3 0.8 -0.4* 
  
† p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
 
4.4.4 Surrogate Constituency Service 
The results in Table 4.15 show that most legislators report that they provide 
surrogate constituency service at least “sometimes”, around the midpoint of the scale. 
Again, I examined the differences between minority women and white men, and 
conducted t-tests for each activity. These tests did not yield significant results. To explore 
these results further, I examined all identity groups (minority women and men, and white 
women and men) to each other, and to the mean legislator through a series of ANOVA 
and t-tests, and found some marginally significant, and interesting, differences. These 
results are presented in Table 4.16. Minority women were found to engage in surrogate 
constituency service more frequently than others; in contrast white women report 
engaging in this activity significantly less frequently than all others. This is another 
interesting finding as the behavior of the minority women generating some mixed support 
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for Hypothesis 4.4.  
Table 4.15 Surrogate Constituency Service by Minority Women and White Men 
Do you provide constituency service on behalf of citizens who do NOT live in your 
district? [1=never 5=often] 
 
  Minority Women White men        Difference 
  (n=19-20) (n=134) 
  3.5 3.1 -0.4   
 
† p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4.16 Surrogate Service by Social Marginalization 
 
 Identity Mean  
   
 Minority female 3.5 † 
 White female 2.8** 
 Minority male 3.0  
 White male 3.0  
    
 Total 3.0  
   
  ANOVA: 0.10 
 
As in the previous test for the role of identity, I found that there were no 
statistically significant differences between tokens and dominant group members. The 
results for this series of analysis is presented in Table 4.17. Again, it is notable that while 
the hypothesis is not supported, this is not because tokens do not feel an obligation or 
moral, intrinsic, motivation to work on behalf of citizens who do not reside in the district, 
but rather, other legislators unexpectedly are equally likely to engage in surrogate 
representation in these ways.  
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Table 4.17 Surrogate Activities by Tokens and Dominant Group Members 
Do you provide constituency service on behalf of citizens who do NOT live in 
your district? [1=never 5=often] 
 
  Tokens Dominant Difference 
 (n=36-37) (n=127) 
  3.3 3.0 -0.3  
   
† p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
 
The difference of means tests between each group and the average member did 
reveal some marginally significant results, presented in Table 4.18. The results show that 
members of token groups provide more constituency service to citizens beyond the 
district than the average member. In comparison to the analysis on social marginalization 
this model appears to perform better.  
Table 4.18 Surrogate Service by Institutional Marginalization 
 Groups mean  
   
 Token 3.3 † 
 Minority 2.8  
 Balanced 2.9  
 Dominant 3.1  
    
 Total 3.0  
    
 ANOVA: 0.13  
 
 Discussion & Conclusion 
The data from the 2015 “Representation in U.S. State Legislatures” produced 
results with mixed support for the hypotheses, depending on the data source and 
independent variable in question. Hypothesis 4.1 and Hypothesis 4.2 are supported in all 
cases, both in terms of social and institutional marginalization, and both in terms of in 
and outside of the district. Hypothesis 4.3 is mostly supported, though not in the case of 
123 
 
bill sponsorship, and the number of hours spent on some specific activities of socially 
marginalized legislators, or in the case of studying legislation for institutionally 
marginalized legislators. Hypothesis 4.4 was not supported; however extended analysis 
revealed that some differences appear in comparing highly marginalized legislators to the 
mean legislator though not to non-marginalized legislators. In all, three of four 
hypotheses were largely supported by the data. 
 The data on meeting with groups produced results which were very interesting 
and lent strong support to the hypotheses. First off, the data show that indeed 
marginalized legislators, such as minorities and women, meet with their identity based 
groups, both within and outside the district, lending support for the notion that 
marginalized legislators perceive of salient identity constituencies. The data also showed 
that minority women, but especially tokens, meet rather frequently with many groups. 
Not only did respondents say that they meet with groups in general, but they also 
specifically stated that, at least some of the time, they will leave their district to meet with 
groups. These results also lent support to the Hypothesis 4.2 in showing that indeed 
minority women, but especially tokens frequently meet with significantly more groups. 
These findings suggest that marginalized legislators don’t merely shift focus to the salient 
identity constituency, but that those are additive pressures to which marginalized 
legislators respond. Hypothesis 4.3 regarding the amount of work legislators engage in 
were largely supported, and indeed showed that minority women, but especially token 
group members, are significantly different in their work load and productivity. Though 
Hypothesis 4.4 was not supported by these data, the results show some differences 
between marginalized legislators and the mean legislator indicating opportunities for 
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further research. 
 In comparing the results between the social marginalization and institutional 
marginalization, I find that the institutional marginalization variable performs at least as 
well, if not better in finding support for the hypotheses. The data show that token 
members of legislators, regardless of race/ethnicity or gender, are put in a position of 
additive pressures which has several consequences for the amount of work they engage 
in, the number of groups they meet with, their view of “home” and surrogate constituency 
needs, and the amount of constituency service they provide.   
The goal of this chapter was to examine the legislative behavior of state 
legislators. I asked and provided some answers to questions about individual and group 
variations in legislative behavior and external motivations for their behaviors. I built on 
the previous chapter which suggested that legislators who are socially or institutionally 
marginalized should be more likely to perceive of multiple constituencies which may not 
be geographically and electorally bound. In this chapter, I generated hypotheses on the 
basis that having salient identity constituencies should put additional pressure on 
marginalized legislators because they feel morally obligated to represent those groups. I 
suggested that being a part of a minority identity group, such as being a minority woman, 
and especially belonging to a minority identity and being one of very few representing 
the same identity group in the legislature should lead to a moral incentive for surrogate 
representation. I argued that legislators who are more likely to be surrogate 
representatives should be more likely to perceive of their position as closer to a full-time 
job, that they should work more hours, write more bills, meet with more groups including 
outside of the district, and that they should provide more constituency service on behalf 
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of constituents who do not live in the district. Finally, I also argued that institutional 
marginalization, as a compounding motivation for surrogate representation, should have 
stronger predictive power than social marginalization alone.  
 This chapter represents an early attempt to quantitatively measure and test 
surrogate representation. There are certainly questions left unanswered, but some 
questions about how marginalization in two different forms affect legislative behavior 
have been answered, and new questions have arisen as a result of this chapter. This 
chapter contributes to the literature on representation broadly by providing an empirical 
assessment of representation without electoral accountability. It furthers our 
understanding of what the goals of representation are and how legislators attempt to 
achieve those goals. It also contributes to the literature on the behavior of gender and 
race/ethnicity and politics in understanding the behavior of minorities and women at the 
highest level of political inclusion. We are just reaching a point where we can empirically 
examine the behavior of minority women vis-a-vis white women, and white and minority 
men, and while there are still insufficient numbers for more powerful multivariate 
analysis, the bivariate results here present a wealth of data on the behavior of minority 
women representatives. Finally, this chapter contributes to the literature on legislative 
behavior, while an enormous literature has examined institutional behavior through the 
lenses of partisan effects, institutional effects, regional effects, gendered effects, and 
racialized effects, few studies have examined legislative behavior through a lens of 
institutional marginalization invoking the effects of group proportion on legislative 
behavior.  
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Chapter 5: Additive Pressures of Marginalization and the Effects on 
Committee Membership 
Legislators who belong to marginalized identity groups, such as racial and ethnic 
minorities and women, have a sense of moral obligation to represent their group members 
broadly speaking, while also representing the interests of their districts. When 
individuals, in this case legislators, are marginalized, they are more likely to become 
aware of their identity and have a sense of belonging with other members of the group, in 
other words, their personal identity salience is heightened (Crenshaw 1993; Gurin and 
Townsend 1986; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 1998b). Because of their position as 
legislators, this increased identity salience will cause them to feel representationally 
responsible for members of their group, both in and outside of their district. They will 
come to perceive of their group members as an additional constituency to their district 
and display an increased interest in identity policy preferences. I expect this unique 
perspective to have implications for the legislative behavior of members of marginalized 
groups. As seen in the previous chapters, the view of salient identity constituencies has 
implications for both hill (activities in the legislature) and home (constituency service) 
style behaviors. In this analysis, I concentrate on the implications for hill style behaviors, 
and in particular, I ask if marginalized legislators display differences in policy 
preferences from other members through their legislative committee memberships. Using 
data of committee membership for over 4,000 lower house state legislators across 13 
states, I show that marginalized legislators do show preferences for committees that deal 
with identity-based issues areas. 
 Large bodies of literature have shown that there are distinct differences in policy 
priorities between white legislators and minority legislators, and between male legislators 
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and female legislators (Branton 2007; Brown 2014; Michele Swers 2001, 2002; Minta 
2009, 2012a; Swain 1995; Swers 2005, 2013). I look specifically at how both social 
marginalization and institutional marginalization affect the committee membership 
decisions of state representatives. I argue that marginalized legislators, just as other 
legislators, seek to represent their electoral, geographically bound, district but that these 
legislators have the additional pressure to represent an identity-based constituency (the 
salient identity constituency). The additive pressures marginalized legislators are likely to 
perceive in seeking to represent both their district constituencies and identity group 
members create incentives to prioritize policy preferences through committee 
membership. I argue that the additive pressure is the result of an internal moral obligation 
to represent members of a salient identity constituency, itself a function of the awareness 
of the marginalization of the group members (Dawson 1994; Mansbridge 2003; Whitby 
1997). I argue further that this moral obligation and awareness of the salient identity 
constituency is heightened when the legislator is institutionally marginalized by 
belonging to a group that holds only a small share of seats in the legislature (as tokens). 
Under these conditions, when a legislator serves as one of a very small number of 
representatives, s/he is especially likely to have a heightened awareness of identity and 
marginalization and feel a sense of responsibility and obligation to carry out legislation 
on behalf of the socially underserved group and this is best done in committee (S. J. 
Carroll 2002b; Kanter 1977; Mansbridge 2003; Saint-Germain 1989).  
Committees are a good avenue to examine policy preferences, because so much of 
the legislative work is done in committees. Committee work affects bill development in 
more ways than sponsorship and roll-call voting alone (which are common avenues for 
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similar studies), because it also covers the deliberation of the bill and ultimately has a 
very large role in the fate of bills. In addition, committees are useful to look at because 
everyone has to sit on committees, so we see some constraint in choices. This constraint 
is useful for understanding prioritization because we can get a ratio among a specific set 
of preferences. 
 Representing Interests on the Hill 
Traditional theories of mainstream legislative behavior (theories driven by 
analysis of white, male representatives) fall short of being able to explain the different, or 
at least additional, behaviors exhibited by marginalized legislators. (Duerst-Lahti 2002; 
Marin Hellwege and Sierra 2016; Robert R Preuhs 2006a). I have argued that 
marginalization leads to implications for legislators’ prioritization of identity-based 
issues, which has implications for hill and home style legislative behaviors (Chapter 2 
this volume). I have already shown that marginalized legislators’ heightened awareness 
of identity leads to a perception of group members as a salient identity constituency 
(Chapter 3 this volume) and a broader, even a surrogate, sense of “home” in representing 
an identity-based constituency (Chapter 4 this volume). I will argue in this chapter that 
there are also implications for marginalized legislators’ hill style behavior, in that 
marginalized legislators will seek to represent the interests of their salient identity 
constituencies through their committee memberships. 
I use state legislative committee membership to examine hill style behavior 
because committees are considered the “workhorses” of any legislative body (Pelissero 
and Krebs 1997; A. Rosenthal 1990). As such, the type of committee a legislator sits on 
becomes vitally important to the legislative record a legislator compiles. Because time is 
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the scarcest resource a state legislator possesses, and the committee structure claims 
much of that resource, state legislators choose to spend their time on committees that 
align with existing policy goals. Therefore, committee membership may serve as a proxy 
for legislator policy preferences. I expect that given marginalized legislators’ perception 
of a salient identity constituency, they should make committee membership choices that 
are markedly different from that of non-marginalized legislators.  
Committee membership is important to legislators because it helps them fulfill 
multiple goals including, achieving policy goals, providing constituency service, 
establishing a reelection record, and attaining institutional power. I expect that although 
marginalized legislators have the same rational goals as non-marginalized legislators, 
their moral obligation to serve their salient identity constituency and the awareness of the 
under-representation of the salient identity constituency leads to a more limited, or 
concentrated, set of committees on which these legislators choose to sit. Several studies 
have shown that women and minorities tend to hold a different set of policy preferences 
from white males (Crenshaw 1993; Dawson 1994, 2001; Foster 2008; Masuoka and Junn 
2013; G. R. Sanchez 2006; Wolbrecht, Beckwith, and Baldez 2008), and that legislators 
who identify with these groups are more likely to represent those interests in the 
legislature (Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Haynie 2001; Minta 2009, 2011, 2012a; 
Reingold and Haynie 2013; Michael S Rocca and Sanchez 2008; Whitby 1997). 
Theoretically, marginalized legislators should seek opportunities to work on issues 
related to their salient identity constituency; which in many cases involves addressing the 
marginalization of these vulnerable populations.  
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Scholars have shown that women and minorities are more likely to bring 
previously “uncrystallized”, or new, issue areas to the table, ostensibly because white 
men have not previously prioritized the same issues (S. J. Carroll, Dodson, and Mandel 
1991; S. J. Carroll 1989; Dodson 2006; Mansbridge 1999; Mendelberg, Karpowitz, and 
Goedert 2014a; Minta 2011). Thomas and Welch (1991) argue that “women’s priorities 
will be somewhat, though not dramatically, different from men’s” (Thomas and Welch 
1991, 452). Thomas theorizes that legislative behavior is solely (or at least primarily) 
based on a woman’s own life experience (Sue Thomas 1991b). Consistent with this 
perspective, scholars have found that there is a gender gap in the types of activities that 
male and female legislators engage in, including which activities they engage in more or 
less frequently, the types of bills they sponsor and co-sponsor, and the types of 
committees they sit on (Swers 2002, 2005, 2013). For example, in a survey of state 
legislators, Thomas and Welch (1991) ask members of lower houses in twelve states to 
create a list of their top policy priorities. They find that women are more likely than men 
to prioritize policies dealing with children, the family and welfare (Sue Thomas and 
Welch 1991). In addition, scholars have consistently noted that women are 
overrepresented as members and chairs on health and social and human services 
committees (S. J. Carroll 2002b; Dodson 1998, 2006; Reingold and Swers 2011; Sue 
Thomas 1991b).  
In terms of race and ethnicity, scholars have similarly found that minority 
legislators’ preferences often echo those of women in addressing the social issues facing 
marginalized and vulnerable populations. Race and ethnicity scholars have proposed that 
minority legislators have different policy priorities than their white counterparts, which 
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leads to differences in legislative behavior, including pursuit of specific types of 
committee assignments and leadership positions (Barrett 1995; Haynie 2001; Orey, 
Overby, and Larimer 2007; Whitby 1997). Studies have shown that African Americans 
are more likely than white legislators to prioritize, and be members of committees dealing 
with health and social services regardless of gender (Barrett 1995, Bratton, Haynie, and 
Reingold 2006, Sanchez & Marin Hellwege 2014). Research on health and welfare 
committee leadership has shown that attaining leadership positions on these committees 
allows black legislators to provide greater substantive representation to black 
communities (Browning, Rogers, and Tabb 1984).  
 Similarly, Fraga et al. (2006) show that Latinos, and especially Latinas, use their 
position to further a Latino policy agenda. They show that both Latino and Latina 
legislators are predominantly concerned about representing their district, but that they 
also have an interest in representing the broader population of Latinos. They also show 
that Latino/a legislators, in general, show a particular interest in children’s policy, as well 
as policy affecting immigrants and other minority groups (Fraga et al. 2006). Bratton 
(2007) examines legislative behavior in six states and finds limited support for the notion 
that Latino legislators have different policy preferences than non-Latino legislators. Also, 
she finds that Latino legislators do not exhibit significantly different patterns of 
committee membership than non-Latino legislators. Instead, she argues that “the two 
most powerful and consistent influences on committee membership across committees 
are gender and profession” (Bratton 2007, 1150). Sanchez and Marin Hellwege (2014), 
however, do find a difference between Latinos and non-Latinos in their 13 state study of 
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state legislators’ committee membership suggesting a possible change in dynamics in the 
years since Bratton’s study.     
So far I have focused the discussion of marginalization along single dimensions, 
either race/ethnicity or gender; however recent literature has challenged this view of 
marginalization and argued for the need to consider identity along the lines of both, as 
well as an identity at the intersection (Crenshaw 1993; Garcia Bedolla 2007; Hancock 
2007; Smooth 2006). Legislators who are marginalized along the lines of both 
race/ethnicity and gender, i.e. minority women, are likely to perceive of a dual, or even 
triple, identity, and in turn feel representationally responsible for at least two separate 
salient identity constituencies as well as their district. Fraga et al. (2006) find that 
minority women legislators are able to use their multi-faceted identity to build coalitions 
and to generate a more fluid policy agenda. In other words, their intersecting identities 
provide these legislators with multiple options for constituency building and policy 
responsiveness in appealing to both women and Latinos. Recent work on minority 
women’s legislative behavior finds that minority women tend to behave in ways 
predicted by theories of both female and minority legislative behavior (Brown, 2014). 
Carroll (2002) argues that female African American members of Congress successfully 
advocate for women’s issues while simultaneously incorporating policy priorities of 
interest to the black community.  
Barrett (1995) argues that African American women are among the most cohesive 
group of legislators and that these legislators “seem to share a strong consensus on which 
policy areas should receive priority” and that these policy areas deal predominantly with 
the welfare of vulnerable populations, such as health and education as well as economic 
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development and unemployment. Takash (1993) makes a similar argument in her study 
of Latina politicians in the California state legislature. She finds that they express interest 
in furthering women’s issues but also emphasize a need to further Latino interests, such 
as education and public safety (Takash 1993). Marin Hellwege and Sierra (2016) also 
show that Latinas use their intersectional identity as both Latinas and women to appeal to 
constituents from these two different communities. I expect that minority women’s dual 
marginalization leads to a perception of two salient identity constituencies; they will feel 
representationally responsible for both minorities and women. Dual marginalization 
through intersectionality will lead minority women to be the most likely to display 
behaviors consistent with the preferences of the salient identity constituencies, such as 
education, health, welfare, children and families. 
Mansbridge (2003) suggests that legislators are more likely to engage in surrogate 
(beyond district) representation when there is a strong common bond between the 
representative and the group that is to be represented. She argues that the creation of a 
moral obligation for the representative stems from an awareness of the needs of this 
population and the responsibility the legislator has as one of few legislators to represent 
this constituency. I argue that this suggests that identity is not the only impetus for 
identity-based representation, but that more fundamentally, such representation stems 
from a legislator’s sense of marginalization. As such, we should expect that not only will 
minority women be especially likely to engage in identity-based representation, but those 
legislators who are particularly marginalized in the legislature as tokens (belonging to a 
group with fewer than 15% of seats) should also engage in such representation. A 
marginalized position in the legislature is likely to further raise the awareness of a 
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legislator’s own identity and the needs of the salient identity constituency (S. J. Carroll 
2002b; Gurin 1985; Kanter 1977; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 1998a). I expect a 
heightened awareness of identity will result in a particular set of policy preferences for 
marginalized legislators, which will be evident in their choices of committee 
membership.  
 Expectations for Committee behavior 
Committee membership is influenced by multiple factors including: constituency 
and district interests (Fenno 1973; Matthews 1960; Ray 1980; Bullock 1972; Rhode and 
Shepsle 1972; Smith and Deering 1984), seniority (Matthews 1960; Shepsle 1978; 
Masters 1961), previous occupation (Matthews 1960), party loyalty (Coker and Crain, 
1994), and reelection (Masters 1961; Clapp 1964; Smith and Ray 1983; but see Bullock 
1972 and Smith and Deering 1984). For state legislative committee membership, 
specifically, research falls generally into four explanatory categories: (1) reelection, (2) 
party loyalty, (3) seniority, and (4) ideology. This chapter serves to focus on a fifth 
dimension, which is less frequently heralded in mainstream scholarship: personal 
characteristics activated by social and institutional marginalization. Research by Hedlund 
and Patterson (1992) bears the closest resemblance to the present research. They test the 
reelection hypothesis common to the congressional literature in the 1960’s and 70’s. The 
reelection hypothesis (see, for example Masters 1960 and Clapp 1961), proffers that 
legislators seek membership on committees that ensure their successful reelection. 
Though they find little evidence to confirm the reelection hypothesis, they do find that 
the legislators engage in highly strategic behavior to gain a preferable assignment. They 
also take into account demographic characteristics of the legislators, but find no evidence 
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to support the idea that age and gender significantly impact the assignment process. 
Hedlund and Patterson are the only researchers to consider the impact of personal 
characteristics on membership, however, they deal with it in a cursory manner.  
The committee assignment process is technically a back and forth between party 
leaders and party members as the party tries to place legislators on committee that will 
help them with their reelection goals (Mayhew 1974). The accommodation of committee 
requests is in the best interest of both the member and the party (Hedlund 1989; Kanthak 
2009). Kanthak (2009) suggests that committee assignment is used by party leadership to 
promote partisan loyalty among legislators. This, however, is not to suggest that certain 
partisans tend toward a certain type of committee, as committees are specifically 
designed to be balanced in terms of partisanship. Any skewness is the result of a highly 
unbalanced legislature, rather than a partisan preference. Instead, these results should be 
interpreted as the degree of preference state legislators actually have in their committee 
assignments. In other words, we can expect that committee membership is not the result 
of party alone, though consideration should be made for being a member of the 
controlling party. At the state level, Hedlund (1989) finds evidence that the committee 
assignment process is a powerful tool wielded by party leadership to encourage party 
loyalty and partisan behavior. Using committee request data from six legislative sessions 
in the Wisconsin state legislature, he finds a remarkable correlation between committee 
request and committee assignment. This point is particularly important to the present 
study in which request data was unavailable. Committee membership as an outward 
proxy for the request process is a valuable measure absent request data; in light of present 
data limitations, it still bears strong empirical and theoretical power.   
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I expect that marginalized legislators will have strong preferences for a specific 
set of committees because they feel a moral obligation to represent their salient identity 
constituency. Given the limited resources state legislators have, marginalized legislators 
will seek to capitalize on their committee membership to focus on issues that are 
pertinent to their salient identity constituencies.  Most often, these will be social welfare 
committees which focus on issues related to vulnerable populations. While I expect 
marginalized legislators to have the same basic, rational, interests as the mainstream 
literature describes, I argue that when legislators are marginalized other preferences are 
de-prioritized in favor of identity-based issues. I further expect that adding more layers of 
marginalization, such as dual social marginalization (intersectionality) and tokenism (less 
than 15% group proportion) will produce the strongest effects. In other words, minority 
women, who represent multiple salient identity constituencies, and, especially, tokens, 
who are one of few representatives for a salient identity constituency, will be especially 
likely to seek avenues, such as committee membership, to represent salient identity 
constituencies. 
5.2.1 A Typology of State Legislative Committees 
The rich variance in committees at the state level provides both an opportunity 
and a challenge. There is no common rule among the legislatures of the 50 state 
legislatures that guides the structure, number, substance, or naming of committees. 
Moreover, committees at the state level change with greater frequency than those at the 
federal level. Therefore, before broad comparative analysis of state legislative 
committees can take place, a mechanism of comparison is required. Though the 
congressional literature puts forth a typology of standing committees (see, for example, 
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Adler and Lapinski 1997), the state literature has been weak on identifying a similar 
categorization scheme. Instead, studies tend to compare across a small set of committees 
that are constant across states such as education, judiciary, and insurance (see for 
example Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011). Many lessons can be borrowed from the 
Congressional literature to inform state level studies, but in terms of committees, the state 
and federal levels require an independent schema. 
In this analysis, I use a five-category classification scheme based on committee 
functions and policy jurisdictions initially created by Sanchez and Marin Hellwege 
(2014), but further developed here. This committee scheme allows for comparison of 
about 92-96% of total committee assignments for the sample of legislatures. Table 1 
displays the five committee types: control, workhorse, caretaker, private goods, and 
public utility.  
Table 5.1 State Legislative Committee Typology 
Committee Type Primary Motive Examples 
Control General 
Appropriations, Budget, Judiciary, 
Rules, Ways and Means 
Workhorse General 
Federal-state Relations, Government 
Oversight, Legislative Effectiveness 
and Administration 
Caretaker Specialization 
Aging, Education, Health & Human 
Services, Poverty, Public Safety, 
Social Services, Veterans 
Private Goods Specialization 
Banking & Financial Services, 
Business & Commerce, Consumer 
Affairs, Insurance 
Public Utility Specialization 
Arts, Infrastructure, Library, 
Museums, Parks and Wildlife, 
Tourism, Transportation 
   
General committees deal with a high variation of substantive issue areas, and are 
better considered as high or low power committees. High power committees wield the 
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most legislative control and prestige in the legislative body; legislators can boast 
membership on these committees to further their own ambitious goals- these are called 
control committees. Control committees can be conceived of as the most prestigious and 
therefore the most powerful committees in state legislatures. Each type of power 
committee has distinguishing characteristics. By way of definition, control committees 
are committees that deal with legislative budgets and rules. Control committees are often 
called prestige committees because legislators with intra-institutional ambition tend to 
use these committees to facilitate their goals (e.g. Fenno 1973, Bullock 1976). Control 
committees are powerful because they hold the purse strings while simultaneously 
enjoying the broadest jurisdictions compared to other legislative committees. In other 
words, control committees have to deal with nearly every piece of legislation at some 
point regardless of the policy substance. Therefore, they are in a position to shape most 
policies considered by the legislative body in any given session.  
Workhorse committees, on the other hand, are less about prestige and control and 
more about engaging in the “grunt work” of the legislative body (e.g. Hall 1996).  They 
can be conceived of as a stepping stone to control committee membership.16 They have 
low visibility, but are essential to the workings of the legislative body and the 
government. Workhorse committees allow legislators to earn “the respect of their 
colleagues” (Matthews 1973, 1967, see also Payne 1980) and eventually gain individual 
power. In state legislatures, these committees perform administrative functions including 
ensuring efficiency, inter-government relations, and government oversight. I expect that 
                                                 
16 Bullock (1970) alludes to this idea through his research on the norm of apprenticeship for freshmen 
committee assignments in the House of Representatives. 
139 
 
all legislators are interested in being members of exclusive control committees, and that 
experience and legislative leadership should be the most likely predictors of membership. 
Conversely, I expect legislators should be equally likely to sit on workhorse committees 
as it is unlikely anyone would have a strong preference for these committees but will join 
them as necessary. As discussed previously, I expect that marginalized legislators have 
the same instrumental goals as any other legislator, though I expect that they have 
additive pressures to represent their salient identity constituencies. As such there should 
be no differences between marginalized and non-marginalized legislators on either of 
these committee types, which are defined by power rather than policy. 
Policy specialization committees allow members to establish a record of policy 
initiatives that give voice to a particular interest. Policy specialization committees are 
“those typically considered to have close relationships with high demand interest groups” 
(Kollman 1997, 529). These specialized committees are of particular importance to 
legislators when they are corresponding to a strong component of a legislator’s district 
and/or reelection constituency. The present typology distinguishes between three types of 
specialized committees: caretaker, private goods, and public utility. The three types are 
distinguished by the nature of the population served and the nature (public or private) of 
the goods and services in which they deal. Unlike the expectations for general 
committees, I expect differences in preferences for the policy specialization committees. 
In other words, I expect all legislators to share instrumental goals, but that 
marginalization affects how they shift their focus when it comes to policy.  
The first type of policy specialization committee is the caretaker committee. This 
committee type serves the interest of needy and vulnerable populations such as children, 
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the elderly, and infirm. They serve a range of social welfare issues such as health, 
poverty, aging, human service, and social services. Legislators are likely to request 
service on caretaker committees when their constituency ranks low on indicators of 
socio-economic status such as median income and education level. The second type of 
policy specialization committee is Private Goods. These committees deal in commercial, 
profitable, and private economic issues. They are likely to include issues of banking, 
small business, consumer protection, insurance, finance, labor, and commerce. 
Conversely, Public Utility committees, the third type, concern the provision of public 
goods with widespread use and ownership. Publicly funded and/or distributed goods and 
services fall into the domain of these types of committees. Examples include parks, 
wildlife, arts, museums, and libraries. 
I expect that marginalized legislators, whose salient identity constituencies are 
likely to suffer from social welfare inequity in comparison to white male constituents, 
should be more likely to display an interest in caretaker issues at the cost of having 
decreased membership in the other two policy specialization committees. Marginalized 
legislators are more likely to have a heightened identity salience which turns their focus 
to their marginalized, vulnerable constituents. Salient identity constituencies include 
populations who are, by definition, marginalized and vulnerable in comparison to white 
men. As such, I expect that marginalized legislators will sit on caretaker committees that 
specialize in areas dealing with vulnerable populations, such as families & children, 
health care, education, and public safety. Consequently, I expect they will be less likely 
than non-marginalized legislators to sit on private and public utility committees. 
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One of the benefits of this study is the constraint of committee choices, and 
particularly the parsimony of the typology of committees. This typology allows for a 
broad sense of the types of committees legislators gravitate towards. Examining 
legislative activities that include less restrictive choices, such as bill sponsorship, can 
include a much larger assortment of topics. For example, such studies could reveal 
differences between African Americans and Latinos and look specifically toward issues 
such as civil rights and immigration. However, such studies would not be as effective in 
establishing a parsimonious comparison between several issues and groups. The typology 
I provide here is able to provide a parsimonious study of nearly all (more than 90%) 
committees. While some of the rich details may be lost for the sake of parsimony, those 
issues are not excluded but rather subsumed within the typology. Several issues 
associated with particular groups, such as abortion access, police brutality, and 
DREAMers’ access to education are likely to fall under “Caretaker” committees. The 
defining factor for caretaker committees is that they include committees that are likely to 
deal with issues of vulnerable, marginalized populations including women and 
race/ethnic minority populations who are vulnerable by definition. These populations are 
more likely experience inequities in terms of issues such as health, welfare, and public 
safety. 
 Hypotheses 
Formally stated, I test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5.1: Marginalized legislators sit on a proportionally equal number of 
control and workhorse committees  as non-marginalized legislators (white men 
and dominant group members)  
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Hypothesis 5.2: Marginalized legislators are more likely to be members of 
caretaker committees than legislators who are not marginalized  
Hypothesis 5.3:  Marginalized legislators sit on a proportionally fewer number of 
private and public committees than non-marginalized legislators (white men and 
dominant group members)  
 Data and Methods 
To test my hypotheses, I use an original data set that includes the committee 
assignment, demographics and institutional characteristics of state legislators. The data 
were collected from 13 states for 3 separate years, for a total of 4,251 assembly (House) 
level state legislators. The states included are: Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Tennessee, and Virginia. The states were selected based on the current number of 
minority women serving to ensure a sufficient number in the dataset.17 Despite the larger 
amount of data than in Chapter 4, there is still insufficient institutional variation of 
identity groups to examine the interaction of marginalization, and instead I will offer two 
separate analyses. The period of study is 1998-2010, with data for three time points: 
1998, 2004 and 2010. I use more recent state legislatures to maximize the number of 
minority women in the analysis. These data were collected directly from each state’s 
legislative journals. These records, usually kept by the clerk of the House, include 
information on legislator race and ethnicity18, committee membership and leadership, 
party affiliation and legislator tenure information for each legislative session. Each 
legislator was coded for both personal characteristics, such as race/ethnicity and gender, 
                                                 
17 Texas is not currently included because its legislature does not meet in the years included in the study. 
Hawaii was not included as the collection was based on the two major sub-sets of minority women, Latinas 
and African Americans. 
18 In some cases, the data on legislators’ race and ethnicity was supplemented by the National Conference 
of State Legislators (NCSL), National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), or by membership 
in a national or state level caucus for racial/ethnic minority groups.  
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and institutional characteristics such as seniority, leadership positions, and committee 
assignments. 
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Format Frequency Mean Min Max 
  
Control Comm. 4059 Ratio 28.2%  0 1 
Workhorse Comm. 4059 Ratio 13.8%  0 1 
Caretaker Comm. 4059 Ratio 21.3%  0 1 
Private Goods Comm. 4059 Ratio 24.6%  0 1 
Public Utilities Comm. 4059 Ratio 10.2%  0 1 
    
Minority women 4059 Categorical 7.4% (300)  0 1 
Minority men 4059 Categorical 13.8% (560)  0 1 
White women 4059 Categorical 16.7% (674)  0 1 
White men 4059 Categorical 62.1% (2,525)  0 1 
      
Token members 4059 Categorical 17.6% (715)  0 1 
Minority members 4059 Categorical 19.2% (779)  0 1 
Balanced members 4059 Categorical 22.9% (930)  0 1 
Dominant members 4059 Categorical 40.3% (1,636)  0 1 
      
Years in Office 4059 Continuous --- 7.8 0 48 
Party Leader 4059 Dichotomous 8.8%  0 1 
Comm. Leader 4059 Dichotomous 22.6%  0 1 
Committee Variety 4059 Count --- 2.5 0 5 
      
Republican (minority) 4059 Categorical 24.7%   0 1 
Republican (majority) 4059 Categorical 21.9%  0 1 
Democrat (minority) 4059 Categorical 20.2%  0 1 
Democrat (majority) 4059 Categorical 33.2%  0 1 
      
1998 4059 Dichotomous 34.1%  0 1 
2004 4059 Dichotomous 34.3%  0 1 
2010 4059 Dichotomous 31.6%  0 1 
Total # Committees19 4059 Count --- 3.6 0 10 
 
There are five separate dependent variables, each representing a different 
committee type. The dependent variables were created through a multi-step process. First, 
once all committee assignments for each legislator were collected, I generated a list of all 
                                                 
19 Variable not included 
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unique committees in the data. This produced a total of 450 unique committees. Second, 
using the NCSL committee system as a framework and guide, I grouped the 450 
committees into 27 committee clusters20. To create a more manageable and parsimonious 
categorization, I grouped the 27 clusters into the five categories discussed above: Control, 
Workhorse, Caretaker, Private Goods, and Public Goods. Appendix F shows the 
breakdown of the 27 committees in the final categorization. The dependent variables are 
the proportion of the count of one type of committee to the total committee count. This 
results in a total of five dependent variables that I test using OLS regression models. 
Thus, coefficients should be interpreted as the percentage point increase over the 
comparison group of the total share of committees devoted to the committee type in 
question in comparison to all other committee types.21  
The key independent variables are dichotomous measures of marginalization. I 
analyze two sets of models (with five models each), testing both social and institutional 
marginalization22. In the first set of models, I examine the role of social marginalization 
with a series of dummy variables for minority men, white women, and minority women, 
using white men as the comparison group for each. In the second set of models, I 
                                                 
20 Committee Groupings: Agriculture, Energy, Environment, and Natural Resources; Banking, Insurance, 
and Financial Services; Budget, Revenue, Taxation, Finance and Appropriations 
Business and Commerce; Children, Seniors and Family; Consumer Affairs; Economic Development; 
Education; Election Administration; Fish and Wildlife; Government Oversight; Health and Human 
Services; Judiciary and Ethics; Labor; Law, Criminal Justice, Corrections and Public Safety; Legislative 
Effectiveness/Administration; Government Relations; Military Affairs; Miscellaneous/ Can't fit; Public 
Employees and Pensions; Public Utilities, Infrastructure, and Transportation; Regulated Industries and 
Professions; Rules; Science and Technology; Tourism and Cultural Affairs; Veterans Affairs; Ways and 
Means 
21 The data does not include some miscellaneous committees that were not placed in a category (examples 
include committees entitled “Miscellaneous”), as such the constant coefficients across all models will not 
equal .100, but rather amount to about .92-.96. In other words, the models collectively measure 92-96 
percent of total committee membership.  
22 See Appendix G for an overview of how identity groups fall into different group proportion categories in 
U.S. state legislatures in 2015. 
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introduce a measure of institutional marginalization through group proportions, 
comparing “tokens” (less than 14.9%), “minority” (15-29.9%), “balanced” (30-59.9%) 
group members to those who belong to a dominant group holding more than 60% of the 
seats. This allows me to examine how different degrees of marginalization affect the 
proportion of a particular type of committee a legislator sits on, and whether these are 
reflective of the preferences of women and minority salient identity constituencies. 
I include several individual level control variables reflective of findings from the 
literature. I control for the number of years in office because it is likely that legislators 
with more years in the legislature are more likely to be allowed a higher degree of 
preference in type of committee. However, seniority is likely to have a smaller effect in 
state legislatures than is expected in Congress since there is a high degree of variation on 
the institutional norms of the importance of seniority (Squire 1988). Even so, I expect 
legislators with more seniority to prefer control committees.  
I include dichotomous measures for whether the legislator is a party leader and/or 
committee leader as I expect that leadership positions, such as being a party leader or 
committee chair, should lead to sitting on more control committees. These are highly 
prestigious committees, and so I expect legislators with several years of experience 
and/or prestigious leadership positions to prefer powerful committee assignments. With 
more “power” there is also more opportunity to sit on control committees, and thus a 
lower likelihood to sit on workhorse committees in particular, but specialization 
committees in general. I also expect that holding a party leadership position involves a 
high time commitment and so such a member is likely to sit on a smaller number of 
committees.  
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I also control for whether the legislator is a member of the majority party. This 
variable (included as a series of dummy variables) specifies if the member is in the 
Democratic majority or minority, or the Republican majority or minority, using 
Republican majority as the comparison group. This variable combines party control and 
party since all members are given committee assignments but the chambers are 
unbalanced between the two parties’ share of the chamber. Using only party control, or 
only party, would not measure individual behavior but rather chamber behavior, given 
that chambers are often unbalanced even though the committee system is created with the 
goal of equal party representation on committees (Kanthak 2009). For example, if 
majority members are significantly more likely to sit on control committees, this could 
likely be a function of the fact that there are more majority members and seats need to be 
filled. Including both control and party allows me to compare behaviors of Democrats 
when in control or not to Republicans when they are not in control. This allows for an 
interesting comparison of the two major parties’ behavior while in control, though I don’t 
have any expectations that one party should behave differently from another when in the 
majority.23 I also control for the variety of committee types the member sits on, in other 
words, the number of different types of committees. The variety variable measures the 
number of different types of committees the legislator sits on; as such, the range of this 
variable is 1-5. If a legislator sits on several different types of committees, then the 
                                                 
23 Because I use Republicans in the majority as the comparison group, this analysis does not allow me to 
compare the behavior of Democrats in the majority to Democrats in the minority or Republicans in the 
minority; however additional analysis in the case of Caretaker committees (which is arguably the primary 
model of interest) found that there were no statistically significant differences between these three groups, 
but that only Republicans in the majority behaved differently from all three other groups. 
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likelihood that s/he sits on any one type of committee will be higher adding a bias to this 
legislator over a legislator who sits on several of the same types of committees.  
 Results 
5.5.1 Social Marginalization & Committee Types 
Table 5.3 provides the results for five separate models, one for each committee 
type, using the social marginalization independent variables. Table 5.4 provides the 
related calculations for the proportion of committee type by social marginalization. I 
discuss all the five models and related calculations for the social marginalization first, 
followed by the institutional marginalization models. The results broadly reveal 
differences in committee membership when comparing minority women, minority men 
and white women to white men, for some types of committees, but not all. As expected, 
the null findings show that there are no differences between state legislators’ tendency to 
sit on control committees based on identity, lending support for Hypothesis 5.1. The 
proportion of control committees in comparison to other types of committees is about 35-
37% for all groups, as shown in Table 5.4. As expected, on high prestige committees, 
which are highly sought after, the strongest predictors include seniority and holding a 
leadership position. Those who sit on control committees tend to have fewer assignments 
overall, again something to be expected for legislative leaders. While I did not expect any 
differences regarding the party-control variable, the data suggest that when Democrats 
are in power they hold fewer control committee positions than Republicans, when they   
are in power. Further, the data show that Democrats in the minority hold more control 
committee positions than Republicans in the majority. This is very interesting as it 
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suggests that the surplus of Republicans sit on committees other than the powerful 
control committees. 
Continuing in Table 5.3, the results show that in terms of workhorse committees, 
there is a marginally statistically significant difference between minority men and white 
men; however, not between either white or minority women and white men. The data 
show that minority women and white women are not significantly different from white 
men. For each of these groups the proportion of workhorse committees was about 2%, as 
shown in Table 5.4. Minority men are significantly different from white men and have an 
increase of nearly 3 percentage points, more than double, in their proportion of 
workhorse committees than that of white men. This is an unexpected finding which 
suggests that minority men are may have an interest in administration and legislative 
oversight—a finding which should be examined further in future research. The evidence 
for Hypothesis 5.1 is mixed, but the hypothesis is supported in the case of the most 
marginalized group—  minority women. The evidence also points to support for 
Hypothesis 5.1 in the case of white women, but is rejected for minority men. There are no 
differences in terms of seniority of leadership positions on workhorse committees, 
indicating that even more senior and powerful legislators are unable to avoid workhorse 
assignments in state legislatures, contrary to my expectation. Democrats in the majority 
are better able to avoid these committees than their Republican counterparts. Overall, the 
results seem to suggest that legislators are somewhat equally distributed in these low-
power committees; it appears that workhorse committees are committees that ultimately 
everyone needs to participate in.   
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In Hypothesis 5.2, I state that socially marginalized legislators sit on a higher 
proportion of caretaker committees than white men, as seen in tables 5.3 and 5.4. The 
starkest differences in committee membership should appear in the caretaker committees 
because the policy issues involved in caretaker committees are ones that the literature has 
shown are of high priority to both women and to racial/ethnic minorities. The results 
show a significant and positive difference between all socially marginalized groups in 
comparison to white men, with the largest substantive effects for minority women. 
Whereas white men’s committee memberships include about 24% caretaker committees, 
36% of minority women’s committee memberships are caretaker committees. The results 
are significant for minority men and white women as well with 26% and 31% caretaker 
committees, respectively. These calculations are shown in Table 5.4. In addition, when 
examining these ratios across types of committees, caretaker committees make up the 
largest proportion of types of committees for minority women, also supporting 
Hypothesis 5.2. In comparison, white men sit on vastly more control and public 
committees than caretaker committees. In terms of social marginalization there is strong 
empirical support for Hypothesis 5.2. Seniority and holding a leadership position, all 
associated with more prestige, decrease the proportion of caretaker committees. 
Republicans in the minority, as well as Democrats in any position, also sit on fewer 
caretaker committees than Republicans who are in the majority.  
In terms of the other two specialization committee types, the findings are mixed, 
shown in the last two columns of tables 5.3 and 5.4. I did not present hypotheses 
specifically for these committees, because there is so far no reason to expect differences 
for these committee types, and further they serve to establish a comparison group to 
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caretaker committees. Thus, the analysis for these committees is largely exploratory. That 
said, the data yield interesting results. There are significant differences between minority 
women and white men for private goods committees, with minority women sitting on 
fewer such committees, but no differences appear between white women and minority 
men.  
There are also negative and significant effects for more senior members and those 
holding a leadership position, which is to be expected as these legislators’ share of 
committees include mostly control committees. The ratio of private committees for white 
men and women, as well as minority men, rests around 28-29% of all committee types. 
Minority women sit on fewer such committees, with only 23% private committees, as 
presented in Table 5.4. Minority women sit on a smaller proportion of public committees 
than white men do, yet white men sit on only 2.7% public utilities committees. 
Substantive differences here are relatively small, minority men sit on 1.7% public utility 
committees, white and minority women sit on significantly fewer such committees in 
comparison to white men with 1.4% and 0.3% such committees respectively. More senior 
legislators and those who hold party leadership positions hold a significantly smaller 
share of both of these committees than rank and file members do.  
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Table 5.3 OLS- Ratio of Committees by Social Marginalization 
 Control Workhorse Caretaker Private Public 
Minority man -0.009 0.028** 0.019+ -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) 
      
White woman -0.017 -0.008 0.076*** -0.010 -0.030*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
      
Minority woman -0.017 -0.005 0.122*** -0.062*** -0.024* 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) 
      
Seniority 0.004*** -0.000 -0.002** -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
      
Party leader 0.291*** 0.001 -0.117*** -0.123*** -0.043*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) 
      
Comm. leader 0.070*** 0.009 -0.028** -0.050*** 0.005 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
      
Comm. variety -0.054*** 0.046*** 0.008+ -0.014*** 0.032*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
      
(R), min. party 0.0183 -0.001 -0.056*** 0.026* 0.027*** 
member (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.01) (0.008) 
      
(D), min. party 0.039** -0.010 -0.038** 0.002 0.016+ 
member (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) 
      
(D), maj. party -0.028* -0.018* -0.041*** 0.065*** 0.024** 
member (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
      
1998 -0.012 0.024*** 0.003 0.002 -0.015* 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
      
2004 0.004 -0.005 -0.014 0.010 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
      
Constant 0.353*** 0.020+ 0.238*** 0.292*** 0.027** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) 
Observations 4059 4059 4059 4059 4059 
R2 0.189 0.063 0.059 0.047 0.056 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.4 Proportion of Committee Type by Social Marginalization 
 Control Workhorse Caretaker Private Public Total 
White men 35.3% 2.0% 23.8% 29.2% 2.7% 93.0% 
Minority men 34.4% 4.8% 25.7% 28.0% 1.4% 94.3% 
White women 33.6% 1.2% 31.4% 28.2% 1.7% 96.1% 
Minority women 33.6% 1.5% 36.0% 23.0% 0.3% 94.4% 
 
5.5.2 Institutional Marginalization & Committee Types 
As expected the models for institutional marginalization largely echo the results 
of the social marginalization models, the results for these next five models and their 
related calculations are presented in tables 5.5 and 5.6. The similarities in results are 
important because they show that using the theoretically stronger concept of 
marginalization performs just as well as previous empirical studies. More importantly, 
considering institutional marginalization will become increasingly important as the 
proportion of minority and women legislators grows and provides for even greater 
variation in state legislatures. These results show that legislators who are marginalized in 
the institution are more likely to represent their salient identity constituencies than those 
legislators who are less marginalized as minority group members, or those who are in 
balanced groups. 
In terms of the proportion of control committees, the results, in Table 5.5, show 
that there are no differences between legislators who are highly marginalized in the 
legislature as tokens or minority members and those who hold a dominant position. 
Members of each of these groups sit on about 32-34% control committees, as presented 
in Table 5.6. In comparison, balanced group members sit on about 38% such committees 
of their total committee memberships. All of the seniority and leadership variables are 
positive and significant as expected. This is a very normatively good result as it suggests 
that these prestigious committees are reserved for those representatives who are held in 
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high esteem in the legislature through their seniority and/or leadership positions, and 
those legislators who are marginalized are no less able to gain membership on these 
committees. As for the low prestige committees, the workhorse committees, again I find 
no significant results in Table 5.5 for marginalized legislators in comparison to white 
members, showing that both high and low prestige committees are somewhat equally 
distributed. These findings again support Hypothesis 5.1. The data, in Table 5.6, show 
that the proportion of workhorse committees to all other committees for dominant, 
minority and token group members is 2.4-3.5%; only balanced group members avoid 
these committees with a 0.5% membership ratio. 
The salient identity constituency theory I have presented argues that while 
socially marginalized (identity) groups should hold certain preferences, those individuals 
who are institutionally marginalized are also likely to prioritize the interests of the salient 
identity constituencies s/he seeks to represent. In other words, we should see a strong and 
positive effect for legislators who are tokens in their legislatures in determining the share 
of their caretaker committee membership. Indeed, Hypothesis 5.2 is supported showing a 
statistically significant difference between token and dominant group members. While 
the proportion of caretaker committees is only about 24.1% for dominant group members, 
over a third of a token member’s committees are caretaker committees. Minority 
members also hold a larger proportion of caretaker committees than white men with 
28.3% such committees. Balanced members were not significantly different from white 
men. These findings lend support to Hypotheses 5.3 and 5.4. Senior members and those 
with leadership positions have a smaller proportion of caretaker committees, again this is 
the expected result as leaders are likely to prioritize control committees. 
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Table 5.5 shows that there are significant differences found between token and 
dominant group members in terms of the share of committees that are private goods and 
those that are public utility committees. The results show that token members are less 
likely than dominant group members to be members of private or public goods 
committees, which is not surprising given their focus on caretaker committees. Whereas 
dominant group members’ proportion of private committee membership amounts to about 
29.1%, tokens only sit on 24.7% of such committees, as shown in Table 5.6. Neither 
minority nor balanced members are significantly different from dominant members. In 
the case of public committees, both token and minority members are found to be 
significantly different from dominant group members. As for the control variables, more 
senior legislators and those who hold leadership positions are less likely to sit on these 
committees (except for committee leaders on public committees), even at the expense of 
important policy specialization committees.  
Again, taken as a whole the results of the institutional marginalization or group 
proportion set of models are quite similar to those for social marginalization. These data 
show that marginalization, broadly speaking, has an effect on committee membership. 
The data also show that marginalized legislators are able to prioritize the issues of their 
salient identity constituencies on the hill through membership on caretaker committees.  
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Table 5.5 OLS- Ratio of Committees by Institutional Marginalization 
 Control Workhorse Caretaker Private Public 
Token member -0.000 -0.011 0.101*** -0.044*** -0.032*** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
      
Minority member 0.013 -0.006 0.042*** -0.005 -0.020** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) 
      
Balanced Member 0.060*** -0.030*** -0.002 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
      
Seniority 0.004*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
      
Party Leader 0.283*** 0.004 -0.115*** -0.124*** -0.042*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) 
      
Comm. Leader 0.064*** 0.011 -0.027** -0.051*** 0.005 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
      
Comm. Variety -0.054*** 0.045*** 0.008+ -0.014*** 0.032*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
      
(R), min. party 0.015 -0.001 -0.053*** 0.024* 0.027** 
member (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) 
      
(D), min. party 0.039** -0.007 -0.041*** 0.000 0.018* 
member (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) 
      
(D), maj. party -0.026* -0.014+ -0.047*** 0.063*** 0.026** 
member (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
      
1998 -0.001 0.019* 0.000 0.004 -0.016* 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
      
2004 0.012 -0.009 -0.018+ 0.012 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
      
Constant 0.323*** 0.035** 0.241*** 0.291*** 0.029** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) 
Observations 4059 4059 4059 4059 4059 
R2 0.195 0.064 0.057 0.047 0.056 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.6 Proportion of Committee Type by Institutional Marginalization 
 Control Workhorse Caretaker Private Public Total 
 Token 32.3% 3.5% 24.1% 29.1% 2.9% 91.9% 
 Minority  38.3% 0.5% 23.9% 29.0% 2.2% 93.9% 
 Balanced 33.6% 2.9% 28.3% 28.6% 0.9% 94.3% 
 Dominant 32.3% 2.4% 34.2% 24.7% 0.0% 93.6% 
 
 Implications 
This chapter broadly contributes to both the literature of state legislative 
committees and to the study of the legislative behavior of women and minority 
representatives. I ask how marginalized legislators’ perception of salient identity 
constituencies leads to hill style behavior as manifested in one particular legislative 
activity, committee membership. In particular, this chapter sheds light on the legislative 
behavior of marginalized legislators who are understudied due to their still relatively 
small numbers. The models serve to both reinforce previous findings about minority 
preferences, but also show how minority and women’s preferences are captured in social 
welfare, i.e. caretaker, committees. In particular, the results show that dual 
marginalization, in the case of minority women, and being highly institutionally 
marginalized, in the case of tokens, has a strong effect on these legislators’ preferences, 
adding support for the notion that these legislators have added pressures to represent their 
salient identity constituents. This, importantly, suggests heterogeneity of preferences 
based on identity. In other words, we can see clear differences in policy preferences 
between marginalized and non-marginalized legislators. These findings suggest that there 
is no one-size-fits-all model of legislative behavior and that the degree to which a 
legislator is marginalized both in society and also institutionally in their legislature are 
important factors in how s/he chooses to allocate time on legislative activities. 
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Ultimately, the question deals with the representation of minority constituents, and the 
data suggest that marginalized constituents are differently represented on state legislative 
committees.  
While these differences are important, it is also important to recognize instances 
when marginalized legislators are not significantly different from white males or 
dominant group members. Such results indicate that membership on some committee 
types is better explained by institutional position variables, such as seniority and 
leadership. This means that there are occasions when gender and race/ethnicity do not 
necessarily matter for membership, and also that there are instances when minority 
women are not “disadvantaged” or “advantaged” in their legislative activities. This is 
important, especially in terms of control committees, because it shows that there is no 
evidence of a systematic bias against racial/ethnic minorities or women when it comes to 
membership on higher prestige committees, nor a difference in their ambition for high 
prestige committees. In other words, all legislators appear to have an equal interest in 
being a member of control committees. Indeed, all legislators, regardless of 
race/ethnicity, gender or institutional marginalization, hold a statistically equal proportion 
of this committee type.  
Given that there are some types of committees in which marginalization produces a 
significant effect and some in which it does not appear to have an effect, this means that 
the answer to the looming question “do descriptive features such as race/ethnic identity 
and gender have an effect on legislative committee membership?” is “it depends”. In 
terms of the substantively defined committees, I find variation by both social and 
institutional marginalization for caretaker committees. Unlike the committees defined by 
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power, we should expect differences among legislators’ preferences for substantively 
different committees. The literature has long shown minority and women legislators’ 
focus on issues dealing with social welfare, and this work further supports this finding. 
This study is also important because of its theoretical richness in considering the 
foundations of identity-based representation as being grounded in marginalization, and 
goes further to test this by looking at institutional marginalization. The study also allows 
for simultaneous comparisons of several groups to non-marginalized legislators. Thus, it 
provides also an empirical richness that some previous literature has been lacking. One of 
the limitations of the empirical methods used here is in isolating salient identities as the 
casual mechanism as opposed to the results revealing legislators’ personal preferences. 
This is a common challenge in observational data, which speaks to the strength of the use 
of multi-methods approach of the full dissertation. While the causal mechanism may be 
more difficult to pin-point with these data, the richness of the complimentary qualitative 
data, particularly in Chapter 3, suggests that legislators use their legislative activities to 
tend to the needs of their constituents, including salient identity constituents.  
The salient identity theory provides a framework for the continued study of 
marginalized legislators as the number of minority and women legislators grows. I 
anticipate that with a growth in minority population in the United States this will also 
create openings for further cleavages within groups, and also opportunities for a focus on 
a larger variety of issues for “minority” legislators. I expect with such a shift that the role 
of institutional marginalization will expand. I expect that the continued study of the role 
of institutional marginalization under varying conditions will be imperative to the 
examination of the legislative behavior of identity groups. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The old, tired perception of legislators as old, white, males has been fading over 
the past few decades. More so than ever, our members of Congress and state legislators 
include women and racial/ethnic minorities. This is a reflection of both the changing 
demographics of the country and the degree of political inclusion for these historically 
marginalized groups. As the number of legislators who are women and minorities 
increases, so too does our understanding of legislative behavior expand. Traditional 
theories of legislative behavior have been limited as they have largely examined the 
behavior of white men. In response, scholars of gender, race, and ethnicity have 
examined how these groups might behave differently from traditional expectations, 
particularly in terms of their preferences and leadership styles. Even so, much of this 
scholarship has still been limited to thinking about representation in terms of electoral 
gains or ambition. A fundamental goal of this dissertation has been to push readers to 
think “outside the box”, as the saying goes, or more concretely, as the title implies—
thinking about representation beyond the constraints of the district.  
What I have presented in this dissertation is a holistic theory which not only 
pushes the reader to think about representation which is defined by identity, rather than 
by geography, but also to consider how both social marginalization (identity) and 
institutional marginalization (group proportion) affect legislative behavior. I show that 
context matters, and I argue that studying legislative behavior through the lens of only 
race/ethnicity or gender and without considering the degree of institutional 
marginalization may lead to biased results. I show that when legislators’ group 
proportions are very small, there is a higher degree of awareness and attention to identity-
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based issues and representation. Conversely, differences between groups are likely to 
diminish as the groups grow, because there is a larger collective effort, less perceived 
need, and thereby less individual attention to identity-based issues. I expect that as the 
number of women and minority legislators grow, so too will the need to examine 
contextual variables, such as group proportion.  
The salient identity theory presented in Chapter 2 is more holistic than much of 
the previous literature on elite identity politics because it examines two separate 
trajectories of the foundation of marginalization, and examines the implications of these 
conditions on both hill (policy development) and home (constituency service) style 
behaviors. I argued that a high degree of social and institutional marginalization activates 
legislators’ awareness of identity and identity-based issues, thereby having implications 
for their perceptions of constituency and ultimately their legislative behavior. I suggested 
that more highly marginalized legislators perceive of identity group members as a salient 
identity constituency that is to be represented. I also argued that this constituency 
transcends geographical boundaries because it is defined by identity and its 
representation fueled by an intrinsic moral obligation. I then suggested two avenues of 
implications for legislative behavior, as I theorized that legislators should be likely to 
represent these salient identity constituencies through substantive policies as well as 
constituency service. Finally, I contended that the implications of the salient identity 
constituency theory would be best examined by using a multi-methods approach and 
presented a research design for the dissertation to do so.  
In the first substantive chapter, Chapter 3, I sought to test some of the 
fundamental implications of the salient identity constituency theory—the existence of an 
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identity-based constituency and the possibility of extra-district representation. This 
chapter sought to answer how marginalized legislators think about representation, 
including who they represent, why they represent and how they represent. The chapter 
drew on the richness of qualitative data gathered through face-to-face interviews with 
state legislators and observations and found marginalized legislators have additive 
pressures to represent both their district as well as at least one salient identity 
constituency. This chapter showed that traditional theories of legislative behavior were 
not necessarily “wrong”, even about minority or women’s behavior, as much as they are 
limited. Marginalized legislators do not necessarily perceive of constituency differently 
from non-marginalized legislators, but rather marginalized legislators perceive of more 
constituencies and have a stronger moral obligation to represent them.  
In Chapter 4, I tested the implications of the salient identity theory on home style 
legislative behaviors. I examined how the additive pressures of marginalized legislators, 
who represent multiple constituencies, leads to a heavier workload and an increased 
likelihood of engaging in home-style activities outside the district. This chapter served to 
lend evidence to an expanded view of legislative behavior, one that is not confined to 
district boundaries. The chapter also offers a more specific test of surrogate 
representation than previously found in the literature by distinguishing between in-district 
and extra-district behaviors (but see Broockman 2013). In addition, this study is the first 
to use a survey of legislative behavior to test the implications of surrogate representation. 
For this chapter, I tested four hypotheses, three of four were strongly supported by the 
data, while the final one saw mixed results. In the first I stated that socially and 
institutionally marginalized legislators will meet with identity-based groups, both in 
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general, and outside the district, more frequently than legislators who are not 
marginalized. This hypothesis was supported by data that showed that minority women 
and token legislators meet with more race/ethnic minority based groups and women’s 
groups than legislators who are white males or dominant group members. In Hypothesis 
4.2, I stated that socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will meet with a 
larger number of types of groups, both in general, and outside the district, than legislators 
who are not marginalized. The results showed that indeed, both minority women and 
tokens meet with more groups than white males and dominant group members, both 
within and outside the district. In particular, this test showed strong support for tokens’ 
motivations to meet with several groups. This data revealed not only that marginalized 
legislators meet with identity groups, but also that the implication of doing so is not a 
shift in focus, but rather an additive one, in comparison to non-marginalized legislators.  
Based on the implications of the expected additive pressures resulting from a 
desire to represent both a district constituency and a salient identity constituency, I 
expected that socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will work more than 
legislators who are not marginalized, as stated in Hypothesis 4.3. The vast majority of the 
seven dependent variables used to test this hypothesis were significant and in the 
expected direction, for both social and institutional marginalization. In comparing the 
predictive power of the different independent variables, once again the institutional 
marginalization variable performed somewhat better than the social marginalization 
variable. 
Hypothesis 4.4 stated that socially and institutionally marginalized legislators will 
provide constituency service on behalf of an extra-district constituency more frequently 
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than legislators who are not marginalized. This hypothesis was not supported by the 
restricted sample of the most marginalized and least marginalized legislators. Although 
based on some additional tests with the full sample, there was some support that the most 
marginalized legislators, minority women and tokens, behave differently from the mean 
legislator. The results of this measure were somewhat counter-intuitive based on the 
literature. The literature has suggested that constituency service is a costly activity with 
rewards only at the electoral margins (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1979, 1984; Norris 
1997). Note that these studies of constituency service adhered to the traditional, dyadic 
view of representation. In other words, if constituency service is high cost, low reward, 
we can reasonably expect that surrogate constituency service is very high cost, and 
virtually no reward.  
The only electoral reward for legislators in surrogate constituency service must be 
indirect, through for example extra-district campaign donations. It was based on this logic 
that I theorized that it should be unlikely for legislators to engage in such behavior, but 
that the moral obligation of representing a salient identity constituency should be 
sufficient to motivate marginalized legislators to go beyond their district boundaries. 
However, the hypothesis was rejected, not because marginalized legislators do not 
provide surrogate constituency service, but rather that, unexpectedly, everyone does. This 
is an important finding as it suggests that the representative reach of our state legislators 
may be more expansive than previously theorized. In terms of the test for the salient 
identity theory, these results suggest that further research is needed to understand why, 
and for whom, legislators engage in surrogate constituency service. 
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The final substantive chapter examined the salient identity theory’s implications 
for hill style behaviors. In particular, I used committee membership to measure legislative 
preferences. This chapter used a third source of data relying on aggregate data of state 
legislators’ committee assignments for 13 different states for the years 1998, 2004, and 
2010. One of the important contributions of this chapter is a typology of state legislative 
committees which encompasses 450 different committees, and over 90% of state 
legislators’ committee assignments for this sample. I examined the ratio of membership 
on five committee types; control and workhorse committees, which I call general 
committees, and three policy specialization committees, caretaker, private goods, and 
public utility. In examining degree of both social and institutional marginalization for all 
state legislators in the sample, this study was thus able to compare across states, 
committees, and groups.  
I tested three hypotheses related to this data. I expected that because marginalized 
legislators have the same instrumental goals as non-marginalized legislators they should 
hold an equal proportion of both control and workhorse assignments. This hypothesis was 
supported in the case of both social and institutional marginalization. This is also an 
important finding for scholarship that has argued that because of their marginalization, 
minority and women legislators are less likely to hold positions on powerful committees, 
as this data finds it not to be the case. In response to the literature, which has suggested 
that marginalized legislators have distinct preferences related to vulnerable populations, I 
expected that these legislators should concentrate their policy specialization efforts on 
caretaker committees. I find this to be the case as marginalized legislators are more likely 
to sit on caretaker committees, and also less likely to sit on either private goods or public 
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utility committees. Albeit, the data showed the strongest support was for the most 
marginalized legislators with other groups seeing weaker or no support for the 
hypothesis.  
One of the predominant findings of this dissertation is in its analysis of the current 
state of political representation. This dissertation suggests that while the state of dyadic 
and collective descriptive representation in U.S. state legislatures may be low, the state of 
our representation may be subjectively “better” than we might expect. Allowing for 
theories that go beyond the confines of geographic representation pushes us to think 
outside the box, and reveals that even though citizens may not have a dyadic descriptive 
representative, they are still likely to be able to, and apparently do, reach out to a 
surrogate representative. On the flip side, this dissertation also reveals the challenges 
associated with marginalization for women and minority state legislators. This 
dissertation adds to this scholarship in suggesting that marginalized legislators face 
heavier workloads than their non-marginalized legislators. While much of this workload 
may be self-imposed because of a moral obligation, it exists nonetheless. This 
dissertation has also shed light on how marginalization acts as a fundamental catalyst for 
minority and women behavior, as such I expect that similar behaviors are likely among 
other legislators who belong to marginalized groups, such as LGBT legislators, or 
legislators from religious minority groups. In addition, I expect the salient identity 
constituency theory to translate to other dyadic systems of representation, where there are 
one or several minority groups.   
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APPENDIX A 
A. 1: NCSL WLN 2014 Agenda 
  
 
WOMEN'S LEGISLATIVE NETWORK 2014 
LEGISLATIVE SUMMIT AGENDA 
 
MONDAY, AUG. 18 
4-5:30 p.m. 
Hilton 
Minneapolis, 
Level 3 
Rochester 
Women's Legislative Network Board Meeting 
All are welcome at the Summer meeting of the Network board. We will 
share highlights from 2014, brainstorm future program ideas, and 
discuss fundraising for the Network’s 30th anniversary year. 
TUESDAY, AUG. 19 
  
8:30 a.m.-1 
p.m. 
Convention 
Center, 
M101 AB 
Women's Legislative Network Leadership Training 
Advance registration is required. Contact Katie Ziegler for more 
information. 
  
8:30 a.m.         Welcome and Coffee 
  
8:45-9:45 a.m. Women in Legislative Leadership Roundtable 
Discussion 
Hear from female legislative leaders about their experiences moving up 
the ladder. 
Panelists: 
Senator Pam Jochum, Senate President, Iowa 
Speaker Becky Lockhart, Speaker of the House, Utah 
Mary Panzer, former Senate Majority Leader, Wisconsin 
Senator Sandra Pappas, Senate President, Minnesota 
  
9:45-10 a.m.    Break 
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10 a.m. – 1 p.m. Driving Engagement through Strengths, Emotional 
Intelligence, and Energy (lunch will be served) 
Trainers: Carol Granis and Tami Evans, Leading Edge Coaching and 
Development 
  
Even in the best of times, it can be stressful working in a state 
government environment. With endless budget challenges, partisan 
bickering and significant state issues, it can be hard to lift colleagues, 
staffers and even ourselves out of the funk. That’s why it’s critical to 
drive engagement throughout your agency and office. Part One of this 
session is about maximizing engagement through strengths-based 
leadership. Part Two focuses on your emotional impact on others and 
what you can do to connect and move ahead with colleagues and 
constituents. Part Three is about energizing yourself through four 
critical wellsprings. All three parts are delivered with the unique blend of 
research, best practices, and improvisational comedy that Leading 
Edge is known for. By the end of the day, you will leave renewed, 
taking critical tools and skills you’ll need to lift yourselves and others 
up. 
6-7:30 p.m. Social Event: Mill City Museum 
Meet with colleagues old and new at the historic Mill City Museum 
located on the bank of the beautiful Mississippi river, whose power was 
harnessed for one of the state's first industries – flour milling. 
Experience the pioneering spirit of Minnesota with local food, musical 
acts, log rolling and wood carving in one of the city's most treasured 
locations. The Mill City Museum is a spectacular venue to showcase a 
proud state considered one of the most innovative in the country. 
WEDNESDAY, AUG. 20 
4-5 p.m. 
Convention 
Center, 
200 C 
Women's Legislative Network Roundtables 
Join us for informal roundtable discussions about women in politics, 
leadership, hot topics, and anything else on your mind! 
5-6 p.m. 
Convention 
Center, 
Lounge A 
Level 2 
Women's Legislative Network Reception 
Join the Women's Legislative Network for a reception honoring the 
incoming president, New Mexico Representative Jane Powdrell-
Culbert, the Network executive board, and women in politics around the 
world. 
THURSDAY, AUG. 21 
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12:30-2 
p.m. 
Convention 
Center, 
200 ABIJ 
Women's Legislative Network Lunch and Business Meeting 
Join the Women's Legislative Network for our annual elections and a 
keynote address about women and small business in Minnesota. 
  
Panelists: 
Senator Vicki Jensen, Minnesota 
Representative Marion O'Neill, Minnesota 
Laura Ooley, CEO, Appmosphere, Minnesota 
6:30-9 p.m. Nicollet Island Social Event 
Experience the beauty of Nicollet Island, smack dab in the middle of the 
Mississippi River with its historic St. Anthony Falls, just north of the 
birthplace of Minneapolis. Delight in the creative, cultural and 
innovative spirit that makes Minnesota unique. Local musical acts, 
runway shows, an exciting chef challenge and a biergarten will delight 
your senses with all that makes Minnesota unique. 
FRIDAY, AUG. 22 
12:30-2 
p.m. 
Convention 
Center, 
Ballroom 
AB 
General Session: Seattle Kick-Off Luncheon 
The Insiders' View: Politics Today: Smart, perceptive and the ultimate 
political insiders, Mark Halperin and John Heilemann share their 
unrivaled insights on the interplay among the economy, Wall Street and 
Washington and the forces that shape American politics. Managing 
editors of Bloomberg Politics and best-selling authors of Game 
Change and Double Down, their keen analysis and lively observations 
make them two of the top political observers today. Find out what's 
ahead for Democrats and Republicans in the upcoming election from 
two of the best political pros. 
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A.2 NCSL WLN 2015 Agenda 
  
 
WOMEN'S LEGISLATIVE NETWORK 2015 
LEGISLATIVE SUMMIT AGENDA 
8/10/2015 
The Women's Legislative Network celebrated its 30th anniversary at the NCSL Legislative 
Summit in Seattle 
 
SUNDAY, AUGUST 2, 2015 
Time Sessions 
4 -5:30 p.m. 
Sheraton Ballard 
Room 
Women's Legislative Network Board Meeting 
Participants at the summer board meeting reviewed the year's 
activities, discussed the Network's 30th anniversary, and planned 
for the future. 
MONDAY, AUGUST 3 
9 a.m.-Noon 
Sheraton 
Redwood B 
Courageous Conversations: Digging Deep for Success 
This workshop explored one important factor that often holds 
women back from being the most effective leaders we could be: 
ourselves. Using humor and examples, we explored how closely 
tied our success is with our ability to initiate and navigate 
courageous (aka. difficult!) conversations. We discussed how to 
give feedback to a colleague, address the seemingly intractable 
challenge within your caucus, propose the bold idea you've been 
sitting on, or acknowledge the "elephant in the subcommittee" that 
everyone has been avoiding. In this lively, thought-provoking 
session, participants learned how to: 
• Identify the factors that are holding you back from speaking up 
• Increase your skills and confidence in how to identify and 
prepare for important conversations 
• Articulate strategies to navigate high-stakes conversations 
effectively 
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• Connect with your peers to access the collective wisdom in the 
room, sharing success stories and lessons learned 
  
Facilitator: Sara Lawson, Shorthand Consulting 
Noon-1:30 p.m. 
Sheraton Aspen 
Room 
States Support Female Veterans 
With the Task Force on Military and Veterans' Affairs 
This session examined how states are addressing the unique 
needs of female veterans regarding education, employment and 
reintegration. 
Read the recently-released report from Easter Seals about 
community supports for female veterans. 
  
Speaker: Col. David W. Sutherland (U.S. Army Ret.), Chairman 
and Co-Founder, Easter Seals Dixon Center for Military and 
Veterans Services, Washington, D.C. 
Kimberly Mitchell (Former U.S. Navy), President and Co-Founder, 
Easter Seals Dixon Center for Military and Veterans Services 
  
Sponsored by: NCSL gratefully acknowledges the Easter Seals for 
sponsoring the lunch. 
5:30-7 p.m. Social Event: A Taste of Washington 
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4 
2-3:15 p.m. 
Convention 
Center 
304 
Economic Engines: Women-Owned Businesses Keep the 
American Dream Alive 
Firms owned by women grew at 1.5 times the national average in 
the past 15 plus years. This session featured a discussion about 
strategies to ensure women have access to financing they need to 
become business owners, improve employment and gain a 
foothold in industries such as construction and transportation. 
  
Panelists and Resources:  
  
 NCSL Blog post about the session  
 Connie Evans, Association for Enterprise Opportunity 
 Policy Resources  
 Jennifer Teehan, Washington Women’s Business Center 
 Kristina Trujillo, Exovita Biosciences  
 Julie Weeks, Womenable  
 Womenable's Reference Library  
 Links to relevant women's entrepreneurship web sites 
171 
 
 The 2015 State of Women-Owned Businesses report, with 
executive report and summary tables with data by state  
4-5 p.m. 
Convention 
Center 
304 
Women's Legislative Network Roundtable Policy Discussions 
Women legislators and friends gathered for informal roundtable 
discussions about women in politics, human trafficking, domestic 
violence and campus sexual assault, women in the workforce and 
wage issues, and women's health. 
5-6 p.m.  
Convention 
Center 
3ab Lobby, 
North Galleria 
Women's Legislative Network 30th Anniversary Gala 
Reception 
The Network celebrated its 30th anniversary and women in 
politics. 
7-10 p.m.  State Dinner: New Mexico 
Dinner with New Mexico delegation including State Legislators, 
Staff and Lobbyists 
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5 
12:30 p.m. 
Convention 
Center 
Ballroom 
6ABC 
Women's Legislative Network Group Photo 
All female state legislators were invited to the stage following the 
Robert Gates session for a commemorative group photo to mark the 
Network's 30th anniversary. 
12:30-2 p.m. 
Convention 
Center 
2AB 
Women's Legislative Network 30th Anniversary Lunch 
Participants celebrated the Network's history, women in state 
legislatures and politics at the luncheon and participated in the 
business meeting and elections. 
  
Moderator: Debbie Walsh, Center for American Women and Politics 
Panelist: Chancellor Lisa Brown, WSU Spokane, former Washington 
senate majority leader 
Panelist: Shirley Hankins, Washington, former Washington state 
representative and Network chair 
Panelist: Louise Miller, Washington, former Washington state 
representative and Network chair 
6:30-10 p.m.
  
Social Event: Washington Block Party, Seattle Space needle 
THURSDAY, AUGUST 6 
12:15-1:45 
p.m. 
General Session Luncheon 
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Convention 
Center 
Ballroom 
6AB 
Thomas Jefferson embodied the aspirations of a young nation in ways 
that reverberate still today. The New York Times best-selling author 
Jon Meacham paints a portrait of Jefferson as a flawed, contradictory, 
elusive man who embodies an eternal drama—and one we confront 
today: The struggle of leadership to achieve greatness in a difficult 
and confounding world. 
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APPENDIX B 
Email Interview Invitations 
Dear Representative [last name of state legislator], 
Quality governance depends upon the policy efforts of elected representatives.  I 
am conducting an academic study to better understand the process of representation 
through legislative activities in state legislatures, and I need your help to complete this 
research.   
For my research I hope to interview state legislators, such as yourself, about your 
constituency and the activities you participate in as part of your role as representative. 
Interviews will be conducted during the 2014 Legislative Summit of the NCSL, 
August 19-22 in Minneapolis, MN. 
The interview should take no more than 30 minutes of your time and its purpose 
is purely academic.  The goal of the study is to increase our knowledge of the perception 
of constituency and legislative activities of state legislators. The findings of the study will 
benefit state governance as a whole as we learn more about the factors that contribute to 
the state legislative process. I cannot complete this research without your insights, so I 
hope that you will take the short time needed to fill out the survey.    
Your participation is, of course, completely voluntary, and there is no 
penalty if you choose not to meet with me.  
I hope you find that this research question merits your valuable time.  If you are 
able to meet with me for this short interview during the Legislative Summit please 
reply to this email, or contact me via e-mail at jhellweg@unm.edu  so that I may 
schedule an appointment with you. If you are not attending the Legislative Summit but 
would like to participate I would be happy to schedule a phone interview with you at your 
convenience. 
Please contact me for any questions, or if you have other concerns you may 
contact the University of New Mexico Human Subjects Review office at 
IRBMainCampus@unm.edu.  Again, thank you for your assistance. 
 
Sincerely, 
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APPENDIX C 
Semi-Structured Interview Instrument 
I. Intro 
a. I know that running for, and holding, public office is a very big commitment; why 
did you decide to run for the first time?  
i.Probe: Were you recruited/ supported by the party? 
II. Representation- These next couple of questions are about your role as 
representative 
2. Tell me about your constituency; whom do you represent? 
[if other than district] What kinds of activities do you engage in to represent [group]? 
(Floor speeches, bill sponsoring, constituency service, committee selection?) 
Do you feel you are better able than most other legislators to represent [group’s] 
concerns? 
3. What are the major issues and concerns in your district? 
i.Is your district competitive?   
4. What makes you a good representative for your district? 
5. Has there ever been an issue in which you felt strongly one way and a majority of 
your district felt strongly another way? 
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[if yes] What did you end up doing? How did you handle it? Was it a difficult decision 
for you to make? 
[if no] Do you see any possibility of an issue such as this arising in the future? 
[if yes] What issue is that? What will you do if that issue comes up in the legislature or in 
a campaign? 
III. Goals and Priorities 
To start I’m going to ask you some questions about your goals and priorities that you 
have as a public official. 
6. What are your policy goals as an elected official?  
i.Are you term limited?  
[if yes] When will your term end? Would you do something different with unlimited 
terms? 
7. We know that prestige is a major factor for committee preferences in the U.S. 
Congress; is it the same case in your legislature that some committee assignments are 
seen as more prestigious than others? 
i.[if yes] which committees are the most? Do you sit on any of these committees? 
ii.What are the benefits of sitting on these more prestigious committees? 
iii.Do you have as one of your goals to sit on a prestigious committee, if you do not already? 
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IV. Women and Minorities in Legislative Politics- Women and minorities have yet 
to reach parity in any U.S. legislature, I’d like to ask you some questions that specifically 
address this- 
8. Your state has <%> of women legislators; what do you think about this number? 
[if sufficient] What impact, if any, do you think this has on legislative activities? 
[if insufficient] What impact, if any, do you think having a small number of women in 
your legislature has on the institution and on policy outcomes?   
Do you have as a goal to increase this percentage? How do you do that? 
9. Sometimes we talk about a set of concerns as “women’s issues”; do you think that 
women as a group have particular political concerns? 
 [if no] Why not?  
[if yes] What are some of those concerns? 
i.Do you feel that [you and] your female colleagues are better able than your male 
colleagues to represent such concerns? 
 [if yes] Why? 
10. Do [you and] your female colleagues seem to be more willing than your male 
colleagues to represent such concerns? 
[if necessary] Have you personally done any work on any of these issues? 
[if yes] What is the most recent women’s issue you’ve worked on? What did you do? 
[if no] Why not? 
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i. What about minority women? Would you say that there are a fair number of 
minority women?  
ii. Do you think that minority women have particular issues that affect them or that 
they are concerned about that are different from other women?  
V. Collegiality in the Legislature –The next set of questions are about the 
collegiality in you legislature and among legislators- 
11. Would you say that the legislature is collegial?  Why/ Why not? 
i.When disagreements and conflicts [do] occur, what are they usually about? 
ii.[if necessary] Are the disagreements mostly personal or ideological in nature? 
12. Would you say that you meet with other legislators outside of officially scheduled 
hours, or when the legislature is not in session, to accomplish your goals as legislator? 
 
[if yes] About how often? A few times a year/session? Every month? Every week? Every 
day? 
i.Are you a member of any caucuses? 
ii.What is the purpose of the caucus(es)? 
iii.Has there ever been a time when you felt you were being excluded from a social 
gathering (or a series of gatherings, caucuses, etc.)? 
[if yes] Why do you think you were being excluded? 
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iv.In your legislature, is informal or semi-formal socializing necessary, or important in 
getting bills passed? 
[if no] What if a legislator is trying to get a leadership position?  
Finally, as an experienced state legislator, what advice would you give to new, incoming, 
legislators? 
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APPENDIX D 
Survey Instrument 
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APPENDIX E 
Email Survey Invitations 
 
Honorable [Legislator Name Here], 
Congratulations on a completed or near complete legislative session. As you know 
quality governance depends upon the policy efforts of elected representatives. To 
understand better what this means I am conducting an academic study to better 
understand the process of representation through legislative activities in state legislatures, 
and I need your help to complete this research. For my research I am surveying state 
legislators, such as yourself, about your constituency and the activities you participate in 
as part of your role as representative. 
The survey is available here: 
 (or if you cannot see the button above go to: legislator-
survey.unm.edu) 
The survey should take no more than 20 minutes of your time and its purpose is purely 
academic. The goal of the study is to increase our knowledge of the perception of 
constituency and legislative activities of state legislators. The findings of the study will 
benefit state governance as a whole as we learn more about the factors that contribute to 
the state legislative process. I cannot complete this research without your insights, so I 
hope that you will take the short time needed to fill out the survey.  
Your participation is, of course, completely voluntary, and there is no penalty if you 
choose not to complete the survey. 
I hope you find that this research question merits your valuable time. You may also 
contact me at juliahellwege@unm.edu for any questions, or if you have other concerns 
you may contact the University of New Mexico Human Subjects Review office 
at IRBMainCampus@unm.edu. 
If you have already received this message and do not wish to participate or be contacted 
again, please send me an email and I will take you off my list. 
Again, thank you for your assistance. 
Sincerely,  
 
Julia Hellwege, PhD Candidate University of New Mexico 
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APPENDIX F 
Committee Categories within Typology 
Control Committees:  
Budget, Revenue, Taxation, Finance and Appropriations 
Judiciary and Ethics 
Rules 
Ways and Means 
 
Workhorse Committees:  
Election Administration 
Government Oversight 
Government Relations 
Legislative Effectiveness and Admin 
Public Employees and Pensions 
 
Caretaker Committees: 
Children, Seniors and Family 
Education 
Health and Human Services 
Veterans Affairs 
Law, Criminal Justice, Corrections and Public Safety 
 
Private Goods Committees: 
Banking, Insurance, and Financial Services 
Business and Commerce 
Consumer Affairs 
Economic Development 
Labor 
Regulated Industries and Professions 
Science and Technology 
Agriculture, Energy, Environment, and Natural Resources 
 
Public Utility Committees: 
Fish and Wildlife 
Military Affairs 
Public Utilities, Infrastructure, and Transportation 
Tourism and Cultural Affairs 
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APPENDIX G 
Identity groups by Institutional Marginalization in U.S. State Legislatures 2015 
STATE  Min. Women Min. Men White Women White Men 
 Alabama  token minority token dominant 
 Alaska  token token minority dominant 
 Arizona  token token minority balanced 
 Arkansas  token token minority dominant 
 California  token token token balanced 
 Colorado  token token balanced balanced 
 Connecticut  token token balanced dominant 
 Delaware  token token minority dominant 
 Florida  token token minority balanced 
 Georgia  token token token balanced 
 Hawaii  balanced token balanced minority 
 Idaho  token none minority dominant 
 Illinois  token token minority balanced 
 Indiana  token token minority dominant 
 Iowa  token token minority dominant 
 Kansas  token token minority dominant 
 Kentucky  none token minority dominant 
 Louisiana  token minority token dominant 
 Maine  token token minority dominant 
 Maryland  token minority minority balanced 
 Massachusetts none none minority dominant 
 Michigan  token token minority dominant 
 Minnesota  token token balanced dominant 
 Mississippi  token minority token dominant 
 Missouri  token token minority dominant 
 Montana  token token minority dominant 
 Nebraska  token token minority dominant 
 Nevada  token token minority balanced 
 New Hampshire token token minority dominant 
 New Jersey  token token minority balanced 
 New Mexico minority minority token balanced 
 New York  token minority minority balanced 
 North Carolina token token minority dominant 
 North Dakota none none minority dominant 
 Ohio  token token minority dominant 
 Oklahoma  token token token dominant 
 Oregon  token token balanced dominant 
 Pennsylvania token token token dominant 
 Rhode Island token token minority dominant 
 South Carolina token minority token dominant 
 South Dakota none token minority dominant 
 Tennessee  token token token dominant 
 Texas  token minority token balanced 
 Utah  token token token dominant 
 Vermont  token token balanced balanced 
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 STATE  Min. Women Min. Men White Women White Men 
  
 Virginia  token token token dominant 
 Washington  token token minority dominant 
 West Virginia token token minority dominant 
 Wisconsin  token token minority dominant 
 Wyoming  none token minority dominant 
  
186 
 
REFERENCES 
AAPOR. 2016. Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys, 9th 
Edition. 
Atkeson, Lonna Rae, and Nancy Carrillo. 2007. “More Is Better: The Influence of 
Collective Female Descriptive Representation on External Efficacy.” Politics & 
Gender 3(01): 79–101. 
http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S1743923X0707002X\nhttp://journals.cambrid
ge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=836776&fileId=S1743923X0
707002X. 
Barker, Lucius Jefferson, Mack H. Jones, and Katherine Tate. 1999. African Americans 
and the American Political System. 4th ed. New Yor: Pearson. 
Barreto, Matt A. 2007. “ISí Se Puede! Latino Candidates and the Mobilization of Latino 
Voters.” American Political Science Review 101(03): 425. 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055407070293. 
Barreto, Matt A., Natalie Masuoka, and Gabriel Sanchez. 2008. Religiosity, 
Discrimination and Group Identity Among Muslim Americans. 
Barrett, Edith J. 1995. “The Policy Priorities of African American Women in State 
Legislatures.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20(2): 223–47. 
Beckwith, Karen, and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers. 2007. “Sheer Numbers: Critical 
Representation Thresholds and Women’s Political Representation.” Perspectives on 
Politics 5(3): 553–65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446503. 
Bejarano, Christina. 2013. Latina Advantage: Gender, Race, and Political Success. 
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
Bejarano, Christina E. 2013. The Latina Advantage : Gender, Race, and Political 
Success. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
Bobo, Lawrence, and Franklin D Gilliam. 1990. “Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and 
Black Empowerment.” American Political Science Review 84(2): 377–93. 
Branton, Regina P. 2007. “Latino Attitudes Toward Various Areas of Public Policy: The 
Importance of Acculturation.” Political Research Quarterly 60(2): 293–303. 
Branton, Regina P., Erin C. Cassese, and Bradford S. Jones. 2012. “Race, Ethnicity, and 
US House Incumbent Evaluations.” Legislative Studies … 37(4): 465–89. 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00058.x (October 5, 2014). 
Bratton, Kathleen A. 2005. “Critical Mass Theory Revisited: The Behavior and Success 
of Token Women in State Legislatures.” Politics & Gender 1(01). 
Bratton, Kathleen a., and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. “Agenda Setting and Legislative 
Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race.” The Journal of 
Politics 61(03): 658–79. 
187 
 
Bratton, Kathleen A., Kerry L. Haynie, and Beth Reingold. 2006. “Agenda Setting and 
African American Women in State Legislatures.” Journal of Women, Politics & 
Policy 28(3-4): 71–96. 
Broockman, David E. 2013. “Black Politicians Are More Intrinsically Motivated to 
Advance Blacks’ Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives.” 
American Journal of Political Science 57(3): 521–36. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23496636 (April 27, 2016). 
———. 2014. “Do Female Politicians Empower Women to Vote or Run for Office? A 
Regression Discontinuity Approach.” Electoral Studies 34: 190–204. 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379413001583. 
Broockman, David E., and Daniel M. Butler. 2015. “Do Better Committee Assignments 
Meaningfully Bene t Legislators? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in the 
Arkansas State Legislature.” Journal of Experimental Political Science Journal of 
Experimental Political Science Journal of Experimental Political Science (2): 152–
63. http://journals.cambridge.org/XPS (June 28, 2016). 
Brown, Nadia E. 2010. “Who’s Worth Representing ? Advanced Marginalization in the 
Context of Representation.” In Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, , 1–32. 
———. 2014. Sisters in the Statehouse. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199352432.001.0
001/acprof-9780199352432 (June 22, 2016). 
Browning, Rufus P., Marshall Dale Rogers, and David H. Tabb. 1984. Protest Is Not 
Enough : The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Burke, Edmund. 1774. “Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 1774.” 
Burrell, Barbara. 1998. A Woman’s Place Is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in 
the Feminist Era. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Butler, Daniel M., and David E. Broockman. 2011. “Do Politicians Constituents ? 
Racially Discriminate Against A Field Experiment on State Legislators.” American 
Journal of Political Science 55(3): 463–77. 
Caiazza, Amy. 2004. “Does Women’s Representation in Elected Office Lead to Women-
Friendly Policy? Analysis of State-Level Data.” Women & Politics 26(1): 35–70. 
Cain, Bruce E, John A Ferejohn, and Morris P Fiorina. 1979. “The House Is Not a Home: 
British MPs in Their Constituencies.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4(4): 501–23. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/439403 (June 22, 2016). 
———. 1984. “The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. 
Representatives and British Members of Parliament.” Source: The American 
Political Science Review 78(1): 110–25. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1961252 (June 
10, 2016). 
188 
 
Cammisa, Anne Marie, and Beth Reingold. 2004. “Women in State Legislatures and 
State Legislative Research: Beyond Sameness and Difference.” State Politics & 
Policy Quarterly 4(2): 181–210. 
http://spa.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1177/153244000400400204 (October 5, 
2014). 
Canon, David T. 1999. Race, Redistricting, and Representation : The Unintended 
Consequences of Black Majority Districts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Carnes, Nicholas. 2012. “Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class 
in Congress Matter?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 37(1): 5–34. 
Carroll, Susan. 2003. “Are U.S. Women State Legislators Accountable to Women? The 
Complementary Roles of Feminist Identity and Women’s Organizations. Paper 
Presented at the Gender and Social Capital Conference, St. John's College, 
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, May.” : 1–31. 
Carroll, Susan J. 1989. “The Personal Is Political: The Intersection and Private Lives and 
Public Roles Among Women and Men in Elective and Appointive Office.” Women 
& Politics 9(2): 51–67. 
———. 2002a. “Representing Women: Congresswomen’s Perception of Their 
Representational Roles.” In Women Transforming Congress,. 
———. 2002b. “Representing Women: Congresswomen’s Perception of Their 
Representative Roles.” In Women Transforming Congress, ed. Cindy Simon 
Rosenthal. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 506. 
http://www.oupress.com/ECommerce/Book/Detail/1340/women transforming 
congress. 
Carroll, Susan J., Debra L. Dodson, and Ruth B. Mandel. 1991. The Impact of Women in 
Public Office. 
Carroll, Susan J., and Kira Sanbonmatsu. 2013. More Women Can Run. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Casellas, Jason P. 2009. “The Institutional and Demographic Determinants of Latino 
Representation.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34(3): 399–426. 
———. 2010. Latino Representation in State Houses and Congress. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Pres. 
Celis, Karen, Sarah Childs, Johanna Kantola, and Mona Lena Krook. 2008. 
“RETHINKING WOMEN’S SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION.” 
Representation 44(2): 99–110. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00344890802079573 (April 20, 2016). 
Center for American Women and Politics. 2012. Gender Differences in Voter Turnout. 
New Brunswick. 
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/genderdiff.pdf. 
———. 2016. Women in Elective Office 2016. New Brunswick, NJ. 
189 
 
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-elective-office-2016. 
Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. 2008. “Critical Mass Theory and Women’s 
Political Representation.” Political Studies 56: 725–36. 
Cornell, Stephen. 1996. “The Variable Ties That Bind: Content and Circumstance in 
Ethnic Processes.” Ethnic & Racial Studies 19(2): 265–89. 
Cowell-Meyers, Kimberly, and Laura Langbein. 2009. “Linking Women’s Descriptive 
and Substantive Representation in the United States.” Politics & Gender 5(04): 491. 
Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1989. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum (1): Article 8. 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf. 
———. 1993. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color.” Stanford Law Review 43: 1241–99. 
Crowley, Jocelyn Elise. 2004. “When Tokens Matter.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
29(1): 109–36. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3162/036298004X201113/abstract. 
Dahlerup, Drude. 2006. “Do Women Represent Women? Rethinking the ‘Critical Mass’ 
Debate.” Politics & Gender 2(4): 491–530. 
Dawson, Michael C. 1994. Behind the Mule : Race and Class in African-American 
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2001. Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political 
Ideologies. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/B/bo3628408.html. 
DeSipio, Louis. 1996. Counting on the Latino Vote : Latinos as a New Electorate. 
University Press of Virginia. 
Dodson, Debra L. 1998. “Representing Women’s Interests in the US House of 
Representatives.” In Women and Elective Office, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde 
Wilcox. London, UK: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2006. The Impact of Women in Congress. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dovi, Suzanne. 2002. “Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, 
Black, or Latino Do?” American Political Science Review 96(4): 729–43. 
DuBois, Ellen Carol. 1998. Woman Suffrage and Women’s Rights. New York: New York 
University Press. 
Duerst-Lahti. 2002. “Knowing Congress as a Gendered Institution.” In Women 
Transforming Congress, ed. Cindy Simon Rosenthal. Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press. 
Duerst-Lahti, Georgia, and Rita Mae Kelly, eds. 1995. Gender Power, Leadership, and 
190 
 
Governance. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
https://www.press.umich.edu/10376/gender_power_leadership_and_governance 
(June 22, 2016). 
Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C., and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, eds. 2014. 
Representation: The Case of Women. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/representation-
9780199340118?cc=us&lang=en&. 
Fenno, Richard F. Jr. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. London, UK: 
Longman Publishers. 
———. 2003. Going Home: Black Representatives and Their Constituents. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
http://www.bibliovault.org/BV.landing.epl?ISBN=9780226241319. 
Foster, Cariy Hayden. 2008. “The Welfare Queen: Race, Gender, Class, and Public 
Opinion.” Race, Gender & Class 15(3/4): 162–79. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41674659 (July 4, 2016). 
Fox, Richard L, and Jennifer L Lawless. 2010. “If Only They’d Ask: Gender, 
Recruitment, and Political Ambition.” The Journal of Politics 72(2): 310–26. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381609990752 (July 7, 2016). 
Fraga, Luis R., Linda Lopez, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Ricardo Ramirez. 2006. 
“Strategic Intersectionality: Gender, Ethnicity, and Political Incorporation.” Journal 
of Women, Politics & Policy 28(3-4): 121–45. 
———. 2007. “Representing Gender and Ethnicity: Patterns of Electoral Success and 
Legislative Advocacy among Latina Women in Four States.” In Intersectionality 
and Politics: Recent Research on Gender, Race, and Political Representation in the 
United States, ed. Carol Hardy-Fanta. New York: The Haworth Press. 
Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M Piscopo. 2008. “Gender Quotas and Women’s 
Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina.” Politics & Gender 4: 393–
425. 
Garcia Bedolla, Lisa. 2007. “Doing Intersectionality Research: From Conceptual Issues 
to Practical Examples Intersections of Inequality: Understanding Marginalization 
and Privilege in the Post-Civil Rights Era.” Politics & Gender 3(2): 232–48. 
Garcia Bedolla, Lisa, Katherine Tate, and Janelle Wong. 2005. “Indelible Effects: The 
Impact of Women of Color in the U.S. Congress.” In Women and Elective Office, 
eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 152–75. 
Garcia, John A. 1986. “The Voting Rights Act and Hispanic Political Representation in 
the Southwest.” Source: Publius 16(4): 49–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330158 
(June 12, 2016). 
Garcia, John A. 2012. Latino Politics in America. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
191 
 
Gay, Claudine. 2001. “The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political 
Participation.” American Political Science Review 95(3): 589–602. 
———. 2002. “Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the 
Relationship Between Citizens and Their Government.” American Journal of 
Political Science 46(4): 717–32. 
Gay, Claudine, and Katherine Tate. 1998. “Doubly Bound: The Impact of Gender and 
Race on the Politics of Black Women.” Source: Political Psychology 19(1): 169–84. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792120 (May 8, 2016). 
Githens, Marianne, and Jewel Limar Prestage, eds. 1977. A Portrait of Marginality: The 
Political Behavior of American Women. London: Longman Group UK. 
Gollob, Justin T. 2007. “Beyond the District: Extra-District Representation in State 
Legislatures.” Temple University. 
Gonzalez Juenke, Eric, and Robert R Preuhs. 2014. “Irreplaceable Legislators? 
Rethinking Minority Representatives in the New Century.” American Journal of 
Political Science 56(3): 705–15. 
Grose, Christian R. 2005. “Disentangling Constituency and Legislator Effects in 
Legislative Representation: Black Disentangling Constituency and Legislator 
Effects in Legislative Representation: Black Legislators or Black Districts?*.” Grose 
Source: Social Science Quarterly 86(2): 427–43. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42956072 (June 22, 2016). 
Grose, Christian R, Maruice Mangum, and Christopher Martin. 2007. “Race, Political 
Empowerment, and Constituency Service: Descriptive Representation and the 
Hiring of African-American Congressional Staff*.” Polity 39(4). 
Gurin, Patricia. 1985. “Women’s Gender Consciousness.” Public Opinion Quarterly 
49(2). 
Gurin, Patricia, and Aloen Townsend. 1986. “Properties of Gender Identity and Their 
Implications for Gender Consciousness.” British Journal of Social Psychology 
25(1): 139–48. 
Haider-Markel, Donald P. 2007a. “Representation and Backlash: The Positive and 
Negative Influence of Descriptive Representation.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
32(1): 107–32. 
———. 2007b. “Representation and Backlash: The Positive and Negative Influence of 
Descriptive Representation.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32(1): 107–33. 
Hamm, K. E., R. D. Hedlund, and S. S. Post. 2011. “Committee Specialization in U.S. 
State Legislatures during the 20th Century: Do Legislatures Tap the Talents of Their 
Members?” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 11(3): 299–324. 
http://spa.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1177/1532440011413082 (October 5, 2014). 
Hammond, Susan Webb. 2001. Congressional Caucuses in National Policymaking. 2nd 
ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
192 
 
Hancock, Ange-Marie. 2007. “Intersectionality as a Normative and Empirical Paradigm.” 
Politics & Gender 3(02): 41–45. 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1743923X07000062 (September 9, 
2014). 
Hansen, Susan B. 1997. “Talking About Politics: Gender and Contextual Effects on 
Political Proselytizing.” The Journal of Politics 59(1): 73–103. 
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.2307/2998216 (May 8, 2016). 
Harden, Jeffrey J. 2014. “Multidimensional Democracy : The Supply and Demand of 
Political Representation Multidimensional Democracy : The Supply and Demand of 
Political Representation.” 
Harden, Jeffrey J. 2013. “Multidimensional Responsiveness: The Determinants of 
Legislators’ Representational Priorities.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 38(2): 155–
84. http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/lsq.12009 (October 5, 2014). 
Hardy-Fanta, Carol, Pei-te Lien, Dianne M. Pinderhughes, and Christine Marie Sierra. 
2016. Contested Transformation Race, Gender, and Political Leadership in 21st 
Century America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-
relations/american-government-politics-and-policy/contested-transformation-race-
gender-and-political-leadership-21st-century-america?format=PB. 
Hawkesworth, Mary. 2003. “Congressional Enactments of Race – Gender : Toward a 
Theory of Raced – Gendered Institutions.” American Political Science Review 
97(4): 529–50. 
Haynie, Kerry L. 2002. “The Color of Their Skin or the Content of Their Behavior ? Race 
and Perceptions of African American Legislators.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
27(2): 295–314. 
Haynie, Kerry L. 2001. African American Legislators in the American States. New York: 
Columbia University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hayn10644. 
Hedlund, Ronald D. 1989. “Entering the Committee System: State Committee 
Assignments.” The Western Political Quarterly 42(4): 597–625. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/448645 (June 28, 2016). 
Henderson-King, Donna H, and Abigail J Stewart. 1994. “Women or Feminists? 
Assessing Women’s Group Consciousness.” Sex Roles 31(9/10): 505–16. 
Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 2004. “Minority Voices and Citizen Attitudes 
about Government Responsiveness in the American States: Do Social and 
Institutional Context Matter?” British Journal of Political Science 34(01): 109. 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123403000371 (May 8, 2016). 
Herrick, Rebekah. 2009. “The Effects of Sexual Orientation on State Legislators’ 
Behavior and Priorities.” Journal of Homosexuality 56(8): 1117–33. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19882430 (October 5, 2014). 
Hertzberg, Hazel. 1971. The Search for an American Indian Identity. Syracuse, NY: 
193 
 
Syracuse University Press. 
Hill Collins, Patricia. 1990. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the 
Politics of Empowerment. Boston: Unwin Hyman. http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/45a/252.html. 
Horse (Kiowa), Perry G. 2005. “Native American Identity.” New Directions for Student 
Services 2005(109): 61–68. http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/ss.154 (June 12, 2016). 
Htun, Mala. 2004. “From ‘Racial Democracy’ to Affirmative Action: Changing State 
Policy on Race in Brazil.” Latin American Research Review 39(1): 60–89. 
———. 2014. “Political Inclusion and Representation of Afrodescendant Women in 
Latin America.” In Representation: The Case of Women, eds. Maria Escobar- 
Lemmon and Michelle Taylor-Robinson. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Humes, Karen R., Nicholas A. Jones, and Roberto R. Ramirez. 2011. Overview of Race 
and Hispanic Origin: 2010 Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010. 
http://www.census.gov/population/race/. 
Hutchings, Vincent L, and Nicholas A Valentino. 2004. “The Centrality of Race in 
American Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 7: 383–408. 
Jewell, Malcolm E. 1983. “Legislator-Constituency Relations and the Representative 
Process.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 8(3): 303–37. 
Jick, Todd D. 1979. “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods : Triangulation in 
Action.” Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4): 602–11. 
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life : Skewed Sex 
Ratios and Responses to Token Women.” American Journal of Sociology 82(5): 
965–90. 
Kanthak, Kristin. 2009. “U.S. State Legislative Committee Assignments and 
Encouragement of Party Loyalty: An Exploratory Analysis.” State Politics and 
Policy Quarterly 9. 
Kanthak, Kristin, and George A. Krause. 2012. The Diversity Paradox. London, UK: 
Oxford University Press. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-diversity-
paradox-9780199891740?cc=us&lang=en&. 
Kathlene, Lyn. 1994. “Power and Influence in State Legislative Policymaking: The 
Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates.” American 
Political Science Review 88(3): 560–76. 
Kerr, Brinck, and Will Miller. 1997. “Latino Representation, It ’S Direct and Indirect.” 
American Journal of Political Science 41(3): 1066–71. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111688. 
Lawless, Jennifer L., and Richard L. Fox. 2005. It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don’t 
Run for Office. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Leech, Beth. 2002. “Interview Methods in Political Science.” PS: Political Science: 663–
194 
 
88. 
Leighley, Jan E, and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. “Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: 
Competing Models and Contrasting.” The Journal of Politics 61(4): 1092–1114. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647555 (June 22, 2016). 
Lieb, David A. 2016. “DIVIDED AMERICA : Minorities Missing in Many 
Legislatures.” Associated Press. 
http://bigstory.ap.org/4c6c0cf4d1aa4c8eba374876b8a24533. 
Lopez, Linda, and Adrian D. Pantoja. 2004. “Beyond Black and White: General Support 
for Race-Conscious Policies Among African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans 
and Whites.” Political Research Quarterly 57(4): 633–42. 
http://prq.sagepub.com/content/57/4/633\nhttp://prq.sagepub.com/content/57/4/633.s
hort. 
Maestas, C., G. W. Neeley, and L. E. Richardson. 2003. “The State of Surveying 
Legislators: Dilemmas and Suggestions.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 3(1): 
90–108. http://spa.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1177/153244000300300104 (October 
5, 2014). 
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent 
Women? A Contingent ‘Yes.’” The Journal of Politics 61(03): 628–57. 
———. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” American Political Science Review 97(4): 
515–28. 
Manuel, Tiffany. 2006. “Envisioning the Possibilities for a Good Life: Exploring the 
Public Policy Implications of Intersectionality Theory.” Journal of Women Politics 
& Policy 284(3): 173–203. http://jwpp.haworthpress.com (June 22, 2016). 
Marin Hellwege, Julia, and Christine Marie Sierra. 2016. “Advantage and Disadvantages 
for Latina Officeholders: The Case of New Mexico.” In Latinas in American 
Politics: Changing and Embracing Political Tradition, eds. Sharon A. Navarro, 
Samantha L. Hernandez, and Leslie A. Navarro. Lanham, MD. 
Masuoka, Natalie. 2006. “Together They Become One: Examining the Predictors of 
Panethnic Group Consciousness among Asian Americans and Latinos.” Social 
Science Quarterly 87(5): 993–1011. 
Masuoka, Natalie, and Jane Junn. 2013. The Politics of Belonging : Race, Public 
Opinion, and Immigration. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo16095740.html. 
Mayan, Maria. 2009. The Essentials of Qualitative Inquiry. Walnut Creek, CA: LeftCoast 
Press. 
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
McCool, Daniel, Susan M. Olson, and Jennifer L. Robinson. 2002. Native Vote: 
American Indians, the Voting Rights Act, and the Right to Vote. Cambridge, UK: 
195 
 
Cambridge University Press. 
McGuire, William J., and Alice Padawer-Singer. 1976. “Trait Salience in the 
Spontaneous Self-Concept.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 33(6): 
743–54. 
Mehra, Ajay, Martin Kilduff, and Daniel J Brass. 1998a. “At the Margins: A 
Distinctiveness Approach to the Social Identity and Social Networks of.” Source: 
The Academy of Management Journal 41(4): 441–52. 
Mehra, Ajay, Martin Kilduff, and Daniel J. Brass. 1998b. “At the Margins: A 
Distinctiveness Approach to the Social Identity and Social Networks of 
Underrepresented Groups.” Academy of Management Journal 41(4): 441–52. 
Mendelberg, Tali, Christopher F Karpowitz, and Nicholas Goedert. 2014a. “Does 
Descriptive Representation Facilitate Women’s Distinctive Voice? How Gender 
Composition and Decision Rules Affect Deliberation.” American Journal of 
Political Science 58(2): 291–306. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24363486 (June 22, 
2016). 
Mendelberg, Tali, Christopher F. Karpowitz, and Nicholas Goedert. 2014b. “Does 
Descriptive Representation Facilitate Women’s Distinctive Voice? How Gender 
Composition and Decision Rules Affect Deliberation.” American Journal of 
Political Science 58(2): 291–306. 
Mendez, Matthew S., and Christian R. Grose. 2014. “Revealing Discriminatory Intent: 
Legislator Preferences, Voter Identification, and Responsiveness Bias.” 
Michele Swers. 2001. “Understanding the Policy Impact of Electing Women: Evidence 
from Research on Congress and State Legislatures.” PS: Political Science and 
Politics 34(2): 217–20. 
———. 2002. The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Miller, Arthur H, Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk. 1981. “Group 
Consciousness and Political Participation.” American Journal of Political Science 
25(3): 494–511. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110816 (June 22, 2016). 
Minta, Michael D. 2009. “Legislative Oversight and the Substantive Representation of 
Black and Latino Interests in Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34(2): 193–
218. http://doi.wiley.com/10.3162/036298009788314336. 
———. 2011. Oversight Representing the Interests of Blacks and Latinos in Congress. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2012a. “Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Political Representation in the United 
States.” Politics & Gender 8(04): 541–47. 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1743923X12000578 (June 12, 2016). 
———. 2012b. “Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Political Representation in the United 
States.” Politics & Gender 8(04): 541–47. 
196 
 
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-
84871215533&partnerID=tZOtx3y1. 
Navarro, Sharon A., Samantha L. Hernandez, and A. Navarro, Leslie, eds. 2016. Latinas 
in American Politics: Changing and Embracing Political Tradition. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books. 
Norrander, B., and S. Manzano. 2010. “Minority Group Opinion in the U.S. States.” State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly 10(4): 446–83. 
http://spa.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1177/153244001001000408 (October 5, 
2014). 
Norris, Pippa. 1997. “The Puzzle of Constituency Service.” Journal of Legislative Studies 
3(2): 29–49. 
“Numbers and Beyond: The Relevance of Critical Mass in Gender Research.” 2006. 
Grey, Sandra 2: 491–530. 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Harvard University Press. 
Orey, Byron D’Andra, L. Marvin Overby, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2007. “African-
American Committee Chairs in U.S. State Legislatures.” Social Science Quarterly 
88(3): 619–39. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42956214 (June 28, 2016). 
Orey, Byron D’Andra, Wendy Smooth, Kimberly S. Adams, and Kisha Harris-Clark. 
2006. “Race and Gender Matter: Refining Models of Legislative Policy Making in 
State Legislatures.” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 28(3-4): 97–119. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J501v28n03_05 (June 29, 2016). 
Orum, Anthony M, Roberta S Cohen, Sherri Grasmuck, and Amy W Orum. 1974. “Sex, 
Socialization and Politics.” American Sociological Review Texas American 
Sociological Review 39(39): 197–209. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094232 (June 
22, 2016). 
Osborn, Tracy. 2012. How Women Represent Women. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845347.001.0
001/acprof-9780199845347. 
Osborn, Tracy, and Jeanette Morehouse Mendez. 2010. “Speaking as Women: Women 
and Floor Speeches in the Senate.” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 31(May 
2014): 1–21. 
Pantoja, Adrian D, and Gary M Segura. 2003. “Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive 
Representation in Legislatures and Political Alienation Does Ethnicity Matter? 
Descriptive Representation in Legislatures and Political Alienation Among 
Latinos*.” Social Science Quarterly 84(2): 441–60. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42955880 (May 8, 2016). 
Pelissero, John P, and Timothy B Krebs. 1997. “City Council Legislative Committees 
and Policy-Making in Large United States Cities.” American Journal of Political 
Science 41(2): 499–518. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111774 (July 7, 2016). 
197 
 
Piscopo, J. M. 2011. “Rethinking Descriptive Representation: Rendering Women in 
Legislative Debates.” Parliamentary Affairs 64(3): 448–72. 
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/pa/gsq061 (May 8, 2016). 
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Preuhs, R. R. 2005. “Descriptive Representation, Legislative Leadership, and Direct 
Democracy: Latino Influence on English Only Laws in the States, 1984-2002.” State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly 5(3): 203–24. 
http://spa.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1177/153244000500500301 (October 5, 
2014). 
Preuhs, R. R., and E. Gonzalez Juenke. 2011. “Latino U.S. State Legislators in the 1990s: 
Majority-Minority Districts, Minority Incorporation, and Institutional Position.” 
State Politics & Policy Quarterly 11(1): 48–75. 
http://spa.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1177/1532440010387399 (October 5, 2014). 
Preuhs, Robert R. 2006a. “The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive 
Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States.” 
68(3): 585–99. 
———. 2006b. “The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation: Black 
Legislators and Policy Influence in the The Conditional Effects of Minority 
Descriptive Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American 
States.” The Journal of Politics 68(3): 585–99. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00447.x (June 22, 2016). 
Ravitz, Jessica. 2015. “Women in the World: Where the U.S. Falters in Quest for 
Equality.” CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/16/us/american-women-world-
rankings/. 
Rehfeld, Andrew. 2005. The Concept of Constituency Political Representation, 
Democratic Legitimacy, and Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. www.cambridge.org (June 22, 2016). 
Reingold, Beth. 1992. “Concepts of Representation Among Female and Male State 
Legislators.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17(4): 509–37. 
———. 1996. “Conflict and Cooperation : Legislative Strategies and Concepts of Power 
among Female and Male State Legislators.” The Journal of Politics 58(2): 464–85. 
———. 2000. Representing Women: Sex, Gender, and Legislative Behavior in Arizona 
and California. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. 
Reingold, Beth, and Kerry L Haynie. 2013. Representing Women’s Interests and 
Intersections of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity in U.S. State Legislatures. 
Reingold, Beth, and Kerry L. Haynie. 2014. “Representing Women’s Intersts and 
Intersections of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity in US State Legislatures.” In 
Representation: The Case of Women, eds. Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon and Michelle 
M. Taylor-Robinson. Aust: University of Texas Press. 
198 
 
Reingold, Beth, and Michele Swers. 2011. “An Endogenous Approach to Women’s 
Interests: When Interests Are Interesting in and of Themselves.” Politics & Gender 
7(03): 429–35. 
Richards, Lyn, and Janice M. Morse. 2007. Users Guide to Qualitative Methods. 2nd ed. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Rocca, M. S., and G. R. Sanchez. 2008. “The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on Bill 
Sponsorship and Cosponsorship in Congress.” American Politics Research 36(1): 
130–52. http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1532673X07306357 (October 5, 
2014). 
Rocca, Michael S, and Gabriel R Sanchez. 2008. “The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on 
Bill Sponsorship and Cosponsorship in Congress.” American Politics Research 
36(1): 130–52. http://apr.sagepub.com (May 8, 2016). 
Rosenthal, Alan. 1990. Governors and Legislatures: Contending Powers. Washington, 
DC: CQ Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152201?origin=crossref. 
Rosenthal, Cindy Simon. 2001. “Gender Styles in State Legislative Committees Gender 
Styles in State Legislative Committees : Raising Their Voices in Resolving 
Conflict.” Women & Politics 21(2): 21–45. 
———. 2002. Women Transforming Congress. University of Oklahoma Press. 
Saint-Germain, Michelle A. 1989. “Does Their Difference Make a Difference? The 
Impact of Women on Public Policy in Arizona Legislature.” Social Science 
Quarterly 70(4): 1–15. 
Sampaio, Anna. 2014. “Latinas and Electoral Politics: Expanding Participation and 
Power in State and National Elections.” In Gender & Elections, eds. Susan J. Carroll 
and Richard L. Fox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sanchez, G. R. 2006. “The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Public Opinion.” 
Political Research Quarterly 59(3): 435–46. 
http://prq.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/106591290605900311 (October 5, 2014). 
Sanchez, G. R., and N. Masuoka. 2010. “Brown-Utility Heuristic? The Presence and 
Contributing Factors of Latino Linked Fate.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral 
Sciences 32(4): 519–31. http://hjb.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0739986310383129 
(October 5, 2014). 
Sanchez, Gabriel R. 2006. “The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation 
Among Latinos in the United States.” American Politics Research: 427–50. 
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2010. Political Power and Women’s Representation in Latin 
America. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199731954.001.0
001/acprof-9780199731954. 
Scola, Becki. 2014. Gender, Race, and Office Holding in the United States: 
Representation at the Intersections (Paperback) - Routledge. Abingdon, UK: 
199 
 
Routledge. 
Sierra Leonard, Ana, Ajay Mehra, and Ralph Katerberg. 2008. “The Social Identity and 
Social Networks of Ethnic Minority Groups in Organizations: A Crucial Test of 
Distinctiveness Theory The Social Identity and Social Networks of Ethnic Minority 
Groups in Organizations: A Crucial Test of Distinctiveness theory14.” Journal of 
Organizational Behavior 29(29): 573–89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30162648 
(June 13, 2016). 
Sierra, Christine Marie. 2010. “Latinas and Electoral Politics: Movin’ On Up.” In Gender 
& Elections, eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Simrell King, Cheryl. 1995. “Sex-Role Identity and Decision Styles: How Gender Helps 
Explain the Paucity of Women at the Top.” In Gender Power, Leadership, and 
Governance, eds. Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita Mae Kelly. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Smith, Michael A. 2003. Bringing Representation Home: State Legislators among Their 
Constituencies. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. 
Smooth, Wendy. 2006. “Intersectionality in Electoral Politics: A Mess Worth Making.” 
Politics & Gender 2(3): 400–414. 
———. 2010. “African American Women and Electoral Politics: A Challenge to the 
Post-Race Rhetoric of the Obama Moment.” In Gender & Elections, eds. Susan J. 
Carroll and Richard L. Fox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2011. “Standing for Women? Which Women? The Substantive Representation 
of Women’s Interests and the Research Imperative of Intersectionality.” Politics & 
Gender 7(03): 436–41. 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1743923X11000225 (October 5, 
2014). 
———. 2014. “African- American Women and Electoral Politics: Translating Voting 
Power into Officeholding.” In Gender & Elections, eds. Susan J. Carroll and 
Richard L. Fox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Squire, P. 2007. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index 
Revisited.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 7(2): 211–27. 
Stichman, Amy J., Kimberly D. Hassell, and Carol A. Archbold. 2010. “Strength in 
Numbers? A Test of Kanter’s Theory of Tokenism.” Journal of Criminal Justice 
38(4): 633–39. 
Swain, Carol M. (Carol Miller). 1995. Black Faces, Black Interests : The Representation 
of African Americans in Congress. Harvard University Press. 
Swers, Michele L. 2005. “Connecting Descriptive and Substantive Representation: An 
Analysis of Sex Differences in Cosponsorship Activity.” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 30(3): 407–33. 
200 
 
Swers, Michele L. 2002. The Difference Women Make : The Policy Impact of Women in 
Congress. University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2013. Women in the Club. University of Chicago Press. 
http://www.bibliovault.org/BV.landing.epl?ISBN=9780226022826 (June 21, 2016). 
———. 2016. “Pursuing Women’s Interests in Partisan Times: Explaining Gender 
Differences in Legislative Activity on Health, Education, and Women’s Health 
Issues.” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 37(3): 249–73. 
Takash, Paule Cruz. 1993. “Barriers Breaking To Representation : Chicana / Latina 
Elected Officials In California.” Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural 
Systems and World Economic Development 22(3/4): 325–60. 
Tate, Katherine. 2001. “The Political Representation of Blacks in Congress: Does Race 
Matter?” Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly 26(4): 623–38. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/440272 (May 30, 2016). 
———. 2003. Black Faces in the Mirror : African Americans and Their Representatives 
in the U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Thomas, S., and S. Welch. 1991. “The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities of 
State Legislators.” The Western Political Quarterly 44(2): 445–56. 
Thomas, Sue. 1991a. “The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies.” The Journal 
of Politics 53(04): 958. 
———. 1991b. “The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies.” The Journal of 
Politics 53(4): 958–76. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131862 (June 22, 2016). 
———. 1994. How Women Legislate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Thomas, Sue, and Susan Welch. 1991. “The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities 
of State Legislators.” The Western Political Quarterly 44(2): 445–56. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/448788 (June 22, 2016). 
Tolleson-Rinehart, Sue. 1994. “The California Senate Races: A Case Study in the 
Gendered Paradoxes of Politics.” In The Year of the Woman: Myths and Realities, 
eds. Elizabeth Adell Cook, Sue Thomas, and Clyde Wilcox. Westview Press. 
Trainor, Chris. 2016. “Women Are Few and Far Between in the State Legislature--And 
That’s a Problem.” Free Times. http://www.free-times.com/cover/women-are-few-
and-far-between-in-the-state-legislature-and-thats-040115. 
Tremblay, Manon. 2006. “The Substantive Representation of Women and PR: Some 
Reflections on the Role of Surrogate Representation and Critical Mass.” Politics & 
Gender 2: 491–530. 
Uhlaner, Carole Jean, and Becki Scola. 2016. “Collective Representation as a Mobilizer: 
Race/Ethnicity, Gender, and Their Intersections at the State Level.” State Politics & 
Policy Quarterly 16(2): 227–63. 
Weinraub, Marsha et al. 1984. “The Development of Sex Role Stereotypes in the Third 
201 
 
Year: Relationships to Gender Labeling, Gender Identity, Sex-Types Toy 
Preference, and Family Characteristics.” Child Development 55(4): 1493–1503. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1130019 (June 13, 2016). 
Weissberg, Robert. 1978. “Collective vs Dyadic Representation in Congress.” American 
Political Science Review 72(2): 535–47. 
Werner, Emmy E. 1968. “Women in the State Legislatures.” The Western Political 
Quarterly 21(1): 40–50. 
Whitby, Kenny J. 1997. The Color of Representation: Congressional Behavior and Black 
Interests. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Wolbrecht, Christina, Karen Beckwith, and Lisa Baldez, eds. 2008. Political Women and 
American Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
www.cambridge.org (July 4, 2016). 
 
